Distorted Security Discourses

The ROK's Securitisation of the Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2003–2013

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Abstract

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Keywords: securitisation, security discourse, discursive chasms, North Korea's nuclear threat, South Korea, Roh Moo-Hyun, Lee Myung-Bak

South Korea's security discourse on the nuclear threat posed by North Korea has been dichotomised by its position within the political spectrum between the progressives and conservatives. By drawing upon Securitisation Theory (ST), this study challenges the current security discourse in South Korea, which has divided and misled the public as well as securitising actors. This study examines the security discourses of the Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) and Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) administrations, since they represent the archetypes of the progressives and conservatives respectively. The results of the analysis suggest that the current security discourses that have been prevalent in South Korea do not correspond with reality and, subsequently, the discourses were not able to deal with real challenges that the nuclear threat posed. This research also explains the root cause of the distorted security discourses by applying a 'discursive chasm' as a preliminary concept, which indicates a discursive structure that fundamentally impedes the performance of securitising actors' articulation, and that distorts the discursive formation (securitisation processes). The chasms consist of three elusive discourses: first, a discourse on threats that cannot simply be said to be either imminent or not imminent (nuclear weapons as materiality and discourse); second, a discourse on the *other* that cannot easily be defined (the difficulty of representation of North Korea); and third, a discourse on measures that cannot easily be realised (intangible extraordinary measures).

Acknowledgements

The work on this thesis started in 2009 when I was accredited to the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea. I wrote articles in relation to North Korea's nuclear issues almost every day for over three years and, in general, the articles were based upon daily briefings, formal interviews, informal meetings with government officials, and so forth. It was invaluable in that not only could I access policymakers in a relatively easy fashion on a daily basis, but I could witness how the government's wording was made and how influential its message was when the public received it. In that sense, this thesis has been a journey to reconstruct a security discourse of South Korea from fragmentary messages and wordings. It has also been an academically joyous journey in that although the initial motivation of this research emanated from the issues of the Korean peninsula and East Asia, it has benefited from modern Western ideas and thoughts relevant to security studies.

This journey could not have been possible without the cordiality of many people. Firstly, Prof. Christoph Bluth and Prof. Owen Greene, my supervisors, deserve a great deal of thanks for providing me with guidance and support. Besides my supervisors, this page would be incomplete without a mention of my thesis committee: Dr John Nilsson-Wright, Dr Simon Whitby and Dr Bryan McIntosh. I also would like to express my sincere gratitude to my interviewees. Had they not openly shared their experiences and insights, there would not be a thesis. However, since many of the interviews were carried out on condition of anonymity, I will refrain from mentioning their names. Special thanks goes to the British International Studies Association, which assisted me with the final write up cost. My sincere thanks also goes to the Daily NK, which is one of the most important online newspapers focusing on North Korea, as it provided me with an opportunity to join their team while I was in South Korea for my field research. I want to thank Prof. Kang Sung-Hack at the Korea University, Dr Cheong Seong-Chang at the Sejong Institute and Dr Neil Winn at the University of Leeds, all of whom gave me the chance to explore my further academic journey in the UK. Special thanks too to my parents, sister and to my wife, Sang Hee, for providing me with tireless support and prayers.

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Abbreviations

AF	Geneva Agreed Framework
BDA	Banco Delta Asia
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CS	Copenhagen School
CVID	Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement of the DPRK's nuclear weapons programme
DA	Discourse Analysis
DMZ	Demilitarised Zone (between North and South Korea)
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea; North Korea
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GIC	Gaeseong Industrial Complex
HEU	Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IECA	Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act
IPUS	Institute for Peace and Unification Studies
IR	International Relations
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation
KINU	Korea Institute for National Unification
LWR	Light-water Reactor
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NKPA	North Korean People's Army
NKWP	North Korean Worker's Party
NLL	Northern Limit Line
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA	National Security Act of South Korea
NSC	National Security Council of South Korea
NSS	Nuclear Security Summit
OPCON	Wartime Operational Control
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
ROK	Republic of Korea; South Korea
SPT	Six-Party Talks
ST	Securitisation Theory

UAE	United Arab Emirates
UEP	Uranium Enrichment Programme
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USFK	United States Forces Korea
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

PART I. Conceptualising Security Discourse

1.
Introduction

1.1 Does today's discourse reflect reality?

1.1.1 Today's security discourse

As far as the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula is concerned, the security discourse of the Republic of Korea (ROK: South Korea) has always been split into two political spectrums: conservatives and progressives (or liberals). The conservatives have generally insisted that true peace is not possible unless the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK: North Korea) relinquishes its nuclear programme. They have argued that the nuclear issue must be given top priority in terms of inter-Korean relations, otherwise all efforts to make overtures to the DPRK will come to naught (Kim 2005; Cheon 2008; Park 2010; Kang 2011; Jang 2014; Terry 2014). On the other hand, the progressive bloc has often argued that it would be possible to solve the DPRK's nuclear issue while at the same time improving inter-Korean relations through the process of dialogue and cooperation (Smith 2000; Bleiker 2001; Bleiker 2005; Fuqua 2007; Hoare 2008; Moon 2012; Delury and Moon 2014).

We all know from the experiences of the last couple of decades that the ROK's North Korea policies, irrespective of whether they were based on conservative or progressive values, were not that successful in solving the DPRK's nuclear issues (Gladstone 2016; Perry 2016; Samore 2016). However, it is also true that the ROK's discourse has been seriously affected by the dichotomous viewpoints and, accordingly, each political group has tried to win over the populace by arguing that their own policy is better. For instance, the Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) administrations are said to be progressive, whereas the Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) administrations are regarded as conservative. In other words, at least at a discursive level, for nearly two decades, South Korean audiences have been exposed to the competing discourses on finding a solution to the DPRK's nuclear issues.



Figure 1.1 The ROK's security discourse

The conservative government argued that their own security discourses focused solely upon the nuclear issues, while stigmatising the progressive regime as policymakers that virtually desecuritised the DPRK's nuclear threat (Kim 2007; Ha 2013). On the contrary, the progressive side criticised the conservative camp for abandoning peaceful inter-Korean relations while being bent on securitising the DPRK's nuclear weapons (Moon 2012; Paik 2013; Lee 2014b). What is interesting is that the progressives' propensity to underline the importance of dialogue or reconciliation between the two Koreas has allowed them to be seen as pacifists or doves (Likewise, the conservatives can be seen as confrontationists or hawks). Another point is that even though neither political camp was able to show compelling security discourse that could denuclearise the DPRK, at least conservatives could argue that they prioritised the nuclear problem while progressives pushed it aside (MoU 2011; Ha 2013). To summarise, Seoul's policies towards Pyongyang is one of the most important standards that makes a division between the conservatives and progressives and, accordingly, when it comes to security discourse in South Korea, the 'left-right' political structure has been robust and prevalent (KINU 2013b) (Figure 1.1).[1]

It would not be easy to succinctly define the words conservatism and progressivism in the political philosophy sense. However, both, as political ideologies, represent the ideas of the political elites (Heywood 2012). From this vantage point, the respective origins of such ideologies can be found by identifying some important political figures. As far as North Korean issues are

[1] Even Ahn Cheol-soo, one of the main progressive leaders regarded as a probable candidate in the future South Korean presidential race, argued that he has 'economic progressivism and national security conservatism' (Lee 2011d). This clearly shows the strength of today's security discourse in the ROK.

concerned, modern acceptance of the words conservatism and progressivism used in South Korean society dates back to the 1940s, during which time the Korean peninsula was divided. The Koreans in the north, the Soviet-sheltered regime, sought communist revolution in the south and unification under the communist flag. The Korean War (1950–1953) was the culmination of the effort. Against this backdrop, and since Rhee Syngman (1948–1960), the first president of the ROK, ROK conservatism has been firmly based on anticommunism. During Rhee's presidency, the term 'peaceful unification' was deemed to be pro-communist ideology. Rhee himself actively sought to liberate the north by force before and during the Korean War (Stone 1952; Shin 2006).

While Rhee represents the contemporary origin of the conservatism of the ROK, Cho Bong-am, the former leader of the Progressive (*Jinbo*) Party, is seen as the root of progressivism in terms of inter-Korean relations. Rhee regarded him as the most dangerous political rival, particularly after Cho earned over 30 per cent of the vote in the third South Korean presidential election in 1956. In 1959, Cho was executed on charges of espionage and conspiring with the DPRK. However, 52 years later, in 2011, the South Korean Supreme Court vindicated Cho by overruling the death sentence, saying that 'Cho played a crucial role in shaping [the ROK's] progressive politics. The *Jinbo* Party … cannot be seen as a political party established to overthrow the nation' (Kim 2011). Even though Cho's peaceful unification policy could not be anchored in the ROK security discourse at the time, even among the centrist party leaders (Kim 2016), the principle of peaceful unification now became the central tenet of Seoul's North Korea policy, irrespective of the political spectrum.

Today's security discourse and the cases of Rhee and Cho show that there are at least two traits of the ROK's security discourse on the DPRK. First, to reiterate, Seoul's security discourse has always revolved around the threat posed by North Korea. Within this context, conservativism has stood for anticommunism (*Ban-gong* or *Myeol-gong*), whereas the word progressivism was used to symbolise the 'pro-North leftist' (*Chinbuk Jwapa*). Second, in most cases, conservativism has generally adopted an aggressive posture on progressivism within the context of South Korean security discourse. Ever since the Korean War, which 'resolved nothing; only the status quo ante had been restored' (Cumings 1989: xix), a negative image of North Korea as a sworn enemy has been

reinforced by Pyongyang's successive provocative actions, including the Rangoon bombing in 1983, the bombing of KAL (Korean Air) Flight 858 in 1987 and the shelling of *Yeonpyeong* Island in 2010, just to name a few.[2] Given these circumstances, it seems natural that conservatism has been central to South Korea's security discourse.

1.1.2 The purpose and scope of the thesis

Mere facts themselves cannot be altered. However, what are portrayed as facts are not always facts, particularly when they are linked to discourses. This is because, as Terrell Carver (cited in Pierce 2008: 279) pointed out, discourse is 'a representation of what we want the world to be like, rather than a representation of how the world is'.[3] Therefore, it would be natural to think that decision-makers could manoeuvre facts and convey them to the public by way of discourses in order to strengthen their political power (Howarth et al. 2000; Van Dijk 2009). It is often said that political actors are responding not only to given objective information regarding an issue, but also to some pre-existing images. In other words, they deal with information using their own cognitive structure or identities. Therefore, the same phenomenon can be differently construed. (Boulding 1959; Holsti 1962; Jervis 1976; Mercer 2005; Mercer 2010).

This 'fact-discourse' logic offers us an opportunity to have reasonable suspicions as to whether today's discourse entirely reflects reality. Given that the DPRK's nuclear issue is too important to be addressed with such a dichotomous perspective, a discourse analysis (DA) based on a critical viewpoint, appears essential. In light of this, it seems reasonable that the common discursive ground that each political bloc shares with each other must come to the fore together with differences. From a practical viewpoint, a critical analysis of discourse on the Korean Nuclear Crisis could shed light on the real mechanism of convergence and divergence of such discourse. In this way, DA could be a cornerstone, laying the foundation for more durable and less incompatible discourse. What should be

[2] On 9 October 1983, North Korea failed to murder South Korea's president Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1988) while he was visiting Burma. Instead, several South Korean cabinet members, presidential advisers and ambassadors were killed by an explosion. On 29 November 1987, KAL 858 was destroyed in mid-air on its way from Abu Dhabi to Seoul after two highly trained North Korean espionage agents planted a powerful bomb inside the aircraft. The 115 victims were mostly young South Korean men. The *Yeonpyeong* incident will be discussed later.
[3] The concept of discourse will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

done first and foremost then is to draw the contour of each bloc's discursive configuration with the help of more sophisticated theoretical and methodological instruments.

However, the aim of this thesis is not to reveal a fundamental reason for policymakers' differing perceptions of threat, as that could only be achieved using rigorous political psychology. This study aims to make the seemingly disparate security discourses of the ROK administrations between the conservatives and progressives understood more clearly. The security discourse of the South Korean policymakers will be delineated in this thesis by means of DA and pertinent methods.[4] Here is what needs to be more carefully considered and what seems to be more important: in the process of political justification by way of discourses, one might find some contradictory or distorted points from each administration's position on the issue of security, and we might also discover some cases in which the discourses have been blurring or trespassing on the other's discursive domain. Even policymakers could not be aware of such discursive inconsistency. Eventually, these things need to be proven by carrying out a practical analysis, so that one can discover to what extent today's security discourse reflects reality.

This study delimits the analytical scope into the Roh Moo-hyun (Roh) and Lee Myung-bak (Lee) administrations. The reasons for this are as follows: firstly, when it comes to inter-Korean relations, the two administrations ideally represent the progressive and conservative political entities, respectively. Although the Kim Dae-jung and Park Geun-hye administrations might also represent the progressive and conservative blocs, given that President Kim Dae-jung was under relatively less pressure from the nuclear issue because he was able to bask in the post-Geneva Agreed Framework (AF)[5] period for most of his tenure, and that President Park Geun-hye is still incumbent at the time of writing, dealing with Presidents Roh and Lee would accord with a clear time frame for the thesis. In the case of President Kim Young-sam (1993–1998), many experts still have doubts about his real ideological disposition because he vacillated greatly between the conservatives and progressives in terms of inter-Korean relations (Lee 2004; Lee 2012a; Han 2013; Byeon 2014).

[4] The methods and methodology will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
[5] For the contents of the AF, see Chapter 4.

Secondly, and more importantly, one should narrow the scope of the research to make the method operational so that researchers can find appropriate numbers of sources with which to address analytical concerns. Narrowing down research problems and analysing a small dataset are essential (Schneider 2013b; Silverman 2013). Nonetheless, the scope of this thesis does not mean that it excludes discursive sources of other periods that have impacted on relevant issues; broad contexts and related discourses may be needed occasionally.

1.2 Conceptual framework: securitisation

1.2.1 Why Securitisation Theory and what is it?

This study began with the current narratives of the DRPK's nuclear issue: the ROK's security discourse that has been prevalent on the one hand, and the ROK's unsuccessful North Korea policies on the other. Then, the underlying questions that need to be taken into account may be as follows: in order to be sustainable, to what extent have recent ROK administrations' 'securitised' discourses on the DPRK been adequately consistent with reality? Why have neither perspectives—conservatives or progressives—been successful in deterring Pyongyang from developing its nuclear capabilities? If the two perspectives' security discourses are different, to what extent, and in what ways, are they different? What if the discursive differences between the two are unclear? Which analytical or practical points should be addressed in that case? By delving into each political bloc's discourse, the reality and limitation of the ROK's security discourse could be revealed. In that case, the security discourse of each administration might not be as consistent as expected.

Against this backdrop, this research adopts Securitisation Theory (ST) as a conceptual framework for analysis of the ROK security discourses.[6] There are two reasons for this. One is for methodological appropriateness, and the other is for theoretical application. With regard to the methodological concerns, as this thesis focuses on the role of discourses and the agents who made such discourses, the discursive concepts, such as speech acts, ideas and language

[6] ST will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Therefore this chapter briefly deals with its concept and the context in which it will be used in the thesis.

should be central to the process of analysis. In this sense, ST appears optimal in that its core argument is that a form of security is discursively constructed (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan and Hansen 2009). According to ST, 'security has a particular discursive and political force and is a concept that does something rather than an objective condition' (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 213–214). Given that methodology 'sits between broader theoretical debates and actual hands-on research work' (Schneider 2014), ST seems an appropriate theory that fits in with DA as methods.

In terms of theoretical application, this research could enlarge the scope of ST. ST is still evolving as a security concept on the one hand; at the same time, however, ST has built its own territory upon the field of security studies, and has provided considerable insights into contemporary studies as an alternative framework (Balzacq 2011; Stritzel 2012; Donnelly 2013; Bourne 2014; Stritzel 2014).

With regard to theoretical application of the ROK security discourse, a number of studies have been concerned with the ROK governments' security perceptions of the DPRK's nuclear issues, but most seem predicated on the assumption that the perception could be separated by the conservative-progressive division.[7] Apart from researchers who used the traditional International Relations (IR) theories, such as realism and liberalism, several attempts applying constructivism as a theoretical tool have also been developed based on the previous dichotomy (Son 2006; Kim and Lee 2011; Kim 2012; Paik 2013). From the theoretical point of view, this research applies and challenges ST. This study applies ST to the ROK's security discourse case by means of DA, aiming to analyse the two administrations' discourses while keeping its distance from the ideological stereotype. At the same time, this study challenges ST by investigating its utility as a theoretical framework.

The concept of securitisation is derived from the so-called 'Copenhagen School' (CS). According to the CS, securitisation refers to the discursive construction of threat. Put differently, it refers to 'the articulation of an existential threat that requires urgent action' (Bourne 2014: 271). The CS argued that security is a speech act by saying security; that is to say, to block a threatening development, a state representative claims the right to use extraordinary means by declaring an emergency condition. In sum, security cannot be defined in

[7] For the literature review regarding theoretical viewpoints, see Chapter 2.



NON-POLITICISED	POLITICISED	SECURITISED
• The state does not cope with the issue • The issue is not included in the public debate	• The issue is managed within the standard political system • It is 'part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations, or more rarely some form of communal governance' (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998: 23)	• The issue is framed as a security question through an act of securitisation • A securitising actor articulates an already politicised issue as an existential threat to a referent object

Source: Emmers, R. (2007). Securitization. *Contemporary Security Studies*, p. 112.

Figure 1.2 Securitisation spectrum

objective terms; therefore, it is a self-referential practice (Buzan and Hansen 2009). This is why ST is known for its speech act concept from the viewpoint of language theory. A discursive approach on security differs from an objective conception that regards the absence of concrete threats as important. In this light, the CS offered a constructivist counterpoint to the materialist threat analysis (Buzan and Hansen 2009).

ST sees securitisation as 'a more extreme version of politicisation' (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). The CS categorised public issues into three main types. In the non-politicised stage, the issue is not under the spotlight because policymakers do not manage it. However, government decision and political resource allocations are needed if the issue is politicised. In the securitised stage, the issue requires emergency measures and justifies governmental actions that are not possible within the normal purview of the political procedure (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24) (Figure 1.2).

There are several key components in ST. Firstly, a speech act is made by a *securitising actor* who 'securitise[s] issues by declaring something existentially threatened' (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 36). It can be said that securitising actors include heads of state, governments, political opposition parties, the media, pressure groups, and so on, although a practical range of analytical focus can vary. Secondly, a securitising actor creates a securitising move by declaring something an *existential threat*. Thirdly, a perceived existential threat must be countered by *extraordinary measures* (Salter and Mutlu 2013b). Lastly, a

securitising actor takes extraordinary measures in order to protect some important principles. These principles could vary with the occasion. In most cases, particularly in relation to the political and military security sectors, the principles might be the state's sovereignty or state itself. The CS recognises the principles as *referent objects*: 'things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival' (Buzan et al. 1998: 23–24). In sum, ST argues that something becomes a security problem through a securitising actor's discursive practice because the actor considers it an emergency condition that could threaten important principles.

1.2.2 How does Securitisation Theory work in the ROK context?

Let us return to the practical issues: the ways the ROK has described the DPRK's nuclear issues. This may not be that simple, because the issue is inextricably bound up with the ROK's representation of the DPRK, as well as its perception of nuclear threat itself. For instance, Seoul's policymakers have to ask themselves the following questions when dealing with Pyongyang's nuclear problem: what is North Korea? How should it be defined? Is it our enemy (an anti-government entity) or compatriot? Is it really driven by irrational ideological zeal? Would it be possible or viable to separate the DPRK regime from its citizenry in dealing with inter-Korean relations? All these questions are closely connected to discourse, as these cannot be squarely based on mere facts. These issues are in need of a relevant agent's definition of the social structure. To sum up, Seoul's security discourse on Pyongyang's nuclear threat cannot be based solely upon material factors regarding nuclear weapons. A set of meanings, representations and statements would be needed in some manner (Baker and Ellece 2011).

In what way, then, can ST be applied to the ROK's security discourse? As aforementioned, ST argues that what decides a crucial security object of a country is dependent upon a securitising actor's speech act. Once a socially important issue is recognised as an imminent threat amongst the public (or an audience) by linguistic means, a securitising actor can easily convert that issue into an action step (Donnelly 2013; Salter and Mutlu 2013b). This thesis follows that logic. It acknowledges the importance of speech acts by which securitising actors engage in security practices, and in that sense, this study pays attention to the role of speech acts made by securitising actors in the process of forming

security discourse in South Korea. A systematic analysis of each securitising actor's speech acts could be a starting point for a relatively more neutral understanding of the ROK security discourse. Accordingly, each administration's speech act pattern would also be revealed in an objective way.

However, there are at least two caveats when applying ST to the ROK context. First, the key concepts of ST such as existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures may not be as clear in the ROK security discourse as the CS expected. For example, it seems that Seoul's discourse has not made it clear whether Pyongyang should be part of existential threats as a source of the nuclear threat, or subsumed under the category of referent objects as a compatriot that must be embraced. If the ROK's representation of the DPRK is not clear, its definitions of threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures would subsequently be ambiguous. Put differently, given that identity is a perspicuous representation or interpretation of the *other* (Campbell 1998; Bleiker 2001; Hansen 2006), it can be said that the ROK securitising actors have not been able 'to fully attain their identity' (Howarth et al. 2000: 10) and, accordingly, their securitising attempts might have faced some challenges.

Secondly, it appears unclear whether the ROK security discourse is politicisation or securitisation.[8] As noted above, the prevalent security discourse in today's South Korea has given us an impression that the conservatives prioritised the nuclear issue while the progressives relatively pushed it aside in order to implement an inter-Korean reconciliatory process. Does this mean that the conservatives securitised the nuclear threat, whereas the progressives just politicised it? A detailed investigation of each administration's speech act would reveal the truth about whether today's discourse truly reflects the reality. In other words, it would reveal whether the conservatives significantly carried out extraordinary measures as part of their securitising moves while the progressives did not. What is certain so far is that the ROK has not devised extraordinary counter-measures effectively able to deter the DPRK from developing nuclear capabilities and, therefore, Seoul's security discourse could not be called a true sense of securitisation, particularly as ST generally 'defines securitisation as a successful speech act' (Stritzel 2007: 358). In that sense, the ROK discourse

[8] See Figure 1.2. For the theoretical criticism of the ST framework regarding concepts of politicisation and securitisation, see Chapter 3.

might have fallen under the category of a securitising move somewhere between politicisation and securitisation, regardless of whether the discourse was based on the conservatives or progressives. Put differently, the issue is not so much whether securitisation has taken place in general, but rather about how the terms and framing of securitising moves have developed in the form of securitisation.

In summary, several points need to be examined in order to elucidate the traits of the ROK's securitisation. Firstly, the securitising actors' speech act patterns need to be delineated. This will be used as a starting point for analysing the ROK's security discourse. Secondly, the ways in which the securitising actors described the ST's key concepts—an existential threat (nuclear weapons; enemy or the *other*, meaning North Korea), referent objects and extraordinary measures—in the process of their securitising moves need to be clarified, to identify each securitising actor's securitisation attempt in a concrete manner. Thirdly, if Seoul's security discourse is stuck somewhere between politicisation and securitisation, the cause of the stalemate needs to be elucidated. In these ways, fundamental reasons may be identified for the ROK securitising actors' discursive dilemma.

1.3 Research questions and hypotheses

To reiterate, the underlying questions that this study has raised are as follows: in order to be sustainable, to what extent have the recent ROK governments' 'securitised' discourses on the DPRK been adequately consistent with reality? Why have neither perspectives—conservatives and progressives—been successful in deterring Pyongyang from developing its nuclear capabilities? If the two political blocs' security discourses are different, to what extent and in what ways are they different? What if the discursive differences between the two are unclear? Which analytical or practical points should be addressed in that case?

The research questions and hypotheses of the thesis stand on the basis of these underlying questions. What is important is that an audience will always be in a vortex of dichotomous and conflicting discourses without knowing the real difference of each political bloc's security discourse. Not surprisingly, each government of the ROK, regardless of its political ideologies, started with excessive confidence that it could deal with the DPRK's nuclear issues together

with an improvement of inter-Korean relations (Roh 2003a; Lee 2008a; Lim 2008; Park 2011a; Han 2013). In order to come to power, it is natural for politicians to assure the public that they can solve a specific security issue, but at the same time, it is very important for the audience to question whether the government's security discourse is justifiable or contradictory. In that respect, the fundamental goal of this research lies in laying the foundation for a set of criteria, whereby an audience can recognise to what extent the securitising actors' discourses reflect reality. Against this backdrop, the main question behind this research is as follows:

How did the securitising actors of the ROK (Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak) articulate the nuclear threat of the DPRK in the process of securitising moves, and why were their articulations of the discourses ultimately inconsistent with real challenges?

The main question can be subdivided into several supplementary research questions as follows:

[Speech acts pattern]

1-1. To what extent and how were the DPRK nuclear-related issues described in each actor's speech act pattern?

1-2. In what context and how were the core terms 'nuclear' and 'North Korea' used in each actor's articulation of relevant discourses?

1-2a. What other relevant keywords were used in each actor's articulation?

1-2b. In what ways were the keywords used in each actor's articulation?

[The characteristic of securitisation]

2-1. What were the existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures for the discourses of each actor?

2-2. Did articulations of the threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures differ clearly between the actors?

2-2a. If so, in what sense and to what extent did they differ, and to what extent does ST provide a good framework for understanding this?

2-2b. If not, what factors made the actors' articulation ambiguous and overlapping?

Among the sub-research questions, the ‘speech acts pattern’ will elucidate to what extent the DPRK nuclear-related issues were articulated by Presidents Roh and Lee, respectively. This study will also extract important keywords, which are relevant to the nuclear issues, by means of corpus-assisted DA, so that one can recognise in which way each actor used the keywords. In addition, other than the keywords, as ‘nuclear’ and ‘North Korea’ are among the core terms for the analysis, the context in which the two terms were used will be separately examined in detail. In this way, the general speech act pattern of each actor could be observed in an objective manner, and this would be utilised as a cornerstone towards more qualitative discussion.

The sub-questions of the ‘characteristic of securitisation’ part will be centred on the analyses of the three key components—existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures—which constitute the ST framework. Additional corpus-assisted DA along with other supplementary methods, such as interviews and documentary analysis, will be used for completion of the discussion. As Jackson and Sørensen (2013: 224) rightly pointed out, ‘the identity of key decision makers is uncovered through textual sources, including archives, journals, newspapers, memoirs, and textbooks’. These works would reveal to what extent and in what sense each actor’s articulation of the three components were different (or similar). Moreover, it would show some fundamental factors that made each actor fall into a discursive dilemma, which may reflect some reasons why the securitising moves of the ROK were not effective enough to deter the nuclear threat of the DPRK.

The research hypotheses emanate from the current discourse and the previous questions regarding reasons for the discursive dilemma. As was the case for the research questions, the structure of the thesis hypotheses also consists of the speech act pattern and the characteristic of the ROK securitisation. Given today’s practical discourse and the theoretical framework, the hypotheses can be deduced as follows:

[A. Speech acts pattern]

H.A-1. The progressive securitising actor will be less likely to articulate the DPRK nuclear issue.

H.A-2. The conservative securitising actor will be more likely to articulate the DPRK nuclear issue.

[B. The characteristic of securitisation]
H.B-1. If Presidents Roh and Lee's articulation of existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures are clearly different, there would be few impediments, either based on a material or a discursive structure, to forming the ROK's securitisation.
H.B-2. *If Presidents Roh and Lee's articulation of existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures are not clearly different, there would be some impediments, either based on a material or a discursive structure, to forming the ROK's securitisation.*

Hypotheses A deal with each actor's speech acts pattern. In this case, the progressive securitising actor (H.A-1) means President Roh, and the conservative actor (H.A-2) is President Lee. According to the current discourse in South Korea, it is highly likely that the hypotheses would be proven right. If this is the case, the position of the current discourse would be strengthened. This is because, as mentioned, the conservatives seem to have paid a great deal of attention to the DPRK nuclear issue, while the progressives appeared reluctant to articulate that issue. In this light, an analysis of the speech act pattern would reveal to what extent each actor actually articulated the pertinent issue, so that a proper and active discussion among securitising actors and audiences could occur.

Hypotheses B cover a detailed discussion of each actor's securitising move, which is based upon analysis of the key components of ST. As noted, the concepts of an existential threat, a referent object and an extraordinary measure are constitutive of ST, and security discourses can be analysed with a focus on these concepts. What this means is that the fewer impediments to a securitising move there are, the more likely securitising actors are to articulate a clearer component of ST. That is, the articulation of the components of Presidents Roh and Lee differ enough to be divided into two disparate traits, it may be considered that each securitising actor has a different level of securitising moves (non-politicisation, politicisation and securitisation) (H.B-1); however, if not, it is likely



Figure 1.3 Outline of the thesis

that there may have been some impediments to forming such a distinct securitising move (H.B-2).[9]

The obstacles, if indicated through the analysis, could either arise from material causes, discursive factors or a mixture of both. In this case, an audience, as well as policymakers, could notice that the ostensibly disparate discourses between the two main political blocs have actually become entangled with each other, and that this reflects a discursive reality whereby one-sided discourse cannot stand alone. A detailed discussion will show ways in which each securitising actor's articulation of the ST components are convergent or divergent. The rest of the thesis, therefore, will focus on investigating the ROK security discourse to find out whether its discursive patterns substantiate or invalidate the above hypotheses.

[9] For an explanation of the impediments, this research uses a term referred to as a 'discursive chasm', which is a preliminary concept. For an illustration of this, see Chapter 2.

The next two chapters discuss the theoretical and methodological concerns of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction of the historical and conceptual context for the thesis. It also elaborates on ways in which IR theories such as realism, liberalism and constructivism have been used an attempt to describe and solve the ROK's protracted security dilemma or its perception of the Korean Nuclear Crisis. Chapter 3 suggests the necessity for a discursive approach in dealing with security issues along with concepts of discourse and security discourse upon which the theoretical proposition of the ST is predicated. It then specifies the necessity for a discursive approach to security studies by applying this to the ROK's case. A detailed description of the methods used in the research is also provided in this chapter. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with empirical cases that include the Roh and Lee administrations. These chapters reconstruct each administration's security discourse regarding the DPRK's nuclear issue by applying the ST framework. Through the reconstruction process, the characteristics of each administration's security discourse may be identified, as well as each securitising actor's speech act pattern. From the results of the previous two chapters, Chapter 6 analyses the discursive similarities and differences of the two administrations in a more direct manner. This chapter will demonstrate that discursive chasms matter in terms of the construction and implementation of the ROK's security discourse. The conclusion, Chapter 7, sums up the theoretical and analytical points of the thesis and looks at implications for the synthesis of discursive and material positions in security studies (Figure 1.3).

2.
Theoretical Concerns: Theories Revisited

The aim of this chapter is twofold: one is to show how this research is situated in the literature—literature review—in terms of IR theoretical viewpoints, and the other, which might also be part of the literature review, is to manifest historical and conceptual contexts of the thesis that provide the essential background for understanding the process from which the research questions have arisen. However, the fundamental reason for doing this is beyond such a review. By implementing the comprehensively retrospective work, the limit of scholarly realm that is oftentimes frustrated by academic myopia and pedantic arguments may be recognised. In addition, not to mention the failure of realism to predict the imminent collapse of the former Soviet Union, relatively new theories stemmed from postmodernism have also not provided a practical foothold upon which world policymakers could set up a policy direction. Meanwhile, even though IR theorists have exerted all their intelligential skills in order to achieve better analyses and projections, at least regarding the case of the Korean Nuclear Crisis, it appears that, in reality, much debate generated by numerous scholars seems to have headed for oblivion.

Of course, not all of this is the fault of theorists. Perhaps it is because modern IR simply cannot be free from theorisation so long as it is concerned with ‘social science’. Nonetheless, tracking the previous theoretical analyses and considering the historical background provides room for more academic contemplation, although it could be seen as another Sisyphean task. It may be better to put the historical contexts before the theoretical review in the interest of the logical progress of the thesis: it would be impossible to draw on IR theories as an analytical framework without contexts such as historical background. History provides theorists not only with examples to illustrate theories, but also with a positional spur whereby they can analyse cases from a different perspective (Trachtenberg 2009). The literature review in relation to the methodological part will be discussed in the next chapter.

2.1 Historical and conceptual contexts

Ever since the end of the Cold War, South Korea's perception of North Korea has been structured around the nuclear issue. Therefore, the debate on the ROK's security policy has also focused on the question of whether a specific measure can efficiently block North Korea's nuclear development. The nature of the North Korean threat could be either material or ideational. The threat could emerge from North Korea's threatening capability itself or could snowball from South Korea's threat perception. One cannot be sure which factors are superior in terms of their explanatory power. This reflects almost exactly why various theories and methodologies have argued for a prolonged period without agreement in relation to a specific IR issue. While the policymakers are vacillating about choosing a 'better' solution (or theory) to solve the issue, and arguing over which would be a better perception of the DPRK's intention, North Korea's material threat itself has clearly increased due to the expansion of its nuclear arsenal and the deployment of new missile delivery systems (Wit 2015).

There may be no need to explain the historical issues verbosely because many of the books and articles on the Korean nuclear issues have already dealt with them. For those able to read Korean, *A Chronological Table of Inter-Korean Relations* (1948–2013) published by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU 2013a) might be optimal for checking up on important facts, as it includes almost all major events that have taken place between North and South Korea as well as relevant parties, including the US, China, Russia and Japan. It also introduces major discourses: government statements, intergovernmental agreements, media reports, and so forth. The KINU's research series entitled *International Politics of North Korea's Nuclear Capabilities and South Korea's Responsive Strategy* (Bae et al. 2011) and *North Korea's Nuclear Strategy and South Korea's Responsive Strategy* (Jeong et al. 2014) provide helpful introductions to the ROK's perceptions of the nuclear crisis. Lee Kang-deok, in his book *The Truth of Nuclear North Korea* (2012a) assorted the issue into several related matters, such as the DPRK's nuclear capability, development of its missile systems, Light-Water Reactor (LWR) and the history of Six-Party Talks (SPT) on North Korea's nuclear programme. Byeon Jong-heon's book *Inter-Korean Relations and the Unification of the Korean Peninsula* (Byeon 2014)

narrates the history with a broader time span, which tries to integrate the ROK's perceptions of the nuclear issues into a unification discourse.

The existing literature written by government officials shed light on these issues, inasmuch as all of them have played an integral role in the historical processes. Although it would be naïve to rely on what they say in their books as most tend to justify their actions, scholars can at least suppose what might be close to 'facts' by combining and comparing their different speeches. Despite some controversies over reliability of biographies and autobiographies, these are still important and valuable sources, particularly when it comes to the inside history (Burnham et al. 2008). In the light of this, former Assistant Foreign Minister Lee Yong-Joon's book *North Korea's Nuclear Programme: A Rule for the New Game* (2004) may be a primer for those who want to understand the process of North Korea's nuclear issues from a diplomat's viewpoint. His opinion seems quite conservative, but at the same time readers can learn, through his books, the focal points of the nuclear issues since the late 1980s. The books *Peacemaker: Twenty Years of Inter-Korean Relations and the North Korean Nuclear Issue* by Lim Dong-won (2008), former head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and *Peace on the blade* by Lee Jong-seok (2014b), former Unification Minister, might be two of the most important memoirs in terms of describing the history of nuclear talks with the DPRK. Both men, representing progressive governments, were core architects of policy on North Korea, therefore their opinions can also be seen as rather skewed.

Nonetheless, the memoirs have many primary sources that could be used as crucial substance to interpret historical issues. In this sense, it is safe to say that these kinds of autobiographies are no longer a tertiary source, but instead may be a semi-primary source as a mixture of primary documents and the individual's life. Former Deputy Prime Minister Han Wan-sang's book *The Korean Peninsula Hurts* (Han 2013) is also helpful in order to come to grips with the origin of the ROK government's complicated perception of the DPRK, as Han minutely delineated the cognitive structures of the Kim Young-sam administration. The autobiography, *The President's Time 2008–2013*, written by former South Korean president Lee Myung-bak (2015), revealed sensitive diplomatic issues, including inter-Korean relations and summit diplomacy, whereby readers can infer his and his counterparts' real perceptions of the DPRK. If these had not been included in

the book, the revealed facts would have been classified for up to thirty years after his retirement.[10]

It is relatively rare to find literature written in English that shows the ROK's perception of the North's nuclear issue (Son 2006; Kim and Kang 2010; Kwon and Chung 2012; Moon 2012; Kim 2014b). *The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis* published by Korea Institute for Defence Analyses is one of the most important academic sources introducing changing South Korean perspectives of the North Korean nuclear threat (Park 2008; Park 2011b; Kim 2012; Park and Kim 2012; Hwang 2015; Kim 2015b). *Understanding North Korea: indigenous perspectives* is an edited book, published in English, by South Korean scholars. The book is comprised of chapters on North Korea's political system, economic and social transformation, foreign policy, and so forth (Han and Jung 2014). However, the authors seem to be in favour of active engagement with North Korea and, therefore, irrespective of whether their arguments are right or wrong, it lacks a sense of academic neutrality given the various perspectives on North Korea in South Korean society.

Although many efforts have been made to analyse the level of the DPRK's threat and its real intention, and to form an appropriate strategy for preventing North Korea from becoming a nuclear state, many of those efforts were basically predicated upon the US's perspective (Sigal 1999; Snyder 1999; Cha and Kang 2003; Harrison 2003; Carpenter and Bandow 2004; Cumings 2004; Wit et al. 2004; Cha 2012). There is some doubt as to whether these books reflected Seoul's dilemmatic position in a serious manner, acknowledging a fundamental discursive dilemma between the very existence of the DPRK regime as an illegal political entity and the existence of North Korea as an object of peaceful unification.

However, these sources are still important for an understanding of how the Korean Nuclear Crisis has developed and, more importantly, for portraying the broader context within which the complicated security discourses of the ROK's policymakers were produced. The US perspective, the DPRK-US or the ROK-US relations themselves indicate that South Korea's perception of North Korea is inextricably linked to the international system that lays the foundation for

[10] Lee's memoir engendered controversy. According to South Korean *Yonhap News*, several civic activists accused Lee 'of violating the law on the management of presidential records' and leaking official secrets through the publication of his memoir (Kim 2015c).

theoretical analysis of the issue. The international system, whose explanatory power permeates IR theories, even to several poststructuralists, including ST theorists, underlies numerous theoretical concepts, such as alliance, deterrence, bandwagoning, free rider, intersubjectivity, and so on. The point here is that a wide-ranging understanding of relations between theories and practical issues is needed to fathom why the ROK's perceptions of the DPRK's nuclear programme appear to be intricate. Indeed, much of this literature can be categorised either into different IR theories or theoretical eclecticism. As this literature will be reviewed later in this and following chapters, let us return to the historical issues in terms of the ROK perceptions of the DPRK and its nuclear programme.

2.1.1 A brief history

At least in terms of South Korea's security perception, 'the end of history', expounded in Francis Fukuyama's declaration, turned out to be a phantasm in the early 1990s. For South Korea, 'the end of history' merely meant the start of a nuclear nightmare and the start of a war of statements against one of the most peculiar communist countries in the world. Indeed, the end of the Cold War and subsequent events—the establishment of diplomatic ties between the ROK and the Soviet Union (September 1990), the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a patron of the North Korean regime (December 1991), the appearance of the Yeltsin era, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK and China (August 1992)—seemed to make Pyongyang more obstinate towards its nuclear ambitions. According to Don Oberdorfer (1998), in April 1982, an American surveillance satellite photographed a suspect object that appeared to be a nuclear reactor vessel at Yongbyon, sixty miles north of Pyongyang. However, suspicions that the North Korean regime has a clandestine nuclear programme began in earnest in 1989 (Bluth 2011a; Kang 2011).

This is important for understanding the DPRK's nuclear ambition, as that year numerous and tumultuous democratic upheavals exploded across the Eastern European states, and the East German regime started to falter in the wake of the removal of Hungary's border fence, which ultimately led to German reunification the following year. Accordingly, North Korea was under mounting pressure from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Regardless of whether North Korea's nuclear ambition was real, its movement toward developing a nuclear

programme was reinforced throughout this period. More to the point, North Korea tried to solve its energy supply shortage and security concerns at the same time by building reactors. Meanwhile, both the US and ROK governments were confronted with a critical security threat, as intelligence reports indicated that North Korea has a reprocessing facility in Yongbyon where it could separate weapons-grade plutonium from fuel.

At the same time, however, South Korean political leaders saw the peaceful collapse of communism in Eastern Europe as a new opportunity to realise unification on the Korean peninsula. In terms of Seoul's perceptions of Pyongyang, that both conservatives and progressives in South Korea acknowledge the significance of ethnic nationalism (*danil minjok*) is worthy of notice. For example, while Presidents Rhee Syngman (1948–1960) and Park Chung-hee (1961–1979) 'used ethnic nationalism as the rhetorical basis of' their anti-communist ideology (Shin 2006: 101), President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993) used the same concept to bring about a rapprochement with North Korea by claiming that 'only when the torch of nationalism is alive can Koreans achieve national unification' (Shin 2006: 186). President Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) also stressed the importance of ethnic nationalism, as he declared in his inauguration that 'neither allies nor ideology can surpass the bonds of ethnicity' (Koh 2001). For President Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003), it was also nationalism that motivated him to pursue unification (Jeon 2007).

South Korea's confusion over securitising moves towards the North Korean nuclear threat became conspicuous in the Kim Young-sam administration during which the first Korean nuclear crisis occurred. In terms of North Korea policy, from the very beginning, the Kim Young-sam administration held a conciliatory approach to elicit North Korea's positive response and they also encouraged the US to intervene in the nuclear issue. Unfortunately, Kim's ambition of being a precursor to the unified Korea came to nothing less than a fortnight after his inauguration, when Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 12 March 1993 (Lee 2004; Lim 2008; Bluth 2011a). To make matters worse, when Kim Young-sam repatriated Lee In-mo,[11] an

[11] Lee In-mo was 'a North Korean spy dispatched during the early days of the Korean War (1950–53) and became a partisan when he missed the chance to go back before the cease-fire agreement was signed. […] When the government in Seoul released spies and partisans in exchange for letters rejecting communist ideology and pledges to become loyal South Korean citizens, Lee and 62 other communists refused and opted to remain in prison' (WorldTribune 2005).

unconverted long-term political prisoner, to North Korea as a conciliatory gesture, Pyongyang used this only to strengthen its political propaganda. Kim Young-sam felt a deep sense of betrayal. Shortly after the North's declaration of its withdrawal from the NPT and the Lee In-mo event, Kim Young-sam turned hard-line on Pyongyang, adding that he could never shake hands with someone holding nuclear weapons (Kim 1993). In addition, Kim Young-sam's perspective on negotiations between the US and the DPRK also changed rapidly from supportive to spoiling tactics, as seen from the Geneva Agreed Framework (AF) case that the Kim Young-sam administration tried to thwart (Wit et al. 2004; Han 2013). At that time, even several American diplomats complained that 'it was harder to talk to the South Koreans than it was the Northerners' (Seong 2008).

Since the Kim Dae-jung administration, a fierce rivalry for discourses on the superior North Korea policy has deepened between conservative and progressive groups. Moon (2012: 18) explained that Kim Dae-jung 'was a liberal in that he strongly believed that the international system is not anarchical', and naturally, 'harmony and co-operation becomes all the more possible when the identity of the counterpart is recognised and respected'. This is the philosophical foundation of his Sunshine Policy.[12] The engagement policy was possible in part because he thought that South Korea was superior to the North in terms of its defence ability, including its alliance with the US, economic strength, ideology of democracy and so forth. Lim Dong-won (2008), a key architect of the Sunshine Policy, stressed that the engagement policy is not an appeasement one; if anything, it is an offensive one that could only be used by the strong. Moon (2012: 26) also said that 'the most prominent component of the Sunshine Policy was strategic offensive'.

This might come from the increasing confidence of South Korea as a regional power in the world. As noted by Shim and Flamm (2013: 402–403), 'South Korea is increasingly able to manoeuvre between its supposedly more powerful neighbours and thus is capable of influencing regional affairs according to its own interests and preferences'. The Sunshine Policy reflected this perception. The Sunshine Policy was expanded by President Roh Moo-hyun and

[12] The Kim Dae-jung administration's Sunshine Policy was officially named the 'Policy of Reconciliation and Co-operation'. President Kim Dae-jung was known to be possessive of the term Sunshine Policy, and he used this term in public in September 1994 for the first time while he was addressing the Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C. (Shin 2003).

his government. Both the Kim Dae-jung and Roh administrations tried to advance the liberalism or functionalism that develops different levels of cooperation between the two Koreas particularly in regard to less sensitive sectors such as economic, social and cultural exchange. Gradually, step by step and year by year, they wanted to alter the DPRK's traditionally rigid attitudes toward the outside world. They believed that the improved material interdependence (e.g. economic co-operation) could ultimately bring about collaboration in political and military sectors.

The Lee Myung-bak administration's North Korea policy began with its perception that the two former administrations' policies toward the DPRK had failed. Again, North Korea's nuclear issue dominated almost all the security matters for the Lee administration. They argued that the two former administrations 'ultimately failed to bring about a shift in the North's attitude' (Park 2011b: 322). The Lee administration pursued a principle of reciprocity or a policy of strictly conditional engagement, and disparaged the previous two administrations as naïve and a dangerous unconditional engagement (Gelézeau et al. 2013). The Lee administration's policy on North Korea, however, could neither modify the North's regime nor deter its provocations. During Lee's term, North Korea carried out two nuclear tests (in May 2009 and February 2013), three ballistic missile tests (in April 2009, April 2012 and December 2012), and two unparalleled military attacks (the *Cheonan* sinking and shelling of *Yeonpyeong*).[13] Cheon Seongwhun (2008: 49) argument that the Lee administration's 'firm measures undoubtedly will deter the North Korean regime's risky adventurism' has proved to be wrong, and it became clear that coercive diplomacy itself could not provide a solution.

The Park Geun-hye administration (2013–2017) began with a seemingly less coercive policy towards the DPRK, titled *trustpolitik*, in order to break the stalemate and to head off further armed conflicts in the peninsula.[14] On the one hand, the concept *trustpolitik* was linked to IR realism in that it underlined the fact that North Korea had to pay a heavy price for its military and nuclear threats, but

[13] North Korea sank a South Korean corvette, *Cheonan*, which led to 47 people being killed in March 2010; two South Korean soldiers were killed and 13 others injured after North Korea fired dozens of artillery attacks on the South Korean *Yeonpyeong* Island in November of the same year. It was the North's first artillery attack on the South's territory since the 1950–1953 Korean War.
[14] President Park, South Korea's first female president, was removed from office in 2017 after the Constitutional Court upheld the impeachment motion passed in parliament.

on the other, Park argued that 'even as Seoul and its allies strengthen their posture against North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship, they must also be prepared to offer Pyongyang a new beginning' (Park 2011a: 13–18). However, Park did not suggest a concrete measure regarding how Seoul could offer Pyongyang 'a new beginning' while Pyongyang continued to develop its nuclear capabilities. After all, her *trustpolitik* became the strongest ever coercive measure as Pyongyang carried out its fourth and fifth nuclear tests (Park 2011a; Song 2016).

The political and historical context shown above implies three points that need to be considered before analysing the speech acts of Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak, beginning with the powerful role of the South Korean presidents. Ever since the Rhee Syngman administration, South Korea's security discourse has revolved around the speech acts of the presidents. The potent and influential power of the presidential speech emanates from the so-called 'imperial presidency' in South Korea.[15] The imperial presidency allowed South Korean presidents not only to predominate the foreign policy making process but also to rule 'over the bureaucracy, the National Assembly, and civil society' (Jaung 2010: 63). The second point to be considered is the role of ethnic nationalism. As aforementioned, regardless of political or ideological preferences, all South Korean presidents were, in a sense, in favour of ethnic nationalism. The principles of *hongik ingan*, the unofficial national ideology of Korea, has reminded South Korean political leaders of the single bloodline and the same fate between the two Koreas.[16] The third point relates to the role of divisive political ideologies. The election of Kim Dae-jung reignited the division between conservatism and progressivism in terms of North Korea policy, as the Kim Dae-jung administration meant the return of progressive government in South Korea after a long thirty-seven-year-period of conservative rule.[17] This meant that both Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak could not help being caught in a vortex of ideological conflict in dealing with North Korean-related issues.

[15] In the case of Park Geun-Hye's impeachment, South Korea's Constitutional Court pointed out that the ROK's Constitutional system could be deemed an imperial presidency as it allowed every president unbridled authority.

[16] *Hongik ingan* literally means devotion to the welfare of humankind. It is regarded as the traditional political ideology initiated by *Dan-gun*, the legendary founder of the first ever Korean kingdom Gojoseon (2333 – 108 BC).

[17] It would be fair to say that South Korean security discourse had been controlled by conservative governments before the election of Kim Dae-jung, in that the first progressive government, taken by the *Minjoo* (Democratic) Party, lasted less than one year (15 June 1960 – 16 May 1961).

In essence, regarding North Korea policy, a strain on relations between conservatives and progressives continued. However, even though there is a political or ideological predilection in terms of seeing North Korea (Shin 2006; Kim 2012), can we say that the conservatives securitised the DPRK's nuclear threat and the progressives did the opposite? Would it be correct to believe that one can evaluate the political leaders' security policy based on such political ideologies? It is interesting that even the scholars belonging to the mainstream of each political bloc in South Korea seem to have accepted this kind of division (Kim and Lee 2011). This view seems to be linked to another dichotomy between IR realism and liberalism/constructivism in terms of applying theories to the practical policy of the ROK, meaning that the conservative government applied realism while the progressives preferred the latter. This thesis, however, basically challenges these propositions. The next sections deal with this issue in detail.

2.1.2 Theoretical intricacies: origin, process and solution

The Korean Nuclear Crisis has different origins in terms of the theoretical view, and the different theoretical perspectives constitute the whole process of the crisis. Anticipation of a latent possibility of the DPRK's reform and openness as well as its denuclearisation is differently predicted by each theory. The theoretical intricacies of this problem can be categorised into three parts: origin, process, and solution.

First, as earlier elaborated, the DPRK's nuclear adventure is virtually an outgrowth of the demise of the Communist bloc along with the liberalisation of Eastern Europe in 1989, during which time no one could deny the influence of the 'Gorbachev Doctrine' comprised of *glasnost* (openness), *perestroika* (restructuring), and Gorbachev's 'constructivist' thinking, which rejected the conventional and traditional traits of nuclear weapons (Schmidt 2012; Agius 2016). This Copernican change caused by ideational revolution in modern international relations ironically triggered an intractable and material 'realist' structure on the Korean peninsula, in which the DPRK and the US formed an asymmetric confrontation, which may, in turn, represent strategic studies that essentially focus on military dynamics. North Korea's nuclear strategy seems to tie in closely with what Brad Roberts (2000: 4) defined as asymmetric strategies:

> […] the means by which the militarily weaker state tries to bring whatever advantages it has to bear on the critical weak points of the stronger party. Those advantages are seen to include a propensity to run high risks, a reputation for ruthlessness, and a willingness to utilise massively destructive weapons to realise local gains.

In short, while realism pulled back after the collapse of bipolarity from the global perspective, at least during the first decade following the end of the Cold War, it remained strong at a regional level, especially on the Korean peninsula and its surrounding region.

Second, the rise of China and the relative decline of the US have become a crucial point in the process of development of the DPRK's nuclear weapons programme. In other words, the negotiation matrix of the DPRK's denuclearisation has become complicated as China continues to increase its influence on the process of the issue. This may be viewed as another facet of realism that considers polarity, balance of power, power transition and so forth. Indeed, the rise of China and its increasing influence in the Asia-Pacific region has been a case study among many IR scholars (Brzezinski and Mearsheimer 2005; Chung 2007; Ikenberry 2014; Mearsheimer 2014; Brooks and Wohlforth 2016). Simultaneously, however, a latent bipolar system between the US and China, which connotes a revival of realism, might be altered when the US and the ROK's constructivist effort to persuade China is effective. According to Richard N. Haass (2014), former Director of Policy Planning for the US Department of State, 'the priority must be to persuade China that the demise of North Korea need not be something to fear'.

This could be possible only when the Chinese government changes its current perceptions. Unlike Washington and Seoul, it has been acknowledged that Beijing does not want a sudden collapse of the DPRK that might lead to conflicts between the US, South Korean and Chinese forces. China wants neither a large influx of North Korean refugees nor an advance of US troops, now based in South Korea, on its doorstep. Although China reprimanded North Korea for its nuclear weapons, it cannot pressurise North Korea to denuclearise as harshly as do South Korea and the US for the aforementioned reasons, and, more to the point, because of the necessity for a constant economic development, unthwarted by an unstable situation, including the DPRK's collapse and its concomitant problems (Yu et al. 2016). In any case, China's perception of the DPRK, regardless of whether it is a strategic asset or liability, would be a critical

variable in terms of working out the puzzle of the DPRK's nuclear issue (Moore 2008; Kim 2010; Fitzpatrick 2013; Plant and Rhode 2013; Taylor 2013a). Here, as before, realists' and constructivists' core concepts, such as balance of power and configuration of state identity (or national interests) coexist as competing frameworks, as each struggles to produce a better analytical template for explaining why the North Korean nuclear issue is complex.

Third, given the complicated structures of the origin and process of the DPRK's nuclear issue, a key to solving or analysing this issue must be based on a comprehensive understanding. The division of the Korean peninsula is an outgrowth of the power politics that visibly occurred after the end of World War II. As Cumings (2007) pointed out, the US is not free from responsibility for the division of Korea, and neither is the former Soviet Union. That is, the ideological conflicts between the superpowers have been projected onto the politics at each side of the peninsula. Each Korea actively chose a bandwagoning strategy for its security and profit (Schweller 1994), thus the political elites consolidate their positions in each part of the peninsula while demonising each other as communist and imperialist. In this process, ideological conflicts and negative projection on the *other* has been institutionalised, which might be interpreted as a formation of a state identity of constructivism (Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996; Checkel 1998; Wendt 1999).

Having outlined the theoretical intricacies of this issue, the discussion can be abridged as follows: first, the origin of ideological antagonism on the peninsula began with the power politics that represent realism, and the antagonistic perceptions of each other that connote constructivism was consolidated during the Cold War period. Second, in the post-Cold War period, the rise of China formed another kind of realist power politics that has influenced the process of negotiations regarding the DPRK's denuclearisation. Meanwhile, by persuading Chinese policymakers, South Korea and the US have tried to alter China's security interests on the peninsula, which implies constructivism. Third, the end of the Cold War, which suggested that many constructivist perspectives could not prevent the two Koreas from perpetuating each state's ideological identity, during which the North has developed its realistic and constructivist options—nuclear weapons and *Seon-gun* (military-first) ideology—while the South has been struggling with the creation of new perceptions of the North and with making

‘better’ security policy, whereby it effectively denuclearises North Korea. Indeed, a comprehensive theoretical understanding that contemplates the intricate origin and process is needed, so that a more viable and applicable solution can be found.

From the above discussion, some interim conclusions about the ROK’s perception of the Korean Nuclear Crisis can be made as follows:

(1) the ROK’s perception of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons cannot be separated from its perception of the DPRK as an illegal state or a state that should be peacefully unified at least under the ROK’s control. In other words, as history has demonstrated, it is virtually impossible for the ROK securitising actors to think about the DPRK nuclear issues separately from the way in which they have perceived the DPRK as a whole;

(2) the ROK’s perception of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons cannot be free from the influence of power politics between superpowers; in this case, the US and China constitute the power politics. To put it differently, the ROK’s perception of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons cannot help but be significantly influenced by the international system. Within the system, however, the ROK policymakers have tried to create new constructivist thinking related to a solution for the nuclear issue on a regional scale;

(3) the ROK’s perception of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons, therefore, might become stuck in a discursively dilemmatic situation. Regardless of whether it is the conservative or progressive governments, it can be reasoned that the securitising actors themselves are outgrowths of such security environments. In this situation, perhaps the actors became aware that they had become trapped in such a situation in which they could not clearly perform policies according to their articulations on their own initiatives.

When analysing the ROK’s securitisation, a broad understanding of the theoretical intricacies and discursively dilemmatic situations is first required, so that the three key elements of ST—existential threat, referent objects and extraordinary measures—can be disclosed in a clear manner. In order to delineate the phenomenon that imposed such situations on the ROK’s actors, this study suggests a preliminary concept of a *discursive chasm*. A discursive chasm refers to a discursive structure that fundamentally impedes the performance of

actors' security discourse, and that distorts or paralyses discursive formation (here, a securitising move). When the securitising actors fall into the chasms, it is virtually impossible to break free of the dilemmatic situation insofar as the current discursive or material structure in which the ROK is stuck does not change. The discursive chasms will be explicated in a more concrete fashion as the Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak administrations' security discourses are analysed. More importantly, the concept would play an important role in verifying the suggested hypotheses of the thesis. The following section includes a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the theoretical contexts.

2.2 Theoretical contexts: IR trend and the Korean peninsula

Is theory a causal explanation? Stephen Walt (2005: 26) observed that a theory 'defines recurring relations between two or more phenomena and explains why that relationship obtains'. According to this logic, theories should provide a causal story (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013). This American account of theory is good in that it uses scientific realism (in this case, realism means methodological realism that differs from IR realism) as an epistemological foundation. This kind of approach extols an accurate reflection of reality. Then, has IR mainstream prism (neorealism/neoliberalism), which has an American theoretical tradition, given a plausible and conceivable explanation that can identify a recurring relationship between the two Koreas? The answer probably varies according to perspectives.

However, at least when it comes to South Korea's North Korea policies, neither realism nor liberalism can explain the ROK's complicated perceptions of the DPRK. For example, realism cannot elucidate the DJ and Roh Moo-hyun administrations' perceptions—amenable to compromise with the DPRK—regarding what had happened during the nuclear crisis. Conversely, neo-liberalistic characteristics (Lamy 2008), which are comprised of complex interdependence—a role of non-state actors, no distinction between low and high politics and the decline of the efficacy of military force as a tool of statecraft—seem to be at odds with the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administration's perception of the DPRK, which clearly distinguished between low and high politics while failing to emphasise the role of non-state actors insofar as it is concerned with inter-Korean relations. In short, neither theory can consistently explain the

ROK's perceptions throughout the period during which North Korea developed its nuclear weapons.

Although each mainstream theory has an explanatory power that can generalise several phenomena recurring around the world, if it is unable to tell a coherent and neat story about a specific region, particularly in a region where change in the security environment has had a significant impact, at least on the regional system, the theory can no longer be considered a theory in a stringent sense. Instead, the theories have actually been selectively used to forge each theoretical bloc's foundation. In that regard, this research agrees with the statement that 'IR theorists will generalise in ways not accepted by the area specialist, while area specialist claim that the uniqueness of their region prevents the application of any general theory' (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 83). In addition, this research reasons that the European account of a theory may be more suitable for the nature of the theme of this thesis: 'anything that organises a field systematically, structures questions and establishes a coherent and rigorous set of interrelated concepts and categories' (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 84).

Of course, theories must be based on facts or evidence, and they need to have the power to explicate how facts are linked to one another. It would be preferable if a theory could put forward a reliable solution for ongoing conflicts. In epistemological terms, a natural science—positivism—may be the archetype of this kind of approach. Within the realm of social research strategies, empirical realists argue that 'through the use of appropriate methods, reality can be understood', whereas critical realists point out that the discourses of the social world cannot be 'spontaneously apparent in the observable pattern of events' (Bryman 2016: 25). Either way, for methodological realists, 'there is a reality that is separate from our descriptions of it' (Bryman 2016: 25). One can infer from this perception that positivists regard a reality as something that is value free and can be tested.

In that respect, this research distances itself from positivism; instead it adopts interpretivism, which is 'a term given to an epistemology that contrasts with positivism' (Bryman 2016: 26). This study is therefore in a sense critical of the scientific model and holds on to the idea that the social world requires a different logic, such as a process of narrative adjustment and constitutive relationship (Hansen 2006: xvi). In other words, a reality is not something that is

over there, but it is constantly constituted and interpreted. The events and discourses of the Korean peninsula need to be examined in this regard. Methodological concepts regarding the case of this study will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Korean peninsula has been at the crossroads from a theoretical perspective. This is because the structure of the Cold War remains unresolved on the peninsula although most other regions have had transformative experiences—peaceful reunification, marketisation, globalisation and regional integration, such as the European Union (EU), Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), etc.—throughout the post-Cold War period. The peninsula, as the last vestige of the Cold War, is still divided into two disparate ideologies, and this makes the ROK policymakers confused as to what extent they can break down the Cold War mentality towards North Korea. In a similar vein, the following comments still seem valid: 'what dominated the debate on North Korea was a plethora of short editorials, opinion pieces, and two-page "think-tank" policy briefs that lacked depth, were politically- or ideologically-motivated' (Cha and Kang 2003: 8). North Korea policy has been based on political or ideological preference, not on in-depth considerations that encompass the entire theoretical viewpoints. Scholars and experts on North Korea also do not seem to be free from such ideological predilection.

What appears to be more problematic here is that a dearth of reliable analyses on North Korea has eventually misled analysis of the ROK's perceptions of the DPRK, not to mention the studies on North Korea itself. This matters because there could not be a proper North Korea policy without a proper analysis of the ROK's security perception of the DPRK. It is unfortunate that in this process IR theories were not that helpful for analysing the ROK's complicated perceptions of the DPRK and its nuclear weapons, as they have not succeeded in creating a simple and powerful theoretical framework that can diagnose policy problems and make policy decisions with a view to revolutionising our thinking (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013). As Leon V. Sigal (1999) pointed out, although statesman cannot simplify reality because they have to have their eyes on practical issues and subsequent repercussions, many of which unpredictably occur, such as the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011 and the purge of Jang Song-taek in December

2013, [18] at least scholars can afford to do so since they need to show policymakers and related audiences a deep understanding of aspects of the phenomena.

When those contingencies happen, as seen in the cases of Kim Jong-il and Jang Song-taek, scholars need to 'provide not only factual knowledge, but also the capacity to think and hence be self-reflexive and adaptive when facing new decision situations' (Guzzini 2013: 538). Broadly speaking, there are at least two issues that need to be pointed out regarding the role of IR theories in the Korean peninsula. Firstly, up until now, theories seem to have been manipulated and abused by each political bloc's preference as a way of reinforcing their discursive basis. Secondly, the original characters of each theory have disclosed quite contradictory traits when it comes to the connection between policy and theory. The following section will discuss this matter.

2.2.1 Realism: a self-contradiction?

The protracted theoretical dichotomy between realists and idealists (or any equivalents) has affected scholars that have tried to come to grips with the DPRK issue. This might have led to the binary simplification between 'hawks' and 'doves', which lies in the discourse of world diplomacy, not in the field of science. One might see at this point some chronic problems regarding a relationship between theory and practical issues. As Guzzini (2013: 530) put it, with regard to the study on the ROK's security perceptions of the DPRK, the problems of 'the confusion between practical and scientific knowledge' and 'the reduction of scientific knowledge to a narrow version of empirical theory' have been right. That is, the division of hawks=realism and doves=liberalism (or constructivism) seems to have been routinised in South Korea's security discourse. In this process, each theory was widely used to strengthen the current political division between conservatives and progressives, instead of being used to identify a more plausible solution to the protracted security issues.

In general, it is natural to think that realism has permeated the Korean peninsula more than any other theory. In fact, there was no room for other

[18] After the death of Kim Jong-il, Jang Song-taek was considered the number two man in the DPRK. Jang was Kim Jong-un's uncle; he was married to Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong-il's only sister. Jang was executed on suspicion of counter-revolutionary acts. He had long been known to be in favour of economic reform in North Korea. Kim Jong-un later described him as 'factionalist filth'.

theories, such as idealism, (neo-) liberalism and functionalism, to take their places amongst the 'realistic' theories derived from realism. During the Cold War period, as a security free-rider, South Korea exhaustively bandwagoned with the US and underwent experiences of realism as a comprehensive version of empirical theory, which includes balancing, bandwagoning, containment, deterrence, and so forth (Carpenter and Bandow 2004). It is also an unequivocal fact that the US chose a containment policy throughout the Cold War era for dealing with the DPRK, which relied heavily on realist thoughts, including defence, sanctions, non-proliferation and counter-proliferation (Oh and Hassig 2004).

Against the backdrop of this context, it seems that IR scholars focusing on inter-Korean relations have instinctively linked realism with containment or any relevant concepts that stand on an antipodal point of engagement that represents liberalism or equivalent theories, which has led policymakers to think that any kind of engagement could be a policy of appeasement. What is more problematic is that they see realism as a problem-solving theory, with which North Korea can either collapse or buckle under pressure from the US and the ROK, which has proved to be wrong for over two decades since the outbreak of the first Korean Nuclear Crisis. Accordingly, realism has unwittingly turned into a very egocentric and stubborn theoretical perspective in this process.

Park and Kim (2012) stressed the importance of South Korean military preparedness against the North's nuclear threat, such as developing deterrence and offensive options: consulting closely with the US forces in South Korea, deploying precision-guided attacks and eliminating the North Korean nuclear weapons. According to them, more effective deterrence options, including threats to eliminate the DPRK's regime are needed. Park C.K. (2010: 499) observed that North Korea's nuclear threat is not only interpreted as a deterrence, but also 'as a military leverage to threaten the very existence of South Korea'. Therefore, in response to the DPRK's nuclear threat, South Korea must prepare a new defence posture, including 'extended deterrence by preventive or pre-emptive capability'. Shin (2003) applied the neorealists' core assumption to the Korean peninsula. He opined that the relationship between the two Koreas is still obliged to resort to cheating and the relative gains of the *other*. In this context, he argued that South Korea's support for North Korea could result in their invasion of the ROK.

Sohn (2012) called North Korea's nuclear policy a 'proliferation consistency', since the DPRK's pursuit of nuclear armament has continued to be strengthened. Confronting the threat, South Korea 'must arm itself with self-reliant defence capabilities that can assure the destruction of the North Korean regime should it provoke war' (Kang 2011: 135–136). Terry (2013) argued that acquisition of international status as a bona fide nuclear weapons state had been one of the most consistent strategic goals of the DPRK. According to her, not rewarding North Korea's destabilising behaviour—zero tolerance policy—must be prioritised to break the cycle of provocation. She admitted the need for dialogue with North Korea, but argued that it should be tactical in order to achieve 'intelligence gathering, delivering warnings, conveying positions and exploring differences' (Terry 2013: 84). For her, the current stalemate on the peninsula could be changed only if a fundamentally different leadership were to emerge in North Korea. The end game of the Korean nuclear crisis ought to be with the demise of the DPRK. As one might detect from the above literature, the very concepts of realism, such as sovereign-supreme authority and the existence of sovereignty, are at the centre of the discussion (Schmidt 2012). All placed the ROK's sovereignty and existence as top priority before anything else, therefore, there must be an end game and it should be either the demise of the DPRK or at least the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the DPRK's nuclear programme.

Conservatives have upheld two practical contradictions. Firstly, their perceptions vacillate between North Korea's rationality and irrationality. Many tend to argue that North Korea is not going to give up its nuclear weapons, but, at the same time, they strongly contend that North Korea must denuclearise. For example, the North Korean leaders have often been dubbed as 'absurd' or 'irrational' by many of South Korea's North Korean watchers (Park 2009; FPA 2016). Park H.R. (2008: 353) was dismissive of the engagement policy and believed that 'North Korean policymakers are not as rational as most people assume'. According to him, belief that North Korean counterparts are rational led to failure of the South's policymakers, and this notion can be referred to as a 'self-entrapment of rationality in dealing with North Korea'.

However, this kind of distinction is misleading, because North Korea has been developing the nuclear programme in order to guarantee continuation of its

own regime and this is mainly because of its rationality based on a cost-benefit analysis. From the realist's point of view, Pyongyang's behaviour can be interpreted as a sign of very rational behaviour.[19] This is why many realists predicted that the DPRK determined to go nuclear even before its first nuclear test in 2006 (Sagan and Waltz 1995; Oh and Hassig 2004). In that respect, realism, at least in the case of the ROK's security discourse, has been a categorical proposition rather than being a scientific epistemology.

Even though the awareness of a security reality is correct, conservatives seem to be naïve in terms of creating a realistic solution for the DPRK's denuclearisation. Policies led by realist thoughts have not shown a process by which they can make North Korea state actors think that the cost of developing weapons is quite high compared with their obvious benefits (Yoon 2014). Conversely, conservatives have been making the DPRK regime think that the cost of developing nuclear weapons is the most efficient and the cheapest way to guarantee its own sovereign-supreme authority. For North Korea, if they 'really' are realists, nuclear deterrence is not only inexorable, but also desirable.

Rationality appears to be a problem *per se*. Mercer (2010: 3–5) observed that 'rational decision making depends on emotion. […] A belief that another's threat or promise is credible depends on one's selection (and interpretation) of evidence and one's assessment of risk, both of which rely on emotion'. Quoting a neuroscientist, he said, 'the mechanisms of emotion and cognition appear to be intertwined at all stages of stimulus processing and their distinction can be difficult'. That is to say, one cannot be sure that IR scholars can apply the term rationality to decision-makers in the same manner as it has been applied to natural science or even sometimes to economics, because there could be several emotional or other similar factors in the process of making policy decisions.

Secondly, conservatives' perceptions of nuclear issues seem to have vacillated between realism and constructivism. It is well-known that realism sees state identities as fixed, whereas constructivists or any derivative theories prefer the flexible state identity (Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996; Adler 1997; Checkel 1998; Hopf 1998; Wendt 1999; Copeland 2000; Checkel 2008; Elman 2008; Cho 2009; Cho 2012; Flockhart 2012; Jackson and Sørensen 2013). Most

[19] Interviews with high-ranking South Korean government officials in charge of inter-Korean relations (March 2014–August 2014).

conservatives argued that North Korea would never give up its nuclear weapons, based upon the logic of IR realism such as egoism and power-centrism. At the same time, however, conservatives often use constructivist thoughts in solving the DPRK issue. That is, they seem to believe in the possibility that Chinese security interests on the Korean peninsula can be altered by way of persuasion. The point then needs to be focused on China's self-interest. Would Beijing impose crippling sanctions on Pyongyang for denuclearisation? According to the logic of realism, even if China does so, it would do that because they change a calculation of the offence-defence balance, not because they are inclined to being susceptible to persuasion.

This issue arises from the structural problem, which is the quintessence of structural realism, meaning the international system. As mentioned, the rise of China has been gradually transforming the American-led unipolar system in East Asia and the role of China has become one of the main variables that can impact the DPRK's denuclearisation. Both the ROK and the US are desperately in need of the Chinese government's help given Beijing's influence on Pyongyang. A contradictory point arises: why have conservatives (scholars or policymakers), in general, not tolerated the engagement policies—compromises or agreements—of the progressive governments with the DPRK, which aims to alter the DPRK's behaviour by persuasion, while thinking that they can 'persuade' China? Can they ever believe the power of identity shift over the structure?

Some conservatives might say that what is meant by persuasion and a subsequent change of a state's security identity in this case is not the same as that of the constructivist's concept, arguing that this is part of a strategic endeavour. However, given that (neo-)realists have regarded the rise of China as a structural change, a latent change of the Chinese security identity in North Korea (or on the whole peninsula) should be seen as a dramatic one that can transform the strategic stability in the region. The ROK's strategic dilemma also emerges at this point. As long as Pyongyang insists that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is a matter involving DPRK-US relations, Seoul's scope for strategic activity is limited. In this case, South Korea must cooperate closely with the US to avoid becoming isolated in the processes of negotiations.

This is a structural problem occurring since the mid-1990s. To reiterate, this situation became more complicated when China actively joined the structure,

since this implied that the DPRK's nuclear issue became a matter involving US-China relations. It shows exactly why persuading China is facing a problem of 'structural shift'. If anarchy and the international system are deterministic, as realism demonstrates, what conservatives have argued is a contradiction of what realism says. The concept of realist constructivism came out of this backcloth, and this will be dealt with later in this chapter.

2.2.2 Liberalism and Constructivism: more realistic than Realism?

Other theories have warred with realism over the Korean Nuclear Crisis. The competition amongst theories has become fierce since the end of the Cold War, as realism prevailed over other theories during the Cold War period, as stated above. In a broad sense, (neo-)liberalism (or liberal institutionalism) may be one of the most famous theories to have resisted the realists' predominance. It is generally embodied by economic interdependence by way of international regimes or institutions (Keohane 1982; Krasner 1983; Keohane 1990; Jackson and Sørensen 2013). Although liberalists still acknowledge the importance of the role of states, as Williams (2005) put it, borrowing Carl Schmitt's term, liberalism is sometimes demoted to a 'depoliticised' conception of politics. Jervis' (1999: 51) comments on neoliberalism succinctly explained its limitation in terms of policy implications: 'neoliberals do not discuss how states do or should behave when vital interests clash'. For instance, territorial conflicts between China and Japan (Diaoyu/Senkaku islands), and South Korea and Japan (Dokdo/Takeshima islands) cannot be adequately and simply explained by neoliberal analyses.[20]

This research reasons that liberalism or other equivalent theories could be subsumed under the same category as constructivism or its derivative theories. This is because, at least in terms of the North Korea policy, what these theories have in common is that they have usually been utilised by progressive governments, even though they have different ontological or epistemological perceptions. In practice, scholars who advocated the progressive governments held that their North Korea policies were predicated on both liberalism and constructivism. According to Moon Chung-in (2012), former advisor to the

[20] Former South Korean president Park Geun-hye referred to this situation as 'Asia's paradox': 'Asia increasingly lies at the heart of the global economy. Hence, the international community is apprehensive that a rising Asia long associated with rapid growth and more open cooperation is morphing into a clashing Asia' (Park 2012).

president of the ROK, DJ's foreign policy was deeply rooted in both liberalism and constructivism. Hence, it may be the case that constructivism was used as a theoretical substructure, while at the same time employing liberalism as a practical tool for strengthening economic engagement, so that in the long-term the ROK can see some changes in North Korea, such as marketisation (Smith 2015).

It should be added that neoliberalism and constructivist traditions are not mutually exclusive in that both deal with the concept 'norms'. Regardless of whether norms between the states are established tacitly or explicitly, norms affect states' behaviour significantly. For liberalists, such norms 'lie at the foundation of international regimes' (Viotti and Kauppi 2011: 251); for constructivists, norms—'cultural or institutional elements of states' global or domestic environments'—shape state identity (Katzenstein 1996: 52–53). As Christoph Bluth (2004: 25) pointed out, 'international relations are highly regulated and restrained by norms, and despite occasional breaches there are no indications that most states are willing to abandon those norms'.

With regard to this, Moon and Kim (2002: 45–68) suggested the concept of 'liberal constructivism' in order to 'combine the applications of constructivism and liberalism'. Kim and Cho (2009: 415) also agreed that 'cooperation between liberals and constructivists could reduce hostility and confrontation between the two Koreas in particular, and East Asia as a region'. However, it would be naïve to believe that international regimes always enhance cooperation. Sigal (1999), for example, saw the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during the first Korean Nuclear Crisis as negative. According to him, the IAEA put its internal rules and organisational interests before preventing the DPRK from future bomb-making. He further argued that because of a failure in Iraq beforehand, the IAEA was determined to pressurise North Korea and it impeded diplomatic give-and-take.

Some solutions have been proposed for the DPRK's nuclear issue based on liberal concepts, and these are, in general, linked with the concept of engagement. Of course, engagement could also be a realist concept, and engagement policy itself varies according to its specific forms. As the rivalry between engagement and coercion became tense among policymakers following the Cold War, Victor Cha (Cha and Kang 2003: 89) introduced the term 'hawk

engagement' whereby he underscored that 'engagement should be the desired strategy for hawks because this is the best practical way to build a coalition for punishment tomorrow'. According to him, today's carrots (positive incentives) can be tomorrow's most effective sticks (negative incentives or sanctions).

Oh and Hassig (2004) suggested a concept of 'proactive engagement' for the long-term strategy. They argued that DJ's Sunshine Policy was so cautious that it would take a large amount of time to get the peninsula reunified under Seoul's control. Instead, the engagement policy should target North Korean people by providing them with information so that they can develop their ability to make decisions about their governance. In other words, weakening Pyongyang's regime by enlightening North Korean people and eliminating political ignorance is the kernel of the proactive engagement. Kim and Kang (2010) concluded that engagement is a viable alternative to coercive strategies insofar as one condition would be met: other countries who become involved in any type of negotiations with North Korea should keep a degree of coordination among themselves despite differing different national interests. For them, the main reason why engagement had not worked lay with the huge perception gap between the countries involved.[21]

What these studies have in common is that all made attempts to create more viable alternatives when a situation reached stalemate, in spite of there being no guarantee of success in North Korea policy. However, these attempts using engagement still seem to be lacking in-depth discussion on the understanding of *otherness*, as they are based on so-called traditional IR theories that hold rationalism as one of the most important epistemological concepts. This is a self-oriented approach, just like a policy based on the coercive concept, since it makes little effort to identify the *other*'s objectives, and it also has to rely on the *other*'s (the DPRK's regime) will to change.

The real problem is still not addressed: how can policymakers discern the *other*'s objectives? Diagnosis of a conflicting situation from an objective position is indeed critical and difficult. Even realists, particularly defensive realists, who argue that most policymakers acknowledge without a doubt that the costs of war overshadow the benefits, are no exception to this problem (Lamy 2008). This is

[21] The 'relevant countries' in this case refers to participants in the Six-Party Talks: South and North Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the US.

because ‘defensive actions and capabilities are often misinterpreted as being aggressive’ (Elman 2008: 22). What is crucial is that one state’s (or securitising actor’s) perception of the *other*’s objectives will ultimately decide its security policy, and this perception is based heavily upon its own discursively constructed identity. In light of this, what is more interesting is that not only is there no manifest prediction of the direction the DPRK’s policymakers may take with their decisions concerning nuclear weapons, but the ROK securitising actors themselves remain ambiguous on their security perceptions of the DPRK regime.

A necessity for analysis of ‘ideational’ things comes from this point. Although it cannot solve complicated issues around the world, it can at least broaden the analytical world that had been regarded as a ‘fixed structure’ during the heyday of the IR mainstream theories. Many theoretical challenges to the IR mainstream came from constructivist tradition. In this tradition, much attention is given to the importance of ideational factors. For constructivists, ‘it is simply impossible to get a grasp on reality by only looking at the material world’ (Flockhart 2012: 84). The US expressed grave concern over one North Korean nuclear warhead (long before the DPRK’s first nuclear test), while many French or British nuclear warheads did not matter to the US. In a similar vein, Seoul has regarded Pyongyang’s nuclear weapon as a dire threat, whereas Beijing’s nuclear capability is not being recognised as an imminent threat to South Korea despite its proximity to the Korean peninsula. Ideas, or ideational factors, are the kernel of this tradition. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that discourse incorporates material. Even poststructuralists acknowledge that materiality is important. It is crucial that materiality is ascribed significance through discourse (Smith et al. 2012).

Copeland (2000) highlighted that structural realism lacks intersubjectively shared ideas, which is often a more determinant factor, by which actors constitute the identities and interests of actors. From this perspective, identity is relational: one’s identity and the *other* are dependent on each other. A social context of friendship/enemy comes to mind at this point. Poststructuralists also hold that their ‘analytical focus is on the discursive construction of identity’ (Hansen 2006: 23). As noted by Flockhart (2012: 85), ‘identity is the agent’s understanding of self, its place in the social world, and its relationships with others’. The concept of identity has served as a catalyst for studies on security perceptions of North

Korea. With regard to this, some researches have attempted to devise a path for reconciliation between the two Koreas by using the concept of identity (Smith 2000; Bleiker 2001; Bleiker 2003; Bleiker 2005; Son 2006; Smith 2007; Son 2007; Kim 2012).

Bleiker (2005: 121–122) argued that means of dealing with the *other* could determine the results of the major challenge ahead for both Koreas, because 'accepting the otherness of the other is essential if reconciliation is to prevail over conflict'. He called this an 'ethics of difference'. If the two Koreas cannot transform dialogical breakthroughs, such as Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007, into a more tolerant acknowledgment of each other's fundamental values, the conciliatory progress will be halted and caught in another vicious cycle.

Kim S-b. (2012) suggested an interesting analysis of the Roh Moo-hyun administration's response after the DPRK's first nuclear test. As he put it, from the realist's viewpoint, the Roh administration's response could be construed as under-balancing (or over-engaging). In contrast to this, the Lee Myung-bak administration's reaction to the North can be seen as over-balancing (or under-engaging). By analysing the domestic politics during the Roh administration's period, Kim concluded that the Roh administration's perception of North Korea was the result of discourse that had been formed by the norms and identities of inter-Korean relations. According to him, the Roh administration's under-balancing/over-engaging response to the first nuclear test was because geostrategic interests and security considerations are less important than the cultural elements that represent identities.

Son K-y. (2007) also analysed South Korea's perception of North Korea from the perspective of identity politics. In order to elucidate the formation of national identity, he held that national identity can be changed by human agency, such as norm entrepreneurs and statecraft. Therefore, the role of agents (or securitising actors) becomes important in this case, and actors' attitudes do not automatically reflect a salient identity of a country, but are an articulation of 'identity norms', which means 'standards of appropriate behaviour for in-group actors vis-à-vis an out-group' (Son 2007: 489).

The important role of securitising actors and their identities may be best epitomised by Wohlforth (1993: 2): 'if power influences the course of international

politics, it must do so largely through the perceptions of the people who make decisions on behalf of states'. Viewed in this light, DJ could be labelled as a norm entrepreneur, and his norm entrepreneurship—Sunshine Policy—was gradually embedded in South Korean society after his inauguration. Even though the engagement policy was interpreted initially as dissident norms against the backdrop of previously institutionalised identity norms, through the process of an 'identity norm life cycle (norm emergence – norm collision – norm cascade – norm internalisation)' (Son 2007), Sunshine Policy was followed by President Roh Moo-hyun, despite controversies surrounding the policy. In sum, all three arguments by Bleiker, Kim and Son have none of 'a given national identity' for both individuals and states. Their views 'stand in stark contrast to the realist and liberal assumption that actors in international politics have only one pre-existing identity' (Flockhart 2012: 85).

Smith (2000) argued that alterations in security perceptions are required. She seems to believe that national identity is changeable. As for her, policy analysis or the security perspective on North Korea is 'curiously outdated', and the securitisation against the DPRK is based on the postulation that North Korean politics is 'mad' in the sense that its motivation is normatively unacceptable. Smith also pointed out several fundamental assumptions of the prevalent securitisation paradigm: first, the DPRK will not be changed unless the regime is eliminated; second, the DPRK is an exceptionally bad or mad entity. As a result, 'the [previous] securitisation paradigm provides a poor guide for policymakers because it fails to grasp the complexity of North Korean politics and their rapidly changing nature' (Smith 2000: 617).

Her security analysis of the DPRK goes beyond conventional security matters and elite discourse. In her view, real security threats do come from the breakdown of North Korea's economic structure that may give rise to the DPRK's human security crisis including inequality, cross-border illegality and people-smuggling, rather than from its military capabilities (Smith 2007). Even though this study does not focus on human security, neither does this agree that the nature of North Korean politics has changed 'rapidly', Smith's argument shares the constructivist view that identity is relatively flexible.

In addition, one should think that an alteration of the perspective towards *others* is possible on the premise that an understanding of self is altered in the

first place. It is not easy, of course, to clearly observe this psychological process in chronological order (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Mercer 2010). One might say that both phenomena can occur simultaneously, since identity *per se* means relationships with *others*. Hence, identity is meaningful within a social context, whether based on amity or enmity. Regarding this, Lee Jong-seok, former Unification Minister of the ROK, also posit that North Korea's national identity or interests can be altered by the efforts of the international community. According to him, the North Korean regime did not know whether it should continue to develop the nuclear programme, at least before the fall of Libyan Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011. If anything, in terms of denuclearisation, North Korea had been strongly influenced by attitudes in the US (Lee 2011a).

Howard (2004) dealt with constructivism from another angle: the language games of the US government with respect to North Korea. He gave more weight to a language-based constructivist approach rather than to norm-oriented constructivism, because a norm-oriented one cannot explain 'why the US was willing to talk to one member of the axis of evil, North Korea, while it invaded another, Iraq' (Howard 2004: 812). He argued that both the AF and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) made the US reluctant to forcefully threaten North Korea because of a set of rules for negotiating the DPRK's nuclear issues. Conversely, the US-Iraqi relationship was short of negotiating tables that enabled the language games corresponding to the KEDO or Six-Party Talks (SPT) on the Korean peninsula.

However, Howard's arguments are indistinct for several reasons. First, language games create norms. The AF, KEDO and SPT began with language games but ultimately ended with a set of rules that the countries directly involved should abide by; that is, norms. Therefore, it would not be necessary to distinguish a language-based constructivist approach from a norm-oriented one in this case. Second, a real reason that the US would not invade North Korea is, as Howard admitted, the DPRK's formidable retaliatory capabilities. North Korea deploys a massive conventional force along the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) that can cause significant damage to the South as well as to US forces in South Korea. Cho Myung-chul, a high-ranking North Korean defector, explained that Pyongyang's willingness to wage war against the US and the ROK had been increased since Iraq's defeat in the first Persian Gulf War. Cho further argued

that ‘North Korean military officials concluded that Iraq had been too timid and defensive. If we’re in a war, we’ll use everything. And if there’s a war, we should attack first, to take the initiative’ (cited in Carpenter and Bandow 2004: 91). Nevertheless, Howard’s work deserves some attention as it showed that the ‘strategic use of language’ can either create or limit future actions of states.

To sum up, these alternative approaches have attempted to re-evaluate the rationality of previous securitisation processes or security perceptions, although they seem to be relatively tolerant of the North’s extreme belligerence. Further literature focused on the role of the US in the Korean peninsula (Sigal 1999; Harrison 2003; Cumings 2004; Harrison 2005; Cumings 2007). The authors argued that the US’s perception of the DPRK needs to be reconsidered. For them, the Korean Nuclear Crisis could have been resolved decades ago were it not for the reluctance of the US to negotiate with the DPRK. Although their criticism of US policy does not seem commensurate with that of the DPRK, it can be said that these arguments can be considered to be partly in sync with constructivist concepts, given that they raised the possibility of identity change for the securitising actors.

Despite the increase in studies based on constructivism amongst domestic scholars focusing on the Korean peninsula, most have concentrated on theoretical problems (Hong 2002; Namgung 2008; Choi 2009; Chun 2010). Relatively few studies have been devoted to the constructivist approach, including discursive or interpretative studies in relation to the South Korean governments’ security policy on North Korea (Kim 2002; Paik 2013). Paik H-s. (2013) analysed the Lee Myung-bak administration’s North Korea policy from the constructivist viewpoint. Utilising the concepts of identity, interests, agents and structure, he defined the Lee administration’s North Korea policy as ‘a failed one’. Paik argued that the Lee administration attempted North-South talks five times, all of which were initiated by international environments such as developments in the relationship between the US and China or the US and the DPRK. According to him, policymakers of the Lee administration can be defined as a pro-absorptive unification group, which pursued immediate and direct political interests through the North Korean regime collapse. In this regard, securitising actors of the Lee administration could be termed ‘Korean Neocon’. Although Paik’s analysis is based on constructivist concepts, given that the ROK’s policy towards the DPRK

has an ideologically divisive character, his harsh stance on the Lee administration that symbolised the conservative may not be free from criticism, as it is likely to broaden the previous policy gap between the conservatives and liberals.

Kim Y. (2002) pointed out that several constraints should be considered when applying constructivism to real policy. He took the Sunshine Policy as an example, emphasising that the policy that connotes the process of a 'common identity' (shared knowledge → shared identity → change of understanding → change of policy) necessitates a considerable amount of time. In other words, a policy based on constructivism takes too long to anticipate its effectuality, not to mention a short-term policy effect. To use Europe as an example, the concept of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)—an organised, agreed upon foreign policy of the European Union—'is characterised by remarkable sophistication of procedure', and its 'ambition of creating runs parallel to the entire history of European integration process' (Winn and Lord 2001: 20). That is, from the constructivist perspective, it took an enormous amount of time to form the common identity of the CFSP (McCormick 2011). It is therefore understandable that much more time and effort would be required for a similar process on the Korean peninsula.

It would be safe to say that scholars focusing on constructivism have tried to diversify the perspectives on North Korea. They have attempted to 'explore the background conditions and linguistic constructions' (Checkel 2008: 73) beyond realist definition of statecraft that is subject to the 'confining international structure' in which states must operate (Jackson and Sørensen 2013: 80). At the same time, however, the constructivism-centred approach was inclined to the progressive-wing thoughts, thereby being susceptible to criticism that it is short of an explanation for power politics. In addition, as the above literature review showed, many studies based on the constructivist concepts—discourses, norms, identity—were not able to overcome the level of simple analysis of conservatives and progressives. Even though the increasing number of scholars have been focusing on the role of discourse and language as methodological tools, constructivism, regardless of whether it is based on Wendtian (conventional) perspectives or poststructuralist ones, still appears at an initial stage in terms of epistemology.[22]

[22] Checkel (2008: 72–73) sees conventional constructivists as positivists, in that 'they start from

2.2.3 Towards an eclectic paradigm?

The concept of realist constructivism seem to be necessary at this point, as these concepts partly represent the changing trend of IR theories. After several Grand Debates of IR, including idealists versus realists, traditionalists versus behaviourists, and positivists versus reflectivists, the pursuit of 'theoretical peace' that searches for possibilities of various forms of pluralism, has become another general trend in this academic field (Dunne et al. 2013; Lake 2013). Strictly speaking, constructivism itself is one of such eclectic endeavours to bridge between paradigms (Adler 1997). Barkin (2003) rightly pointed out that constructivism does not have the same theoretical level as realism and liberalism, as it is directly linked to perception of IR theories, and therefore it is a meta-theory. For him, 'realist constructivism' can be an alternative. Barkin argued that constructivism does not necessarily connect itself with liberal-idealism; if anything, it is compatible with realism in that classical realists also stressed the importance of the role of morality and ideational elements as well as material ones. That is, 'constructivism adds to classical realism an ontological basis for understanding the social construction of politics in general' (Jackson 2004: 351). Michael Williams (2005) also observed that Hans Morgenthau's classical realism put emphasis on ideational variables, as Morgenthau demonstrated that the concepts of power and security interests are 'constitutive', according to different actors and situations.

However, as Chun (2010) pointed out, the concept of 'realist constructivism', as its name implies, still shares the same problem with constructivism. As noted above, constructivism is a meta-theory, which tries to bridge between foundationalism (positivism) and anti (or post)-foundationalism (postpositivism). This led many constructivists to experience ontological and epistemological confusion. For example, Alexander Wendt is widely seen as a thin constructivist, and he stays away from anti-foundationalism (Smith 1996; Zehfuss 2013). In effect, however, the basic ontological positions that many constructivists hold are heavily dependent upon normative or ideational concepts, such as identity, interests, ideology and discourse (Agius 2013). Given that all these concepts are

a standard (for the US) positivist view of how we should study IR', whereas he regards the European variant of constructivism as post-positivist or interpretive. In that regard, this research is closer to the European variant of constructivism.

closely linked with anti-foundational positions in many ways, what then would be the ontological and epistemological viewpoint of realist constructivism? If Zehfuss's (2001: 341) comment—'the notion that identities or their transformation can be treated as variables within a causal explanation is problematic'—is valid, the ontological and epistemological confusion of realist constructivism seems likely to continue (Sterling-Folker 2002).

Although this research does not base itself on realist constructivism, it stands in the midst of these trends that have reinforced the eclectic perspectives on IR. This research follows discursive (or interpretive) ontology and epistemology that may be located somewhere between constructivism and poststructuralism, since the study basically holds that security is discursively constructed. Nevertheless, as many other poststructuralists argued (Doty 1996; Hansen 2012; Epstein 2013; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015), this research also acknowledges the importance of material foundation from which discursive concepts can begin to grow, and regards the material factors as virtually existent that have consistently and significantly constrained the securitising moves of the South Korean actors. As aforementioned, the material factors can include several phenomena as follows: geopolitics (the rivalry between the US and China that affects the Korean peninsula as a structural factor), the ROK's Constitution, which illegalises the DPRK regime, the existent material nuclear threats of North Korea, and so forth.

2.3 Conclusion

What needs to be taken into account is: (1) that the 'taken for granted' dichotomy between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism should be flexible and; (2) that the term 'material factor' does not necessarily mean a 'deterministic structure' that IR traditionalists refer to, as it is inextricably and ultimately bound up with intersubjective interaction between state actors. As this study will later discuss, the dichotomy between materiality and non-materiality is neither right nor helpful for finding causes in IR, as causes can include not only the 'pulling and pushing' but also the 'constraining' and the 'constitutive' (Kurki 2006; Kurki 2008). Therefore, focusing on identification of possible 'causal influences' or 'capacities' is preferential, rather than just trying to find causes themselves (Eun 2012).

Having provided the theoretical contexts of the theme of the thesis, before moving to the case studies, the remaining task is to elucidate the methods and methodological foundation of the thesis. The following chapter presents a close examination of the conceptual points of discourse, security discourse and ST; including a preliminary stage in which this research applies ST to South Korea's security environment. Methods for the analysis of case studies will also be laid out in more detail in Chapter 3.

3.
Methodological Concerns: Conceptualising Security Discourse

The thesis has so far shown the principal academic and practical points that need to be considered concerning the ROK's security discourses on issues of the DPRK and its nuclear weapons. The perpetual contestation amongst IR theories has proved that none can be ruled out, not only because each theory is able to explicate part of the security situation on the peninsula, but also because they seem to have overlapped and even appear interchangeable, as shown in the previous chapter. These theoretical and practical considerations lead us to think about the necessity for a better-organised conceptual frame in order to unravel such a complicated issue in which no one has ever drawn a conclusion as to what could be a 'realistic solution' to the DPRK's nuclear problem. Consequently, the ROK administration's security discourses need to be examined in more detail in order to make discursive connections between the so-called leftist and rightist governments clear, and to detect in what sense their discourses overlap, and under what situations the discourses are ambiguous, divergent or distorted.

3.1 Conceptualising discourse

3.1.1 Characteristics of discourse

The goal of this chapter is to set up a clear criterion by which the thesis can analyse the security discourses of the ROK governments in a systematic and pragmatic way. It shows reasons why research based on discourse analysis (DA) is necessary in examining the Korean nuclear crisis. This chapter is also an additional part of the literature review in terms of providing a methodological background. Since discourse is a central term for this study, its meaning must be defined. As already shown in Chapter 1, the term discourse in this study differs from talking about mere facts. This implies that representing a reality is one of the obvious functions of discourse, and we know that the way reality is represented

is usually expressed by means of language. This is why discourse is inseparably linked to language, which is a 'medium through which we make sense of the world' (Diez et al. 2011: 39). In this sense, Paul Chilton (2004: 16) defined discourse as the 'use of language'. Discourse sometimes includes symbols or symbolic actions, and ultimately can 'encompass all forms of communication' (Schneider 2013a; Taylor 2013b).

However, even in this case, non-linguistic representations need to be interpreted as a form of language. No matter what techniques are employed to represent a reality, if representation means conveying a specific meaning, it entails linguistic interpretation. The range of definitions varies. Norman Fairclough saw discourse as a 'language of social practice determined by social structures', while David Howarth observed that discourse is 'systems of meaning, including all types of social and political practice, as well as institutions and organisations'. Maarten Hajer observed that discourse is 'a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices' (cited in Pierce 2008: 279–281).

With regard to definitions of discourse, one might notice that the term 'practice' is frequently used along with meaning, representation, and so on. That is, every discourse comes out of social or political practices. To borrow Hajer's phrase, each discourse is produced, reproduced and transformed by a set of practices. It should also be noted that a set of practices is operated by a group of people. As the sociolinguist James Gee pointed out, 'discourses are ways of displaying (through words, actions, values and beliefs) *membership* in a particular social group or social network' (cited in Taylor 2013b: 17; italics in original).

It seems that regardless of whether it is a thin or thick reflectivist (or postpositivist) tradition, which ranges from conventional constructivism to poststructuralism, one of the most important lexical units is mutual, since 'mutual constitution' is the vital concept for most reflectivists wanting to 'underscore the impossibility of pure objectivity' (Viotti and Kauppi 2011: 277). The concept of the impossibility of pure objectivity is predicated on the reflectivists' firm conviction that a society is intersubjectively (mutually) constituted (Checkel 2008; Adler 2013). Intersubjectivity, by definition, means 'the variety of possible relations between perspectives', which can 'belong to individuals, groups, or traditions and discourses' (Gillespie and Cornish 2010: 1). As mentioned in Chapter 1, even the

same phenomenon can be differently construed, because actors deal with information utilising their own cognitive structures (or different perspectives) that have been formed by myriads of social reasons. In that regard, neither social structures nor their context can be equivalent to the aggregated beliefs of individuals. If anything, a specific discourse that dominates a society is an outcome of intersubjective mutual constitution amongst influential actors. The actors 'can be found in individuals, groups, states, ideational structures, and non-human actants' (Salter and Mutlu 2013a: 2).

Klotz and Lynch (2007: 10) defined practices as 'the habitual actions' that emanate from interpretations that sustain 'dominant intersubjective understandings', and discourses can therefore be seen as 'the combination of language and techniques employed to maintain' the practices. In sum, representing a reality is a discussion about intersubjectivity among social or political agents that exert their power by way of discourse through which practices are being carried out. Put differently, the concept of 'mutual' ('inter-'), 'changeability' and 'contestability' have been at the centre of the tradition that stresses a discursive approach (Weldes 1996; Howarth et al. 2000; Van Dijk 2008; Glynos et al. 2009; Van Dijk 2009). In this process, to reiterate, the role of language is crucial, as language is connected to the 'human cognitive ability to engage in free critique and criticism' (Chilton 2004: 29).

3.1.2 Methodology for discursive turn

Unless neuroscience discovers the entire mechanism that can perfectly shed light on the pattern of people's behaviour, the interpretive approach in political or social science might be ineluctable. That said, the necessity of breaking the mould of dichotomy between explanation and understanding is worthy of notice. In other words, it would be unnecessary to draw a sharp line between causality (or explanation) and meaning (or interpretation) (Hay 2004). In that sense, it is worth quoting the following passage at some length:

> But this dichotomy between explanation and understanding relies on overdrawn distinctions between science and the humanities. […] The main dividing line among constructivists is the putative distinction between constitutive and causal claims. Yet few clear markers differentiate the two, because the language of "causality" is quite fluid. Separating constitutive "how possible" questions from causal "why" questions mirrors the problematic distinction between explanation and understanding. Yes, causal studies do tend to speak in terms of explaining behaviour, while studies of meaning talk about understanding the conditions for action. Certainly the terms are not interchangeable, but in practice there is considerable overlap.

> Those who say they explain behaviour also interpret meaning, and those who focus on understanding language also explain action to some degree.
>
> (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 14–15)

Milja Kurki (2006) in this sense aptly problematised the dichotomy between explanation and interpretation by pointing out that this trend originated from David Hume's conception of causation that only stressed the importance of our experiences of the empirical world, which is later strengthened by King, Keohane and Verba's (1994) *Designing Social Inquiry*. Kurki pointed out that ideas, norms and discourses 'define and structure social relations'. Put differently, one can regard ideas, norms and discourses as '"constraining and enabling" causes', and thereby it 'gets us away from the "pushing and pulling" model' (Kurki 2006: 206–207). Steve Smith (1996: 19) also argued that the empiricist epistemology based on the thoughts of David Hume and John Locke 'rules out any consideration of (unobservable) things like social or international structures' and it therefore 'does not allow us to talk about causes since these are unobservable'. In short, especially in relation to discursive approaches, causality is created not only by what we can observe and measure, but also by various facilitating conditions that are distinct from arbitrary ones.

John Fiske (1994) observed that the language people use is never neutral no matter how benign it may seem to others. As long as this thesis deals with discourse, it may not be a theoretical or methodological neutral interpretation of events. As Robert Cox (cited in Zehfuss 2013: 145; italics in original) pointed out, theory 'is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose'. In other words, 'to theorise means to prescribe a particular way of thinking about the world' (Burnham et al. 2008: 3). A useful starting point for this study is to acknowledge that the concept of the 'neutral' researcher is a fallacy, and to advocate 'reflexivity, so the researcher reflects on his or her own position and how it develops as the research progresses' (Baker and Ellece 2011: 27). Most researchers have their own values and prejudices and this 'undoubtedly affects the nature of their research' (Hammond and Wellington 2013: 14). Regardless of whether it is based upon positivism or postpositivism (reflectivism), this kind of epistemological concerns referred to above are always latent. For example, in IR, both neorealist and constructivist schools of thought are affected by this problem. It would be ineffective to criticise either realism or constructivism from the *other*'s point of

view on the grounds of the ontological or epistemological discrepancies between them, since the respective ways in which they look at a reality are totally different.

3.2 Conceptualising security discourse

Having discussed the attributes of discourse, let us turn to the theme of security discourse. It may be relatively easy to define security discourse as we have already seen that there are several definitions of discourse. One might call security discourse a security-related use of language, or it could be described as a security-related language determined by political structures (organisations) that wish to display a specific security issue through words, actions, values and beliefs. Such security discourses would probably be comprised of a social and political set of practices or habitual actions that emanate from political elites (securitising actors) wanting to represent something as either threatening or threatened objects. To borrow Stephanie Taylor's (2012) definition of DA, analysing security discourse might be defined as 'the study of well-established meanings or ideas around a security topic which shape how we can talk about it' or as 'the study of how meanings of a specific security issue are established, used, challenged and changed'.

As aforementioned, this thesis adopts ST as a theoretical framework. First of all, ST embodies the above-mentioned characteristics of security discourse in a systematic fashion, as well as directly dealing with security issues with either constructivist or poststructuralist perspectives that place emphasis on discursive conceptions as ontological and epistemological distinctions (Buzan and Hansen 2009). Secondly, ST provides researchers who espouse the reflectivist tradition with several helpful concepts, such as (de-) politicisation and (de-) securitisation, from which researchers can develop their own conceptual and methodological ideas that are distinct from security studies based on traditional theories. Thirdly, in terms of understanding security, ST offers room for researchers to forge new links amongst discourse (or language), security studies and critical approaches. In other words, it allows questions to be asked regarding 'existing social power relations' that produce, reproduce and challenge security discourses (Zehfuss 2013: 145). The connection between critical traditions in IR and ST will be discussed in the following section.

3.2.1 Securitisation Theory and its critics

The thesis has covered some essential aspects of ST in Chapter 1. This section deals with a more detailed contemplation of ST and concentrates on the theory as a medium for linking theory and methodology, in the sense that ST has a mixed origin from a theoretical perspective: constructivism, poststructuralism and critical theory (Balzacq 2011). In recent years, several accounts have pointed to the increasing debate on ST. ST 'has grown in complexity and nuance since its earlier articulation in IR by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde' (Salter and Mutlu 2013b: 818). Ever since the publication of *Security: A New Framework for analysis*, critics have argued over this term. The main arguments of the original ST are as follows: security is a speech act that is discursively constructed. To be securitised, issues must be 'articulated' by securitising actors. As noted above, this study basically follows this logic as a basis for interpretation of security discourses. In the articulation, a specific issue is represented as an existential threat to a particular group of people. The securitising actors (often political elites constituting governments) try to legitimate their representations of a specific issue by saying that the threat would significantly develop without taking exceptional (or extraordinary) measures.

According to the CS, which is the matrix of ST, 'the distinguishing feature of securitisation is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action "because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure")' (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). What decides a crucial security object of a country is therefore dependent upon a securitising actor's speech act. In this process, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the CS regards the securitisation as a more extreme version of politicisation. Donnelly (2013: 44) called this a 'threat-urgency modality'. In order to treat something as an imminent or existential threat, and 'to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat', a securitising actor's speech act involves an intersubjective understanding that is continuously being constructed within a political community (Buzan and Wæver 2003). In that sense, security cannot be defined in objective terms and is therefore 'a self-referential practice' (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 34).

This ST's basic logic has provoked several critiques, which engendered the second generation of ST scholars. The criticism of CS seems to be classified into five parts: speech acts, an audience, a criterion of successful securitisation, the

range of securitisation and the boundary of securitisation. To begin with, overemphasis on speech acts of the CS has been criticised by post-CS ST scholars. Ole Wæver, the core of the CS, argued that 'the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering "security", a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area' (1995: 55; italics in original). Wæver applied John Austin's term 'performative utterances' to explain the securitisation process that is initiated from a speech act. According to Austin, performative utterances not only describe something but also create (new) reality; namely, performatives are speech acts. For example, the words 'declare', 'promise' and 'vote' are called *explicit performatives*. By applying this concept to ST, Wæver transformed the traditional threat perception into what a speech act does (Austin 1975; Baker and Ellece 2011). As Léonard and Kaunert (2011: 57) pointed out, 'the original formulation of ST is heavily influenced by linguistics, and more precisely the concept of speech acts'.

Can we, then, conclude that a declaration (or a speech act) predetermines all securitisation processes? Balzacq (2011: 12–13) contended that 'language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it'. For him, a speech act itself cannot be empirically credible nor can it be theoretically useful. He gave an example of a typhoon: 'What I say about a typhoon would not change its essence. […] threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language'. Wilkinson (2007) also highlighted the problem of a speech act's centrality for securitisation. In the case of the overthrow of the government in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, the securitising dynamic was significantly changed by the swelling numbers of demonstrators and 'youths who had grown tired of listening to speeches' provided by an incumbent regime (Wilkinson 2007: 19–20). In other words, the ultimate cause of what has happened in Kyrgyzstan seems to be the actions, not the speech acts.

However, it seems that these critics defined the term 'speech act' too narrowly, and these views are predicated upon the dichotomous assumption that discourse 'is somehow locked in a linguistic realm and "can't do/won't do" materiality' (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015: 6). It is important to note that language and matter are inseparable. Of course, a speech act would be hollow

without an ensuing physical action, but at the same time, materiality is meaningless without a declaration of a specific security issue in regard to social context.[23] The power of a typhoon is immense. Its essence is unalterable regardless of speech acts. What is crucial, however, is that agents—social beings such as securitising actors and an audience—can not only be prepared, but are also much more aware of the danger of the typhoon in a very public sense with a declaration as a momentum. A typhoon is seen as a mature tropical cyclone, but it can also be seen as a god's anger in some regions. The differences of interpretation result in disparate social phenomena. It does construct a reality. The UK's nuclear weapons *Trident* programme does not raise US anxieties, but the US expresses extreme concerns over the DPRK's one low-grade nuclear weapon. 'Material cause in itself does not "determine" outcomes, nor does it provide an adequate explanation in and of itself' (Kurki 2006: 207). Speech acts inevitably incorporate material. These two things—speech acts and physical actions—simply cannot be separately identified.

In short, a speech act as a declaration of a securitising move is too important to be disregarded. Let us remind that when Austin said a speech act, 'he calls the "total situation" (or total context)' and 'the "total situation" is comprised of the "pertinent facts" that determine the situation as being of a certain sort' (cited in Stritzel 2014: 25). Oren and Solomon (2015: 318) also pointed out that 'Austin clearly recognised that the success of words in doing something at the very moment of their utterance depended in part on circumstances that preceded (and likely will succeed) that moment'. Speech acts should be accepted as an outgrowth of the relevant context in which numerous material and ideational elements are included.

Other criticisms of ST focus on the role of the audience. This problem also arose from the ambiguity of speech acts. These critiques suggest that the CS lacks a sense of an audience's role (Balzacq 2005; Balzacq 2011; Watson 2012). It seems that in some sense the CS brings these criticisms upon themselves by insisting that 'the issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such' without concrete conceptualisation of the range and the role of audiences

[23] 'Materiality' refers to 'the matter out of which the world is composed: the nonhuman things that make up our everyday existence as well as the corporeality of our embodiments', while 'discourse' is the 'meaning-making activity' (Aradau et al. 2015: 58). Susan Hekman (2010) (cited in Aradau et al. 2015: 58) said that discourse 'constitutes our social world and the structures that define it. It also constitutes the natural world by providing us with concepts that structure that world'.

(Buzan et al. 1998: 25). For Balzacq (2011: 20), the CS 'opts for an illocutionary view of security rather than a full-fledged model encompassing perlocution as well'.[24] By introducing Kingdon's 'three streams model', Léonard and Kaunert (2011) tried to reconceptualise the role of the audience, claiming that the CS implicitly downplays the audience role. According to this model, the problem stream (which refers to the construction of a policy problem capturing the attention of decision-makers), the policy stream (which refers to the process of policy formation in which policy alternatives are generated by specialists working in government positions) and the politics stream (which refers to political elements, such as public mood, election results and changes in the administration) constitute three streams.

It seems clear that the CS focused more on the securitising actors than the audience, and this critique is right in that the securitisation process initiated by a speech act is ultimately linked to a perlocutionary act. Kingdon's model also can give some insights into ST in terms of forming audience groups systematically. Nevertheless, what is problematic with this criticism is that it is still not clear what kind of audience deserves more attention in a specific security issue, nor does it provide standards for concrete classification between audiences. In some situations, several audiences can also be securitising actors. The audience could overlap with other audience groups according to their respective positions. For instance, expert groups can be subsumed under both policy and politics streams, since they can participate in debating security policies (or policy alternatives) as members of the policy stream, and at the same time they can create or organise public sentiment/opinion as members of the politics stream.

The problem of a criterion of successful securitisation is directly linked to the role of audiences, in the sense that securitisation represents a mutual process between securitising actors and audiences. Regardless of whether they belong to the CS or post-CS groups, it seems that almost all scholars acknowledge that 'audience acceptance' is one of the core conditions of successful securitisation (Buzan et al. 1998; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; Vuori 2008; Balzacq 2011; Stritzel 2011; Stritzel 2012; Watson 2012; Donnelly 2013; Salter and Mutlu 2013b;

[24] According to Austin (1975: 98–132), speech acts can be classified into three types: *locutionary* (which refers to the superficial meaning of a speech), *illocutionary* (which refers to the real meaning of a speech by which the speaker intended to persuade audiences) and *perlocutionary* (which refers to the actual effect of a speech act, which makes audiences do something; if this is the case, the audiences are 'persuaded' by a speaker).

Stritzel 2014). These are all based on the assumption that ‘only the audience can decide whether this proposal will be accepted as legitimate’ (Donnelly 2013: 45–46). Even in socialist systems, securitising actors need to ‘nourish and sustain’ the communication with audiences ‘in order to maintain the political order’ (Vuori 2008: 71).

These perspectives are ostensibly right, and it has indeed made ST abundant in terms of its theoretical position; however, the devil is always in the detail. Although one ought to acknowledge that securitising actors and audiences are reciprocating in principle, some practical issues need to be considered: what if the audience cannot decide which security position (speech acts) would be better? What if public opinion about security issues is too divisive (for example, supporters of the conservatives and proponents of left-wing politics are neck and neck)? What if both securitising actors and audiences just cannot see through the common enemy’s (North Korea’s) intention, and both agents run short of the ability to analyse what is going on in the enemy’s side? What if securitising actors and some audiences, including expert groups, are complicit in the securitisation process in the interest of their domestic authority? Can the acceptance of the audience be an ultimate criterion for a successful securitisation? The problem of insufficient empirical studies strengthening ST still remains.

Be that as it may, it seems possible for researchers to delimit what they should analyse in terms of DA. If anything, investigators need to specify the demarcation between a securitising actor and the audience, even if these two agents are interrelated at the final stage of the securitisation process. The process is sometimes closer to an illocutionary act rather than a perlocutionary act, at least in the early phase: the declaration (or construction) of a new security issue with proposed extraordinary measures provided by policy makers. For example, when Seoul initiates a new North Korea policy, the launch of the policy depends heavily on the president’s (or several top policy makers’) personal political philosophy towards North Korea (Im 2004; Hahm 2008). The direct role of the audience cannot easily be found, particularly in the early stage of the securitising moves against the DPRK, even though the government is elected by the audience’s power. As a result, what is needed is a more condensed and specified definition of a securitising actor (or an audience). This might be a more practical start.

Two additional concerns about ST are the range (which refers to the objects on which ST needs to focus) and its boundary (which refers to the dynamics of securitisation, politicisation and desecuritisation). The origin of these concerns seems to be linked to the CS's original questions: how do researchers 'provide a classification of what is and what is not a security issue?', and 'how do issues become securitised?' (Buzan et al. 1998: 1). Buzan (1991) contended in his book *People, States and Fear* that states are the principal referent object, while at the same time introducing several types of national insecurity including societal threats. Wæver (1995) developed the concept of societal security to refer to identity, which constitutes a duality of state security. For the CS, societal security could be understood as identity security as part of the planning that aims 'to set out a comprehensive new framework for security studies'. In this context, although the referent object for security is often regarded as the state (or the nation), securitising actors 'can construct anything as a referent object' (Buzan et al. 1998: 1, 36, 120). Regarding this, Knudsen (2001) opined that the CS must consider the military sector and the state as a core concept of securitisation. Even if one admits the importance of the broad security concept, securitisation 'inevitably requires a more consistent interest in security policy', since the CS's position, either on the state or on security issues, are ambiguous (Knudsen 2001: 365).

However, Knudsen's view itself still seems to be no more than security studies that are inclined to traditional perspective, and in that respect, the CS's attempt is worth considering, despite its ambiguity. What is interesting here is that this kind of criticism of ST could be converted into contrary logic from the perspective of other academic spectrums. For instance, critical security studies' argument is in sharp contrast with that of Knudsen. Ken Booth (cited in Buzan and Hansen 2009: 215) criticised ST as being 'state-centric, elite-centric, discourse-dominated, conservative, politically passive, and neither progressive nor radical'.

Above this, Hansen (2000) raised an issue of 'the silent security dilemma'. Taking an example of honour killings in Pakistan, she raised a question of 'security as silence'. Honour killings of girls and women in Pakistan are a gender-



Figure 3.1 Conceptual boundaries of ST

related problem. It is not only 'the question of equality of social security', it is also an existent and imminent threat towards *women*. However, this problem has a deep connection to Pakistani culture in terms of gendered collectivity, which has led to a long absence of speech acts for securitisation. Therefore 'the focus on the verbal act of speech causes difficulties in coming to terms with what can be called "security as silence"' (Hansen 2000: 291, 294). Paradoxically, however, through this problem ST shows the importance of the role of speech acts all the more, even though securitisation *per se* cannot solve the problem. Had ST not stressed the distinctive role of a speech act as a catalyst for the securitisation process, the honour killing issue in Pakistan could not have been recognised as a potential security issue that revealed the threat towards women.

Providing a classification of what is and what is not a security issue causes another problem: ST's boundary (Figure 3.1). This is caused by the distinction between politicisation and securitisation suggested by the CS. As Emmers (2007: 116–117) pointed out, 'the model may not be able to sufficiently dissociate an act of securitisation from a case of severe politicisation'. He further argued that 'the solution for non-military challenges are frequently found in the realm of politics', and therefore, concerning securitising as an issue, 'the political motives' need to be stated. In a sense, Emmer's comment was inevitable, as the CS themselves said that securitisation can be seen as 'a more extreme version of politicisation', which means the realm of security and that of politics are standing along the continuum, therefore they cannot be separated at a specific point.

Although appearing to have a different philosophical basis, Karl Schmitt's concept of sovereignty might be briefly recalled at this point. 'For Schmitt, sovereignty is defined by the act of *decision*'. As Schmitt explained, a 'Sovereign is one who decides upon the exception', and it can thus be compared with an extraordinary measurement of ST, which is an articulation of emergency. Schmitt's concept of sovereignty 'lies in the act of decision merges powerfully with his famous vision of "the concept of the political"' (Williams 2005: 85–86;

italics in original). Given that both Schmitt and ST see the conditions of emergency as the essence of decision made by securitising actors (or the Sovereign), the boundary issue between politicisation and securitisation appears to be collateral, because regardless of these '-sation' types, what is crucial here is the forging of security by securing national identity (or fortifying political ideology) that can be corroborated by either politicisation or securitisation.

Meanwhile, the boundary issue also seems to be linked to 'institutionalisation'. If a specific threat is so extremely resilient that securitising actors no longer have to utter the threat repetitively, and thereby the threat becomes taken for granted, one can say that the securitising moves are institutionalised. As Faye Donnelly (2013: 49) pointed out, and as Figure 3.1 shows, this 'raises questions about how desecuritisation becomes possible in this context', and 'if speaking security becomes the norm rather than exception, the boundary between politicisation, securitisation and desecuritisation begins to blur'. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this issue can have an important implication for the ROK's securitisation case, in which the nuclear threat from the DPRK seems to have been so resilient.

3.2.2 Securitisation Theory and the ROK: analytical mechanisms

The new challenge for traditional security studies began with the following questions: '*what* is it that is being secured?', 'what constitutes the *condition* of security?', and 'how do *ideas* about security develop, enter the realm of public policy debate?' (Lipschutz 1995: 1–2; italics in original). ST also arose from this academic-resistant current. It refused to accept an objective or material things as a basis of security, and thereby brought a process of securitisation initiated by agent's speech acts. Hence, ST is inextricably linked to the concepts of ideas, identity and discourse. As Bill Mcsweeney (1996: 84–85) said, for the CS, 'a society's survival is a matter of identity', and 'identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation among people and interest groups'. The CS asserts that 'the label *subjective* is not fully adequate' to figure out the process of forming security based on identity, therefore securitisation 'has to be understood as an essentially intersubjective process' (Buzan et al. 1998: 30–31; italics in original). Security is either socially or discursively constructed.

One additional point that needs to be considered is that a delicate eclectic theoretical perspective is needed when dealing with ST since it is based on a theoretical mix: constructivism, critical theory and poststructuralism. As a result of this, ST has naturally utilised concepts and methods derived from interdisciplinary research, such as politics, sociology, psychology, linguistics and so on. However, the fact that ST is a comprehensive theory has made the CS vulnerable in terms of its academic position. Stritzel (2014) pointed out that the theoretical ambiguity of ST has been clear as it oscillates between a formalistic speech-act theory (linguistics), poststructuralist reading and sociological theory. The CS's middle position, between traditionalist state-centrism and 'equally traditional peace research's and critical security studies' calls for "individual" or "global security"', seems to have made the ambiguity issue bigger (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 213).

No matter how complicated it seems from the perspective of a unitary scholarship however, what is important here is that ST is also based on a 'reflexive relationship between knowledge and social reality' along with other constructivists' theorising (Guzzini 2005: 496). Although ST has a mixed theoretical origin, there is no doubt that ST cannot be equal to critical security studies in which 'emancipation is something of a mantra' (Zehfuss 2013: 150). This does not rule out the possibility of ST as a vehicle for emancipation. Insofar as the 'salience of identity politics' continues (Rengger and Thirkell-White 2007), the connection between critical theory and ST will also run on.

The same holds for the association of ST with poststructuralism. As Sjöstedt (2013: 146) opined, as 'many followers of securitisation lean towards a more postpositivist position, securitisation is essentially viewed as a mutually constitutive process'. Both 'draw attention to the political implications of representations and interpretations' by focusing on discourse (Zehfuss 2013: 154). Both posit that identity is vital in the construction of security (Buzan and Hansen 2009). Both proposed 'a performative analysis' (Guzzini 2005: 512). As Bialasiewicz observed, performativity refers to how 'discourses constitute the objects of which they speak', and therefore, as Campbell (cited in Zehfuss 2013: 154) said, it 'enables us to understand security culture as a relational site for the politics of identity'. These similarities remind us of the constructivist assumptions that see national interests as 'meaningful objects with which the world is

understood', which 'emerge out of the representations'. In constructivism, national interests are seen as 'the product of intersubjective processes of meaning creation' during which securitising actor's articulation and alternative representations can be 'contested' (Weldes 1996: 280–285).

Despite all the similarities, it might not be easy to render poststructuralism equivalent to ST simply because poststructuralists do not correspond with ST's agent-centrism. As Stritzel (2014: 41) pointed out, for example, Jacques Derrida saw 'the speaking human subject' as 'just a function of language', whereas ST place a greater emphasis on speaking agents. Poststructuralists' incessant emphasis on the constitutive power of discourse that necessarily entails 'deconstruction' can also make the CS reluctant to identify with them, because ST needs, in one way or another, a relatively 'stable' rule of speech acts in a language game in order to securitise an object that has previously been established as a basis on which the actors exert their legitimate authorities (Donnelly 2013). Be that as it may, based on the above discussion, one might notice that discourse is vital for analysing securitising moves. Insofar as the core of ST implies the discursive processes in security studies, and given that ST has played an important role of bridging between discursive approaches and traditional security approaches, it would be worth noting how security studies based on a discursive model can contribute to analysis for empirical security issues that have complicated and overlapping theoretical factors, as seen in the ROK's security discourses.

Having discussed the main arguments of ST, its theoretical position, methodological or empirical pitfalls and its inseparable relationship with discourse, let us return to the practical issue of the Korean peninsula, which has every reason to study security in a discursive manner. First, the securitising moves of the Korean Nuclear Crisis emanated from the ideological cleavage between the two Koreas, and the cleavage deepened as securitising actors participated in forms of their own understanding and consciousness by means of discourse (Purvis and Hunt 1993). There is no doubt that the two Koreas have developed their own political discourses by virtue of the disparate ideology, identity, rhetorical style and so on. It is well known that the history of the peninsula's conflict has been fraught with rhetorical, ideological hostility (Oberdorfer and Carlin 1998; Bleiker 2005; Bluth 2011a).

Some might say that the ideological conflict (communism/socialism versus liberal democracy/capitalism) is over on the grounds that the major objective for the North Korean regime is to sustain its current position, regardless of ideological form. This could be right. However, no one can deny that contemporary ideological conflict on the peninsula originated in the Cold War relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. The two Koreas remain suspicious of each other's intention to unify the peninsula by absorption or force based on a one-sided ideology. Moreover, the North Korean-style ideology such as *Juche* (self-reliance or self-dependence), *Seon-gun* (military first) and its own brand of socialism (Kim Il-sung-ism or Kim Jong-il-ism) is the strongest instrument of propaganda for sustaining its internal authority.[25] With regard to this, Norman Fairclough, the core of critical discourse analysis (CDA), claimed that 'political leaders will argue that their views are, basically, *common sense*, whilst their opponents' are entirely *ideological*' (cited in Pierce 2008: 286; italics in original). Both Korean actors also have stigmatised each other as entities preoccupied with authority and ideology, while upholding their own discourses.

Second, the peninsula has been awash with rhetorical wars. The international community seems to have become accustomed to taking a barrage of bombastic (sometimes real threatening) comments from Pyongyang. The intensity of its rhetoric against Seoul and Washington has significantly increased since young leader Kim Jung-un's appearance. Although it is not as vituperative as the DPRK's rhetoric, South Korea has also raised its rhetorical threatening level correspondingly.[26] It is often described as 'a war of words'. Each Korea's ideology is too contradictory to coexist with each other. Consequently, the security discourse of the peninsula has not only been condensed to hostile ideologies between the two Koreas but is also fraught with 'agreeing to disagree' even when they are in agreement in certain cases.

[25] In April 2009, while Kim Jong-il was alive, North Korea removed the term 'communism' from its constitution. Instead, it upheld its own socialism and planned economy system. However, the North Korean media began to use the term again under the Kim Jong-un regime.

[26] For example, from March to April 2013, the DPRK announced the nullification of the 1953 truce that ended the Korean War and declared the military ready for combat. Soon after, North Korea warned foreign diplomats residing in Pyongyang to evacuate in the event of war. In April 2016, Kim Jong-un threatened the US and South Korea with inter-continental ballistic rockets, saying 'keep any cesspool of evils in the earth including the US mainland within our striking range and reduce them to ashes' (Kwon and Park 2016). Meanwhile, reportedly, the US-South Korea held massive joint military exercises, dubbed as a 'beheading mission'. The target of the mission was Kim Jong-un himself (Talmadge 2016).

Third, and more importantly in the context of this research, this ideological cleavage between the two Koreas resulted in sub-ideological conflicts, known as *nam-nam galdeung* (South-South discord), within the ROK, debating whether or not they should regard the DPRK as an enemy. As seen in Chapter 1, this is represented as dissension between the conservative and progressive blocs, and this dichotomy has been dominant amongst securitising actors as well as the audience, which ranges from political elites to scholars to media to the general public (Shin 2006; Son 2006; Son 2007). In other words, concerning the solution for the DPRK's nuclear issue, the dominant security discourse has been a conservative-progressive dichotomy from which almost every sub-security discourse is derived. The frame has been strengthened by several seminal remarks made by securitising actors.

Let us briefly look at some of the remarks of Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak to see why their perceptions of the DPRK's nuclear threats have been regarded as disparate. As aforementioned, it should be noted that South Korean presidents have taken a leading role in establishing security policies on North Korea. As an individual factor, the influential power of the presidents has been phenomenal (Im 2004; Hahm 2008). Lee Sun-jin (2013), former Deputy Minister for policy planning and international organisations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROK, pointed out that 'if truth be known, there have been wide deviations in South Korea's North Korea policy according to each president's political tendency'. Particularly in relation to security perceptions of North Korea, South Korean presidents have exercised enormous political leverage in the process of making North Korea policy. Although this does not necessarily belittle the role of the structural factors and other agency-level factors, analysis of the ROK security discourse would be meaningless without an examination of presidential speech acts.

The following quotation was frequently used to show how President Roh, amongst many analysts, perceived the Korean Nuclear Crisis. Many Pyongyang-watchers called this 'Roh Moo-hyun Doctrine'.

> [North Korea's] rigidity may be reasonably interpreted as motivated by their need to be assured about the safety of its system that might be endangered if it accommodated changes. […] The North Koreans maintain that their nuclear weapons and missiles constitute a means of safeguarding their security by deterring threats from the outside. By and large, it is hard to believe what the North Koreans say, but their claim in this matter is understandable

> considering the environment they live in. We cannot conclusively say that Pyongyang is developing nuclear weapons to attack someone or to support terrorists.
>
> (Roh 2004a: 12 November)

In this speech Roh stressed that a favourable environment for North Korea must precede any containment policy against them. That is, the surrounding countries, such as South Korea and the US, should lighten the security burden of North Korea to solve the nuclear issue because Pyongyang's main security concern is inextricably linked with antagonistic relations, particularly between the US and the DPRK. In the same speech, Roh further argued that 'in the final analysis, the North Korean nuclear issue boils down to whether security will be provided to the North, and whether or not it will be given an opportunity to overcome its plight through reform and openness' (Roh 2004a).

It seems that Roh's belief system lasted even after the North's nuclear test. He finally showed his confidence in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue by way of dialogue after returning from the second inter-Korean summit held in Pyongyang in October 2007: 'negative views are voiced in some quarters about the progress of talks. They say the North is not reliable, but this kind of view is not right. Only dialogue, not any form of pressure, will persuade the North to abandon its nuclear programme' (Roh 2007b: November 13).

Unfortunately, Roh's moment of triumph was not long-lasting. As Donald W. Keyser (2011: 27) pointed out, Lee Myung-bak's landslide electoral victory in December 2007 was widely interpreted as a 'stark repudiation of ten years of progressive policies under Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun' in South Korea. As mentioned earlier, Roh stressed that South Korea and the US need to understand the security challenge North Korea is facing; therefore, it is mandatory that Seoul and Washington must try to dissipate Pyongyang's security concerns. Instead, Lee underlined North Korea's denuclearisation as an essential prerequisite for resuming talks with Pyongyang:

> [That] a second nuclear test was conducted by North Korea last week is extremely disappointing and shocking news, not only to the Korean people but also to the world. When all countries are concentrating on surmounting the current economic crisis, the North Koreans pushed ahead with the nuclear test. […] North Korea has to realise the fact that posing threats to the stability and peace of the world with a nuclear arsenal would turn out to be extremely detrimental to the North Korean regime as well.
>
> (Lee 2009c: 3 June)

Lee's stance on North Korea seemed to be much more resolute. However, it could not prevent North Korea from creating further provocations. As noted

above, North Korea committed unprecedented provocations including the navy ship *Cheonan* incident and the artillery attack on *Yeonpyeong* island. Above all, the DPRK's third nuclear test, which occurred in February 2013, was just before Lee's retirement from the presidency. Meanwhile, Pyongyang's new leader Kim Jong-un successfully constructed his internal legitimacy (Swenson-Wright 2013: 147) (although it is not certain whether Kim asserted his authority over the country in the long term). Lee maintained his hawkish perception of Pyongyang up to the time of his retirement. He expressed that he relinquished a hope of denuclearisation in North Korea without DPRK's regime change: 'At long last, we came to a realisation that it no longer makes sense for us to anticipate that the North would abandon its nuclear programme or its policy of brinkmanship on its own' (Lee 2010a). In a farewell speech, Lee argued that 'although the North Korean regime refuses to change, the people in the North are changing fast and no one can stop it. […] We are observing the change closely' (Ser 2013).

The above-mentioned speeches addressed by Presidents Roh and Lee show that there are some differences in security discourse in dealing with the DPRK's nuclear issue. Accordingly, the Roh and Lee administrations' perceptions of North Korea seem to be disparate, and the discourse based on the 'conservative-progressive' dichotomy has strengthened in this way. It is this dichotomy that has hindered the ROK securitising actors as well as the audience from establishing a more consistent North Korea policy, and the vicious cycle of the pattern seems to be unending as long as there is friction between the two groups.

What is somewhat surprising is that even ST, which itself needs to have a 'critical' perspective, has been used to reinforce such a dichotomous perspective in analysing the ROK's security discourses. For instance, borrowing the ST's terms, Kim S-h. and Lee G. (2011) argued that the Kim Dae-jung and Roh administrations virtually desecuritised the DPRK's nuclear problem by downgrading its nuclear threat from existential to non-imminent. According to them, these administrations also desecuritised the same threat by taking measures including inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007, as well as by stressing the importance of the continuity of inter-Korean relations. They further argued that the Lee administration securitised the same issue, as they regarded

Table 3.1 Units of security analysis: South Korea's securitisation

Units		Contents
Existential threat		The DPRK's nuclear weapons
Referent objects	Special relations	Peaceful Inter-Korean relations → Peaceful unification
	International system	The ROK-US alliance, The ROK-China relations
	Political system	Liberal democracy
	Economic system	Market economy
Extraordinary measures		Pre-emptive strike, coercive diplomacy, engagement, etc.

the denuclearisation of North Korea as an essential prerequisite or at least a crucial element for the restoration of trust between the two Koreas.

However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, one must call into question the current discourse: given that security is discursively constructed in the tradition of ST, can we really say that the Roh administration desecuritised the North Korean nuclear threat while the Lee administration securitised it? Can diplomacy or dialogue not be subsumed under the category of extraordinary measures? Are the two political blocs' security discourses really different? Are the two presidents' perceptions of the nuclear issue really different? If different, in what sense are they different? If not, in what sense are they similar? Can the current discourse framed by the dichotomous perspective be a rational tool for explaining the ROK's security discourses? Is there not a possibility of founding a dialectical discourse model whereby one can evaluate the current security discourse that only highlights the disparities between the conservative and the progressive? If there are some fundamental obstacles that make the ROK's securitising actors become stuck in a discursive contradiction, what are they, and in what way are these obstacles expressed in the actors' speech acts?

In the author's view, ST should and could offer a better starting point for academic assessment of these issues. If security is a result of discursively and socially constructed processes, as the CS argued, speech acts made by securitising actors would matter in that they constitute a potentially dominant security discourse. Therefore, it allows us to investigate what the securitising actors have been saying about the *existential threats*, *referent objects* and *extraordinary measures*. If the Roh and Lee administrations' securitising moves towards the DPRK's nuclear issue are really different, speech acts of the two

presidents must be different. If not, however, there would be at least two latent possibilities that could hinder the ROK's securitisation process. First, the ROK's securitisation against nuclear weapons is, in fact, not so much securitisation as politicisation. The second possibility relates to ST's theoretical incompleteness. Either way, the case of this thesis will show either ST's analytical forte or its inadequacy as a theoretical framework. In this regard, Table 3.1 shows *a priori* classification of the ROK's security discourse on the DPRK's nuclear threat. The analysis of the Roh and Lee administration's security discourses will be dealt with, based on this framework, in the following two chapters.

3.3 Compiling methods

3.3.1 Methodology for security discourse

Research design is concerned with 'turning a research question, a hypothesis or even a hunch or idea into a manageable project' (Hammond and Wellington 2013: 131). That is, 'to formulate a research project is inevitably to make a series of choices' (Hansen 2006: 73). DA is not an exception. When it comes to questions of meaning, it is always difficult to begin with 'a fundamental matrix of dimensions which would satisfactorily allow us to organise all approaches neatly and without remainder' (Glynos et al. 2009: 6). Even though discourse analysts try to represent reality against essentialism or objectivism, all DA may be a sort of specific representation that is selective. In this sense, taking a 'problem-driven approach' might be desirable rather than clinging to ontological emphasis that implies a 'purely theory-driven approach' (Glynos et al. 2009: 9–10).

Having problematised empirical phenomena, as mentioned in Chapter 1, one can then 'narrow the scope' of the agenda 'enough to make it operational' (Schneider 2013b). Silverman (2013: 96) also reiterated that the importance of narrowing the focus rests on the fact that 'it will produce a manageable and achievable research task'. Then what should analysts focus on in methodological terms? Jonathan Potter (cited in Silverman 2013: 110; italics in original) pointed out that 'DA has an analytic commitment to studying discourse as *texts* and *talk in social practices* […] the focus is […] on language as […] the medium for interaction; analysis of discourse becomes, then, analysis of what people do'.

This research has already dealt with the essential traits of discourse, the relationship between discourse and language, and the role of discourse in security studies. Securitising actors construct security identity and security context, which are intersubjective, by means of texts and talk in social practices. Discourse, in other words, 'both provides a constitutive context for political articulations […] and consists of articulatory practices that re-produce but also re-shape this context' (Diez 2014: 3). Following Potter's reasoning, the thesis would also commit to analysing language that forms interaction among securitising actors in the first place (looking for patterns of security discourse), and then it would move to an analysis for 'classifying the various strategies' of the actors (interpretation of the discourse) (Taylor 2013b: 45).

Accordingly, this research holds with the notion that language is political particularly in regard to a discursive approach in security policy, and conforms to the anti-foundationalism that explains 'reality is not discovered. […] No actor can be objective or value-free. Reality is socially constructed' (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 190–191). Be that as it may, it does not necessarily mean that this study is entirely against causality and explanation, nor does it hold to poststructuralism altogether. Avoiding extreme theoretical and methodological positions in the debate seems to have become the ethos of the 21st century's discipline of IR theory (Eun 2012; Diez 2014; Dunne et al. 2013; Lake 2013; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015). According to Jackson and Sørensen (2013: 246), for instance, many IR scholars have 'moved towards a less confrontationist view of methodology. […] They seek out a middle ground which avoids a stark choice between 'positivist' and 'post-positivist' methodology'. In Hay's (2004: 143) words, 'such a dualism is unhelpful'. DA does not focus on providing a new theoretical apparatus; instead, it tries to offer a new analytical perspective in order to investigate the rules and meanings that affect the construction of social and political identity (Torfing 2005).

3.3.2 Methods for security discourse: corpus-assisted DA

Although there are 'no firm guidelines about how' DA 'should be carried out' (Burnham et al. 2008: 248) in terms of methods, there have been many efforts to show how DA can delineate the complicated nature of foreign affairs and national security, and a variety of analytic approaches are being used. This study basically

agrees with the logic of mixed methods in order to ‘compensate for the perceived shortcomings of stand-alone methods, with the aim of either providing a more complete picture or enhancing coverage’ (Barbour 2008: 151). As Jennifer Mason (cited in Barbour 2008: 155) pointed out, ‘social experience and lived realities are multi-dimensional and […] our understandings are impoverished and may be inadequate if we view these phenomena only along a single continuum’.

Analysing securitising actors’ speech acts may be a time-consuming and complicated process, just as it is in analysing qualitative data (Mason 1994: 89). The necessity of computer-assisted corpus linguistic analysis arises at this point. The expediency of corpus linguistics has recently received attention, particularly in DA, as it enriches research design as well as interpreting results (Mautner 2009; O'Keeffe and McCarthy 2010; Pearce 2014). Corpus-assisted DA is a ‘systematic attempt to identify the frequency with which certain words, functions or concepts occur within a text and […] to explore the context in which these words are positioned for rhetorical or other effect’ (Hammond and Wellington 2013: 34). It also allows the researcher ‘to work with enormous amounts of data yet get a close-up on linguistic detail’, which is ‘hardly achievable through the use of purely qualitative CDA, pragmatics, ethnography or systemic functional analysis’ (Mautner 2009: 125).

It is expected that DA assisted with corpus linguistics could offer a meaningful starting point for the evaluation of core terms used by securitising actors. In addition, by utilising corpus linguistics software to identify ‘the relative statistical significance of the co-occurrence of items’ (Mautner 2009: 125), corpus-assisted DA could help analysts to reveal changing and repetitive patterns of actors’ speech acts. Therefore, the author’s ‘individual, intuitive judgement on evaluative meaning with shared assumptions and judgements’ could be improved or objectified with the help of corpus-based collocational information (Mautner 2009: 136). However, it does not necessarily mean ‘relegating qualitative methods to a later stage in the research project’ (Barbour 2008: 160). Having a comprehensive knowledge of an issue means that an analyst is able to deduce or infer *a priori* core terms and preliminary interpretation within a specific context as previously perceived by the analyst. In this respect, it would be possible to choose typical texts and core terms along with corpus-assisted analysis.

Table 3.2 Keywords by simple frequency

Roh Moo-hyun administration	Lee Myung-bak administration
South-North	principle
promotion / enlargement	advanced security
cooperation	unification policy
FTA	South-North
Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)	Cheonan corvette
energy	missile
peace	Mt. Keumgang
agreement	Yeonpyeong Island
military	promotion
stage	reinforcement
inter-Korean relations	national defence
economy	future-oriented
summit	improvement
support	provocation
USFK	strong army
North Korean nuclear weapons	enlargement
mutual	intimidation
Six-Party Talks (SPT)	measures
peace system	support
national security	Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)

Since this study more directly draws on ST, which is later defined by Stritzel (2014: 51) as ‘a distinct theory of discourse of a special kind in security studies and international security affairs’, it would be more accurate to say that this research is a distinct type of CDA that focuses on security phenomena from IR perspectives. Wodak argued that CDA ‘should be transparent so that any reader can trace and understand the detailed in-depth textual analysis’, which is described as ‘retroductable’ by CDA scholars (Kendall 2007). To recap, borrowing Mautner’s (2009: 138) phrase, corpus linguistics software that ‘compiles frequency lists, identifies keywords and reveals statistically significant collocations’ would help analysts who want to challenge a prevalent discursive structure to cope with large amounts of textual data, thereby ‘reducing researchers’ bias and enhancing the credibility of analyses’.

For computer-assisted linguistic analysis, this study will use *Sketch Engine*, a powerful corpus query system (Kilgarriff et al. 2014; Pearce 2014), as the main tool for interrogation of the corpus. For the writing procedure, this section will briefly introduce how keywords of a specific text can be extracted. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the top-twenty keywords in the corpus of each administration’s white paper regarding unification and diplomacy issues, each of which was published in 2008 and 2013 respectively. As the white papers are written in Korean, the

Table 3.3 Keywords by keyness score

Roh Moo-hyun administration	Lee Myung-bak administration
agreement	principle
ROK-US alliance	advanced security
national defence cost	unification policy
Northeast Asian era	strong army
inter-Korean relations	future-oriented
Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)	co-prosperity / co-existence
working level contact	North Korea policy
peace system	national crisis management
Yongsan garrison	preparation for unification
summit	denuclearisation
defence reform	Grand Bargain
North Korean nuclear problem	provocation
Wartime Operational Control (OPCON)	Wartime Operational Control (OPCON)
joint statement	national defence
economic cooperation	finances for unification
special agreement	international community
normalisation of relations	inter-Korean relations
cooperative project	weapon system
independent national defence	separated families
separated families	Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)

words in the tables have been translated into English. In both tables, functional words such as determiners, pronouns and prepositions are excluded.

Table 3.2 represents the top-twenty keywords extracted by simple frequency from each administration's white paper. Although the keywords in the table do not reveal the contexts in which the words were used, they identify words used frequently by securitising actors. Keywords can also denote some specific issues that occurred in each period. For example, on the one hand, one can contemplate that the role of 'Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)' was important in relation to inter-Korean relations throughout the two administrations, as the word can be seen on both sides. On the other hand, words like 'summit', 'SPT' and 'peace system' can only appear on the side of the Roh administration's part, while words like 'unification policy', 'Cheonan corvette' and 'Yeonpyeong Island' can only be found on the side of the Lee administration. Therefore, the table indicates that the different keywords represent each administration's different foci and altered security situation in a definite manner. This is important because it strengthens reliability and validity regarding discursive debate, while decreasing the possibility of making false assumptions when talking about facts.

In Table 3.3, the keywords, sorted in descending order reflect the 'keyness score' that 'roughly expresses relevance of the word in the text compared to a general text in the same language' (SketchEngine 2015b). Extracting words, not

by just raw frequency but by the keyness score, may well complement the keywords extracted by simple frequency. As this indicates words used by a securitising actor by comparing with a reference corpus, it can also provide supplementary entry points for DA, so that the actor's perception of threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures can be considered in a broader context. A reference corpus is 'a large, recent, general language corpus'; large being 'at least 50 million words' (Kilgarriff et al. 2014: 23). A reference corpus is 'ready-made, off the peg, including a wide variety of genres (written, spoken, newspapers, fiction, etc.) and millions of words per genre', whereas a main (focus) corpus could be compared with a 'Do-it-yourself' (DIY) corpora, which is 'designed to tackle smaller-scale research questions' (Mautner 2009: 132).

In sum, it is possible to see the extent to which an actor has used particular words in comparison with the frequency of the words used in a reference corpus, which has a statistically adequate quantity of words from a huge assortment of material. The keyness score can be calculated as follows (SketchEngine 2014):[27]

$$\frac{fpm_{foc} \quad + n}{fpm_{ref} + n}$$

As mentioned, these keywords could be utilised as a 'point of entry' for DA that assists in selecting words. The keywords provide us with additional points for analysis of the ROK's security discourse relating to the Korean Nuclear Crisis. Consideration of the context in which each keyword was used can facilitate avoidance of analytical prejudice. Analysis of keywords can also identify ways in which use of words differ or concur between the two administrations. Analysis of keywords can then be supplemented with a 're-reading' of the original key texts (Hansen 2006: 59). Although the white papers themselves are not the subject of corpus-assisted DA in this thesis, the keywords included in the above tables are expected to be useful in the process of analysing each president's speech acts. As the words are intertextually linked to the presidential speeches, it is estimated that presidential speeches could be traced using some of these keywords. The

[27] In this formula, 'fpm_{focus} is the normalised (per million) frequency of the word in the focus corpus, fpm_{ref} is the normalised (per million) frequency of the word in the reference corpus, n is the simple Maths (smoothing) parameter (n=1 is the default value)' (SketchEngine 2014).

Table 3.4 Intertextual research models

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3A*	*Model 3B*
Analytical focus	Official discourse: Heads of state Governments Senior civil servants High ranked military Heads of international institutions Official statements by international institutions	Wider foreign policy debate: Political opposition The media Corporate institutions	Cultural representations: Popular culture High culture	Marginal political discourses: Social movements Illegal associations Academics NGOs
Object of analysis	Official texts Direct and secondary intertextual links Supportive texts Critical texts	Political texts Parliamentary debates Speeches, Statements Media texts Editorials Field reporting Opinion—debate Corporate institutions Public campaigns Recurring intertextual links	Film, fiction, television, computer games, photography, comics, music, poetry, painting, architecture, travel writing, autobiography	Marginal newspapers, websites, books, pamphlets Academic analysis

Source: Hansen, L. (2006). *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, p. 64

following chapters will illustrate use of many of these keywords in presidential addresses.

3.3.3 Methods for security discourse: interpretive/intertextual DA

As DA essentially deals with texts and talk as a form of language that constitutes (or represents) reality, selecting data for collection may be the first task for most discourse analysts. The process of data collection itself varies since there are several kinds of DA, each serving different analytical purposes. For example, a project may combine DA and ethnography, or use naturally occurring data. In these cases, aside from choosing texts, interviewing, observation, field notes and data notes from interviews can be included (Taylor 2012; Silverman 2013; Taylor 2013b).

With regard to the issue of choosing texts, there seems no manifest criterion for what should be considered appropriate text for DA. However, as Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (2009: 23) recognised, ‘most studies analyse typical texts’, although ‘what is typical […] frequently remains vague’. In that respect, Hansen (2006: 64) offered a meaningful model for the text selection. The process of choosing texts needs careful intertextual reading in a broad sense, and her model

Table 3.5 Key texts for the thesis

Model	Texts (2003.2–2013.2)
Model 1	**Official texts** Presidential speeches White Papers; Policy Reports **Direct and secondary intertextual links** Autobiographies of Presidents Other influential memoirs (written by above Ministerial level officials) Interviews
Model 2	**Political texts** Parliamentary debates (FAUC and NDC) dealing with the DPRK issues* **Media texts** Articles dealing with Presidents and Ministerial level officials' comments **Corporate institutions** Public opinion poll conducted by KINU and IPUS**

* FAUC: Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee; NDC: National Defence Committee
* KINU: Korea Institute for National Unification; IPUS: Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University

is considered appropriate for choosing texts as a basic framework. Since this study takes both the governmental discourse and the main opposing discourse, Models 1 and 2 of Hansen's intertextual models will be considered as the main subjects of analysis (Table 3.4). To begin with, presidential speeches would be the top priority source. In order to put this into practice, each president's (Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak) official speeches, translated into English by translators of *Cheong Wa Dae* (The Blue House; Office of the President of the ROK), will be used as main sources of corpus-assisted DA. As aforementioned, presidential speeches have an enormously significant impact on the ROK's security discourse. Presidents' speech acts are generally seen as the final and most refined form of security discourse. In South Korea, put differently, an official security discourse was made by an implicit system of 'imperial presidency' (Im 2004; Hahm 2008; Kim 2013).

Aside from this, white papers and policy reports produced by each administration will be dealt with as one of the key official texts. These are important because both present the securitising actors' philosophy. More importantly, since the white papers and policy reports of the two administrations were published at the final stage of the respective tenure, one can detect the changing pattern of policies and speech acts compared with their speech acts at an initial or middle stage. These also reflect each administration's defensive logic regarding criticism that emerged from the opposition. Therefore, it would be safe to say that a white paper implies the final and comprehensive thoughts of a

government that need to be publicised to justify their policies. In addition, autobiographies of presidents, other influential memoirs written by major securitising actors and transcripts of the author's interview with the actors will be utilised as secondary intertextual links.

With regard to Model 2, speeches, official political debates (parliamentary debates), interviews and articles produced by political leaders will be considered for locating identity and policy. In particular, in the interest of securing more comprehensive political context for DA, this thesis has examined all the parliamentary debates of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee and National Defence Committee of the ROK Assembly from February 2003 to February 2012, insofar as the Assembly Committee minutes are concerned with the DPRK issues. Furthermore, opinion polls on the South Korean public's perceptions of the government's North Korea policy conducted by institutes such as KINU and IPUS that have public confidence will also be used as an index of the ROK's securitisation. The key texts are summarised in Table 3.5.

For an understanding of the context in which political articulation occurs, comprehensive background knowledge in terms of both choosing texts and interpreting them is vital. As context refers to a slightly more formal version of the situation, circumstances or environment, it can be defined as 'the relevant environment of language use' (Van Dijk 2009: 3). Here, as elsewhere, the connectedness between text and context is intersubjective in the sense that texts (or talks) are not only constituents of a context but also constitute the context (Van Dijk 2008). The following transcript shows the importance of understanding context when analysing texts:

1. **QUESTION**: On North Korea?
2. **MS. HARF**: Uh-huh.
3. **QUESTION**: Yeah. North Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom Hyun Hak-bong
4. has mentioned yesterday [in an] interview with British TV that North Korea [was] ready to
5. fire nuclear weapon[s] [at] anytime. He also said if [the] US uses conventional weapons
6. they will do so [as well]; and if [the] US uses nuclear weapons, they will also do so. How --
7. **MS. HARF**: Well, I saw those reports. There is obviously an overwhelming
8. international consensus against North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
9. We have called on North Korea to abandon both programmes
10. in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. This is required by
11. multiple UN Security Council resolutions. And we remain fully prepared to
12. deter, defend against, and respond to the threat posed by North Korea.
13. We obviously are steadfast in our commitment to the defence of not only
14. the United States but our allies and our interests in the region.
15. **QUESTION**: So now he has acknowledged that North Korea has nuclear weapons. So --
16. **MS. HARF**: I don't think that's a big secret.
17. **QUESTION**: Big secret, okay. (Laughter)

18. **MS. HARF**: There's a reason we're working to denuclearise the Korean peninsula.
19. **QUESTION**: Thank you.

The above quoted text is extracted from the transcript of the daily press briefing of the US Department of State, 23 March 2015, during which then Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf was questioned. In this transcript, the reporter asked Harf about the DPRK's willingness to use nuclear weapons against the US (lines 3–6). Responding to this, Harf mentioned United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions (1718, 1874 and 2094), claiming that North Korea must abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a CVID manner (lines 7–14). The reporter asked again, in line 15, in order to check how the US would respond to what the DPRK is insisting: 'we are a nuclear weapon state'. Immediately afterwards, Harf replied to this question with 'I don't think that's a big secret', which made the reporter laugh in line 17 (in this case, fortunately, there is video material so one can detect how the communication was taking place). There is no doubt that line 16 in this text should be centred from a discursive and contextual viewpoint, for Harf's acknowledgment clearly implying that 'it is not a big secret that the DPRK is a nuclear state' is against the US government's official position: 'North Korea's demand to be recognised as a nuclear weapons state is neither realistic nor acceptable' (Birsel and Nebehay 2013).

In principle, the US government can never acknowledge that North Korea is a nuclear state, but in reality, they are well aware of the extent to which the DPRK has developed its nuclear weapons programme (Hwang 2010a; Nikitin 2013). This is important because it reflects the constitutive power of discourse in terms of security reality by which the US can sustain the legitimacy of the NPT system. This also suggests that the US's securitising move against the DPRK has been subsumed under the category of institutionalisation (meaning that the US securitising actors repetitively articulate the DPRK's nuclear threat, as the 'multiple' UNSC resolutions demonstrated).

Academic implications of this kind of interpretive DA might be epitomised as follows: firstly, it shows how discourses made by securitising actors constitute discursive reality (representation) that is different from material reality; secondly, it shows how securitising actors perceive security reality; thirdly, it shows how powerful and resistant the actors' representations of security reality are in terms of constraining the effect that impacts on their security perceptions, which are self-referential; and finally, the former three characteristics may point to the

concept of the discursive chasm, which in this case represents an ineluctable gap between materiality (North Korea as a nuclear state) and discursive practices (not acknowledging the fact). The chasm may also allude to a point where securitisation process falls into institutionalisation or falls back to politicisation.

As aforementioned in terms of choosing texts, one of the most conspicuous methods in analysing security discourse is 'intertextuality', which is also from linguistics. Intertextuality, a term, coined by Julia Kristeva, literally means 'a kind of play (fullness) between text; that is, the play of intertextuality is the process of reading through which one text refers to another text in the process of cultural production' (Finley 2005: 686). This term implies that 'to communicate we must utilise existing concepts and conventions […] whilst our intention to communicate and *what* we intend to communicate are both important to us as individuals, meaning cannot be reduced to authorial "intention"'; in other words, 'we do not precede language but are produced by it' (Chandler 2014: italics in original). This reflects exactly what the theorists in the postmodern epoch wanted to emphasise: regardless of whether they are literary or non-literary, 'every artistic object is so clearly assembled from bits and pieces of already existent art' (Allen 2000: 6). In that regard, security studies dealing with discourse also put emphasis on the 'mutual' (or 'inter-') constitutive way in which actors' perceptions are in general formed by means of language.

Several literatures have employed the interpretive and intertextual DA in terms of handling security issues. For example, Hansen (2006: xvi) successfully showed how poststructuralist DA can delineate the 'constitutive relationship between representations of identity and foreign policies'. To show how complex the foreign policy debate over Bosnia is, she identified the basic discourses related to Bosnia that have impacted on Western society by choosing textual material, which includes general material (e.g. presidential statements, British House of Commons debates, academic analysis, etc.) and several key texts, such as influential travel books.

Stritzel (2012: 556) utilised intertextuality to avoid '*a priori* selection of agency/agents within securitisation'. In analysing the securitisation process of organised crime in the USA, he argued that the 'sociopolitical process' should be taken into account because the securitisation of organised crime emanated originally from a 'cultural context and its communicative ecology', which can be

corroborated by intertextual links and popular culture in this case. Through Hansen and Stritzel's case studies, one might see the role of intertextuality as an instrument for recontextualisation. Both studies are strong in that they recontextualised the securitising moves in a way that has never been approached, and provided different perspectives. At the same time, both are weak since their re-representations of securitisation also rely on a subjective notion that is imperfectly constituted within the context of specific discursive fields.

Donnelly (2013: 17–19, 71) eschewed herself from poststructuralism in the process of analysing the Bush administration's securitisation of the Iraq War in 2003. For her, poststructuralist scholars 'rely on deconstruction' in which 'any system of meaning, including discourse, will always be unfinished and unstable'. She instead combined critical constructivism with a Wittgensteinian approach to language so that ST is 'conceptualised as a specialised language game'. While recognising that both critical constructivism and poststructuralism approaches 'set out to analyse the mutually constitutive relationship between agency, structure and language', she took language more seriously with the concept of the 'rule', so that finding 'intersubjective reference points that enable agents to act in one way as opposed to another' can be possible. This is a good attempt and it indeed broadens the domain of ST by drawing on a language game. Although she focused more on the constructive role of language rather than on a not fixable meaning, her study is essentially interpretive and constitutive through which speeches, statements and interviews are traced.

Sarai B. Aharoni's (2014) study drew on a narrative approach as a distinctive form of DA. Borrowing Susan Chase's definition, Aharoni (2014: 380) conceptualised narrative as 'an oral or written act of retrospective meaning-making of understanding one's own and others' actions'. By conducting semi-structured face-to-face interviews with those who participated in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, from a feminist point of view, she identified that gender stereotyping could be enhanced and reproduced in strategic dialogue. Here, as elsewhere, 'interpretive methodology' is applied to capture 'not only what was said, but also the meaning behind it' (Aharoni 2014: 380–381). As Roxanna Sjöstedt (2013: 155) pointed out, 'in terms of epistemology, interpretative methods can be used to examine collective ideas and identities' as all 'concepts are traced through text'.

3.4 Conclusion

The methodological sequence of research in the tradition of DA boils down to this: (1) Select an issue with a problem-driven (critical) approach; (2) Choose texts with comprehensive relevant knowledge, and if necessary, collect more data with the help of intertextuality; (3) Identify patterns of discourse used by securitising actors with the help of corpus-assisted DA; (4) Interpret and classify the discourse, and recontextualise a discursive structure. In particular, stage (3) can be divided into several phases. First, each securitising actor's speech act will be examined by identifying the most frequent patterns of word usage. The frequent patterns will be shown in two steps: raw frequency and the keyness score. Second, on the basis of that, each keyword that constitutes frequent patterns will be analysed with the help of key-word-in-context techniques, which are part of corpus-based techniques (Wetherell et al. 2001). In that process, specific keywords that are deemed as more significant than others will be further investigated. The grammatical and collocational traits of those keywords will be analysed. Third, the core terms of this research—*North Korea* and *nuclear*—will also be examined in accordance with additional corpus-based techniques, such as t-scores and MI scores, which demonstrate association between a node word and collocates. Again, each collocate of the core terms will be analysed in order to identify characteristics of the actor's security discourse.

This chapter has discussed the fundamental methodological issue in terms of analysing security discourse within the context of ST. It seems that ST is able to explain itself conceptually, but not in a methodological way due to its complicated theoretical basis. Placing emphasis on a speech act in and of itself does not tell us in what way security discourse should be analysed. What keywords should be centred in terms of representing security discourse? How do we know that securitising actors' speech acts are self-contradicting? How do we know that the actors' speech acts are part of the intersubjective process? In what way can the ROK's pattern of a securitising move best be delineated? These are the practical issues that this research turns to in the next section.

Seoul's security discourses on Pyongyang need to be re-evaluated or re-read. Having considered this, the following three chapters will focus on each president's speech acts and speech acts of the relevant securitising actors in order to find out whether the ROK securitising actors have misled the audience.

As noted, corpus-assisted DA and supplementary qualitative DA, such as interview and textual analysis, will be used as methods for investigating key texts. The discursive structure of the ROK securitising actors has not been disclosed in a proper and systematic way and, subsequently, resulted in both actors and audiences accepting the current discourse uncritically. Once the discursive traits of each administration have been analysed, the security discourses can be evaluated and compared in a more objective and comprehensive manner. This may well challenge taken-for-granted assumptions about the predominant discourse. This has provided the initiative for the research.

PART II. Evaluating Security Discourse

4.
Roh Moo-hyun's Security Discourse

4.1 Did Roh desecuritise the DPRK's nuclear issue?

Previous chapters have shown the conceptual and methodological necessity for the analysis of security discourse in South Korea with regard to the North Korean nuclear issue. South Korean securitising actors have suffered not only from a scarcity of the information about the North Korean nuclear capability but also from an unpredictability of the North Korean decision making process. Therefore, it can be said that the security discourses produced by the ROK securitising actors were not based on reality but rather on a mixture of segmental facts and subjective perceptions. The Roh Moo-hyun administration was labelled as a progressive or a liberal political bloc, and President Roh referred to himself and his administration as being liberal (Oh 2009; Yoo 2010). As noted in Chapter 1, the current security discourse in South Korea has long been producing a discursive stereotype that the progressive administrations virtually desecuritised the DPRK's nuclear issue. Chapter 4 and 5 will therefore be focused on ascertaining to what extent today's discourse corresponds with the securitising actors' speech acts in reality. This chapter consists of two parts: the first part deals with Roh's speech acts patterns and, on that basis, the characteristics of the Roh administration's securitising moves will be examined in the second part with the help of additional DA.

4.1.1 Security as speech act

As illustrated in Chapter 3, corpus linguistics can offer an important insight into analysing discourse at the initial step, particularly when there are enormous amounts of data. In addition to the information about word frequencies, by computing statistical significance among words frequently used, it can indicate some points that need to be more focused on during the process of analysis. In that regard, it can be said that Table 4.1 is an entry point of this chapter: it shows the top-twenty patterns of word usage by Roh during his presidency. The corpus (274,350 words) corresponds to all his speeches, which were formally translated

Table 4.1 Roh's top-twenty patterns of word usage (3-grams)

2003		2004		2005	
Word	**Freq.**	**word**	**Freq.**	**word**	**Freq.**
the United States	78	the two countries	53	as well as	47
the Korean Peninsula	74	as well as	52	Republic of Korea	38
North Korean nuclear	72	our two countries	40	in the world	37
on the Korean	65	the Republic of	37	the two countries	36
the North Korean	64	Republic of Korea	37	be able to	35
in Northeast Asia	61	of the two	35	the Republic of	34
as well as	60	be able to	34	of the Korean	33
peace and prosperity	55	**North Korean nuclear**	33	the Government will	32
of Northeast Asia	46	**the North Korean**	29	would like to	29
of the Republic	40	**in Northeast Asia**	27	will continue to	29
of peace and	40	will be able	26	our two countries	28
Republic of Korea	38	between our two	26	the development of	27
the Republic of	36	the National Assembly	24	ladies and gentlemen	27
in the world	36	of the Republic	24	I would like to	27
and prosperity in	36	the development of	23	of the Republic	25
the intl. community	35	the Korean people	23	serve as a	24
of the Korean	34	the Korean Peninsula	23	will serve as	23
Korean nuclear problem	33	**Korean nuclear issue**	23	the Korean people	23
peace on the	32	I hope that	22	**in Northeast Asia**	23
Korean nuclear issue	31	**of Northeast Asia**	21	between our two	23
2006		**2007**		**Total**	
word	**Freq.**	**word**	**Freq.**	**word**	**Freq.**
as well as	61	the Korean Peninsula	85	as well as	292
would like to	51	**in Northeast Asia**	75	the Korean Peninsula	241
I would like	48	as well as	72	**in Northeast Asia**	210
the two countries	46	on the Korean	64	be able to	195
the Korean people	46	be able to	52	**North Korean nuclear**	190
the Republic of	44	**North Korean nuclear**	44	on the Korean	188
be able to	44	the Korean people	43	**the North Korean**	172
of the Korean	43	**the North Korean**	41	Republic of Korea	172
Republic of Korea	42	would like to	38	**the United States**	170
the Korean Peninsula	41	**the Six-Party Talks**	36	the Republic of	166
of the Republic	38	the Participatory Gov.	33	of the Korean	165
our two countries	35	I would like	33	would like to	162
will continue to	33	**the United States**	32	I would like	152
on the Korean	33	**Korean nuclear issue**	32	of the Republic	147
the intl. community	29	I hope that	30	the Korean people	145
the United States	29	the National Assembly	29	in the world	141
between our two	29	**peace and prosperity**	29	**peace and prosperity**	138
The Government will	27	Korean Peninsula and	27	our two countries	131
the National Assembly	25	will be able	27	will continue to	121
in Northeast Asia	24	in the world	27	the National Assembly	116

into English by the Presidential Office team. The most frequently used words in the table are derived by means of a trigram. A trigram is a kind of *n-gram* that aims to show a contiguous sequence of words, letters, and so on. An *n*-gram can include a unigram (a word), a bigram (a sequence of two words), a trigram (a sequence of three words), and four- or five-grams are also possible until an *n*-gram exists. A unigram and a bigram have been ruled out because if these are applied, too many function words (i.e. determiners, auxiliary verbs, prepositions,

coordinators, subordinators and so on) could be included, and consequently those words could encroach on many parts of the top position in the table.

Of course, it cannot be said that a table based on a trigram is totally free from the influence of function words, and nor can it be guaranteed that there is 'any relation among units in *n*-gram' (SketchEngine 2015b). For example, one can see in Table 4.1 that 'as well as', which is generally used as either a conjunction or preposition, is ranked top in the total. The sequence of words like 'be able to', 'would like to' or 'I would like' also do not mean anything by themselves. These would be meaningful only when they are used in a wider context that includes sentences or paragraphs. Aside from this, some terms seem to overlap. For example, in 2003, the term 'Republic of Korea' (38 times) and 'the Republic of' (36 times) were likely to be extracted from the same sentences in many situations. However, no one can guarantee that both terms were used exactly in the same situation and therefore the table included all the patterns without exception.

A noun like 'Republic of Korea' is also relatively insubstantial as it simply stands for *self* of the relevant corpus. Although the way of representing *self* is important in analysing discourse, it might not be easy to infer specific discursive traits from the simple number, meaning absolute frequency. Nonetheless, it should be noticed that nouns like 'the North Korean', 'the Korean Peninsula', 'in Northeast Asia' and 'the United States' were frequently used as part of Roh's speech acts, as these words are representing the *others* and structures that are seen as significant to *self* and construction of its identity. It is important to note that the raw frequency, which is shown in the second column of each year in the table, 'often picks out the obvious collocates' (Clear 1995). Hence it might be fair to say that the Roh administration's security discourse, through which its social and political practice was implemented, was formed around these words.

Most importantly, this table gives readers an important pattern by showing several lexical words from which readers can extrapolate meaningful contexts. The table clearly shows that many of Roh's speech act patterns consist of North Korea or its nuclear issue-related words ('North Korean nuclear', 'Korean nuclear issue', 'the Six-Party Talks', and so on). Given that the frequencies of these words correspond to what Roh emphasised in his speech, it can be said that the security issue was absolutely central to Roh, among other issues. The corpus used in this

Table 4.2 Roh's top-twenty patterns of word usage (n-grams)

4-grams		5-grams	
word	**Freq.**	**word**	**Freq.**
on the Korean Peninsula	175	**the North Korean nuclear issue**	100
the North Korean nuclear	164	of the Republic of Korea	100
I would like to	150	**peace on the Korean Peninsula**	64
The Republic of Korea	140	guests from home and abroad	58
of the Republic of	120	join me in a toast	55
North Korean nuclear issue	113	me in a toast to	53
will be able to	112	**and prosperity in Northeast Asia**	53
as well as the	77	**peace and prosperity in Northeast**	52
from home and abroad	75	Please join me in a	51
between our two countries	75	on the Korean Peninsula and	49
peace and prosperity in	66	in a toast to the	49
peace on the Korean	64	distinguished guests from home and	45
of the two countries	61	**the North Korean nuclear problem**	42
the Korean Peninsula and	60	and distinguished guests from home	41
guests from home and	58	toast to the good health	37
of the Korean people	57	a toast to the good	37
will serve as a	56	**of peace and prosperity in**	36
prosperity in Northeast Asia	56	to the good health of	35
of peace and prosperity	56	wish every one of you	32
me in a toast	55	I am very pleased to	30

table is not just about security issues; it covers all parts of Roh's speeches throughout the field, including diplomacy, economy, culture, society, art, and so forth (that is, the corpus is not limited to Roh's security-related addresses; it represents all of the addresses). Readers may also reason that the North Korean issue or the North's nuclear issues are closely linked to the Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia, and the US, all of which take up a significant amount of space in the table.

The keywords extracted by other *n*-grams show similar results. In Table 4.2, the most frequently used words have been derived by 4- and 5-grams (the corpus of this table is the same as the previous table). This makes the context in which the words are used clearer. Here, again, it is clear that security-related words are seen everywhere in the table. As in the case of the previous table, this too indicates several discursive traits of Roh's speech acts. Firstly, the North Korean nuclear issue and related issues virtually constitute almost all of the main speeches reflecting lexical words. Secondly, one can infer the fact that the international system cannot be ignored in relation to the DPRK's nuclear issue from phrases like 'peace on the Korean Peninsula' and 'peace and prosperity in Northeast'. This roughly shows the way that Roh thought about the connectedness between international systems (structure) and the North Korean

nuclear issue. Last but not least, the table corroborates that Roh was cognisant of the fact that the resolution to the DPRK's nuclear issue is directly linked to the peace on the Korean peninsula and prosperity in Northeast Asia.

This also proves the fact that Roh did not desecuritise the nuclear issue. The frequency of his articulation of the relevant issue itself seems to indicate that Roh raised the securitising move from the level of politicisation to securitisation. In other words, the North Korean nuclear issue had been articulated in a constant manner during the period of the Roh administration. In that respect, given the influence of presidential addresses of the ROK, it can be said that the nuclear issue had invariably been practised with all types of social and political practice in South Korea. If not a perlocutionary act, at least Roh's speech acts could constitute an illocutionary act. Of course, one needs to analyse further to examine his speech acts in detail focusing more on pertinent issues: in what way was the DPRK's nuclear issue articulated? How can the key elements of ST—referent objects and extraordinary measures—be delineated in Roh's speeches? The following sections deal with such matters.

4.1.2 Conflicting referent objects

According to ST, an issue 'is managed within the standard political system' during the period of politicisation, whereas the issue arises as 'an existential threat to a referent object' at the stage of securitisation (Emmers 2007: 112). What then is a referent object to the ROK government? As outlined in the previous chapter, common sense tells us that there are several referent objects to the South Korean governments, all of which are related to the value of South Korea's Constitution. With regard to this, liberal democracy, based on fair market economy, may well be the ROK's referent object. The Constitution of the ROK clearly stipulates (Article 1) that 'the ROK shall be a democratic republic. The sovereignty of the ROK shall reside in the people, and all state authority shall emanate from the people'. Article 119 conditions that 'the economic order of the ROK shall be based on a respect for the freedom and creative initiative of enterprises and individuals in economic affairs. The state may regulate and coordinate economic affairs in order to […] prevent the domination of the market and the abuse of economic power […]'.

The next referent object is relevant to national security. With regard to this, national security and the defence of the land are compared to the 'sacred mission' in Article 5 of the Constitution. Article 37 shows how important defending national security is by stipulating that 'the freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by Act only when necessary for national security, […]'. The importance of the ROK-US alliance comes out of this point. When North Korea, under the patronage of the Soviet Union and China, invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, a UN coalition led by the US was determined to defend the South. The war fell into a stalemate after China entered, and it finally ended as a result of signing an armistice in July 1953. The entire peninsula could have been under the control of the communist North Korea without the US's military assistance. Before the US-led counterattack, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) easily overwhelmed South Korean forces in a surprise attack.

At the conclusion of the Korean War (1950–1953), during which around 37,000 Americans were killed, the ROK and the US signed a Mutual Defence Treaty in November 1953. Since a peace treaty has never been signed amongst the countries involved in the Korean War, Article VI of the treaty stipulates that 'this treaty shall remain in force indefinitely'. In essence, the ROK-US alliance is the foundation of national security for South Korea. As far as South Korean national security is concerned, the existence of the alliance is indispensable. In this sense, the US troops have been regarded as sacrosanct in the ROK. Roh himself evinced this perception several times:

> The Korea-US alliance, forged with blood, has been instrumental in maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia, in addition to security in Korea for the past 50 years. At the Korea-US summit in May, President George W. Bush and I agreed to further solidify the bilateral alliance. During my visit to Washington, I had the opportunity to meet Korean War veterans and was quite impressed by their pride and unchanging love for Korea.
>
> (Roh 2003c: 26 July)

Last but not least, peaceful unification is a supreme task for South Korea. The word 'unification' is mentioned nine times in the Constitution and seven times with the term 'peaceful' (English version). This fact alone substantiates that peaceful unification is a Maginot Line for the ROK. Regarding this, the Constitution (Article 4) specifies that 'the ROK shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order'. Articles 66 and 69 of the Constitution more directly impose a duty of pursuing peaceful unification on South Korean presidents. However,

maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations, which is a prerequisite to peaceful unification, is another problem. The issue of conflicting referent objects arises from this point. There are two issues: one is residing in the ROK's own contradiction and the other is about the ROK's relative position of inter-Korean relations. These two things are closely related to each other. In reference to the former, Article 3 of the Constitution of the ROK may come up. It prescribes that 'the territory of the ROK shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands'. According to this Article, North Korea is an anti-government organisation that is taking possession of the northern part of the peninsula. This Article forms the backbone of the legitimacy of peaceful unification, but at the same time, ironically, it has been an obstacle to establishing peaceful inter-Korean relations because of its inherent message: North Korea is illegally taking over half of the Korean peninsula.

Article 3 therefore has been central to debates in South Korea concerning its perspective on North Korea. The following dialogue derived from the debate at the National Assembly of the ROK. The debate is between a then member of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee Hong Jun-pyo and Kim Seung-gyo, who was a solicitor attending the Committee (NA 3/12/2004).

1. **HONG**: Did you say that Article 3 (territorial clause) is a declaratory stipulation?
2. **KIM**: It should be interpreted like that --
3. **HONG**: Is it represented like that in the Constitution? Is there any country
4. that regards a territorial clause as a mere thing which has just been mentioned once?
5. **KIM**: Nowadays many Constitutional scholars also think like me. Therefore how to
6. see the conflicting problem between Article 3 and Article 4 (unification clause) --
7. **HONG**: Article 4 is all about how to unify. That Article declares that we should unify
8. the peninsula peacefully and not by invasion or war. I don't understand the way
9. you construe Article 3: a territorial clause does not have a regulatory power.
10. **KIM**: There are many declaratory stipulations other than the territorial clause.
11. **HONG**: Declaratory stipulations themselves are many.
12. **KIM**: In any case, a considerable number of Constitutional scholars are
13. of the same opinion.
14. **HONG**: I've never heard that a considerable number of Constitutional scholars share
15. the view of such opinions.

The gist of Kim's story may be as follows: given that North Korea is a proper nation in terms of international law and it does exist in reality, any inter-Korean relations would necessarily be conflicting if we keep denying the North's regime or its legality. Therefore, it would be better to think that Seoul has already acknowledged the Pyongyang regime. In this sense, Article 3 of the Constitution could be interpreted as a declaratory stipulation that does not exert regulatory power. However, from Hong's perspective, perhaps it would be hard to accept

the fact that the DPRK has been acknowledged since it should be seen as an anti-government entity. As can be seen in lines 7–9, Hong cannot agree with Kim because Article 3 should be construed as a regulatory stipulation not limited to a mere declaration. Perhaps this dialogue shows Hong's concerns that the current divided situation on the Korean peninsula would last much longer if South Koreans accepted the North's regime as a normal state. As this thesis will later show, these kinds of concerns have been real, particularly among the so-called conservatives and this logic forms one of the central parts of the ongoing debates.

The problem of this perceptual discrepancy is inseparably linked to the issue of inter-Korean relations. Making peaceful inter-Korean relations does not depend solely upon South Korean securitising actors, and many parts of the task rely on North Korean actors. Just as South Korean actors are struggling with the incongruity between their constitutional principle and the reality, the North Korean actors also exert much effort to maintain their own referent objects derived from political identities that appear to deviate from the general thoughts of the international community. The Socialist Constitution of the DPRK, which was amended and supplemented on 1 April 2013, stipulates in Article 9 that 'the DPRK shall strive to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of Korea […] and reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity'. From this clause, one can infer that North Korea is aiming to reunify the peninsula under the flag of socialism. One caveat here is that in North Korea the North Korean Worker's party (NKWP) is more influential than any other governing bodies, which can be seen in Article 11 of the Constitution: 'the DPRK shall conduct all activities under the leadership of the NKWP'.

What is more, the regulation of the NKWP clearly indicates that it strengthens the *Juche* ideology by holding fast to Marxism–Leninism, while showing strong disapproval of 'reactionary and opportunistic' thoughts, such as capitalism, feudal Confucianism, revisionism, sycophancy and so on (NKWP 2010). The political philosophy *Juche* often refers to the 'creative application of Marxist-Leninist principles to the modern political realities in North Korea' (Lee 2003: 105), which was initiated by Kim Il-sung, a founding father of the DPRK. The core elements of the *Juche* ideology include *Jaju* (domestic and foreign independence), *Jarip* (economic independence) and *Jawi* (military independence)

(Lee 2003). According to the regulation of the NKWP, the ultimate goal of the DPRK is to put the entire peninsula under the flag of *Juche* (NKWP 2010). As can be seen in the Preamble of the Socialist Constitution, the *Juche* ideology would be 'immortal' as long as the current Kim regime survives.

Seon-gun policy, which refers to military-first, is another key concept of the DPRK. *Seon-gun* has been central since the Kim Jong-il era, and it represents the military's primacy in society. *Seon-gun* is also 'referred to as *chongdae cheolhak*, meaning "the barrel-of-a-gun policy", which is a reference to Mao Zedong's idea that "political power grows from the barrel of a gun"' (Nelson 2013: 90). *Juche* ideology can be protected by *Seon-gun* policy. Hence, both are complementary as ideological or philosophical weaponry. Another goal of these ideologies is to drive out American imperialism, which has generally led to the contention that the US armed forces should be expelled from the ROK (NKWP 2010).

The referent object of the DPRK is therefore the antithesis of that of the ROK. In terms of the political and economic system, it seems nearly impossible that Pyongyang's own style of socialism based on *Juche* and *Seon-gun* can coexist with the ROK's ideological identities. In relation to the international (regional) system, the structure of the ROK-US alliance, which is deemed 'sacred' in the ROK, is unacceptable in the DPRK. Considered in this framework, it indeed may be said that maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations is one of the most difficult jobs for South Korean securitising actors given the disparate referent objects between the two Koreas. The dilemma between defining state security and pursuing the goal of peaceful unification seems to be perpetual until grave material variables occur (e.g. sudden leadership change of the DPRK regime, breakout of full-scale war, etc.).

Can we find this kind of dilemmatic situation in Roh's speeches? Table 4.3 shows the top-twenty keywords extracted by the keyness score. The way of extracting words by the keyness score was already explained in the previous chapter. The main corpus in this table is the same as that of the previous tables in this chapter: all Roh's speeches during his presidency from February 2003 to February 2008. The reference corpus used here is called *enTenTen [2012]*, which includes 11,191,860,036 words (12,968,375,937 tokens). This time, the words that were originally in the ranking but have a weak correlation with the North

Table 4.3 Extracted keywords in Roh's speeches

Keywords	keyness score	main corpus frequency	reference corpus frequency
Northeast(Asia)	137.03(46.99)	418(521)	116,355(456,988)
Gaeseong(GIC)	125.83(27.92)	39(11)	265(4,188)
peninsula	115.63	303	98,153
prosperity(coprosperity)	94.82(40.18)	310(12)	125,671(5)
cooperation(cooperative)	91.41(33.62)	702(111)	312,508(127,784)
coexistence	82.75	46	10,739
Pyongyang	81.60	50	13,149
democratisation(democracy)	77.58(27.29)	42(217)	10,132(324,328)
denuclearisation(nuclear)	58.73(27.68)	19(397)	958(595,040)
peacefully(peace)	57.44(30.68)	67(702)	36,672(956,788)
exchanges(dialogue)	51.73(28.11)	148(194)	108,495(279,829)
confrontation(confrontational)	47.45(30.14)	72(16)	51,584(9,954)
multilateral(diplomatic)	46.61(38.92)	42(88)	25,487(83,160)
reconciliation	43.28	95	80,318
OPCON(USFK)	39.62(39.53)	12(12)	191(219)
distrust	35.39	30	23,305
summit	34.84	222	257,336
substantive	33.39	48	48,314
friendship(reaffirmed)	32.04(31.67)	162(20)	201,647(14,193)
unification(compatriots)	30.56(27.82)	25(14)	22,111(8,815)

Korean issue are excluded so that one can detect more relevant words presented by Roh.[28] This table gives different insights from the previous tables, which only indicated a simple arithmetic count of the number of words. As mentioned, a result by the keyness score would be meaningful, in that it provides an analytically important point whereby one can extrapolate more general features of each keyword used by a securitising actor from a broader perspective. The words in brackets are also extracted by the same method, all of which are closely related to the original keywords.

First, interestingly, many of the words included in the table directly or indirectly point to the aforementioned referent objects that were derived from the values of the Constitution. At first glance, Roh seemed to put more weight on peaceful inter-Korean relations. Words like 'prosperity', 'cooperation', 'coexistence', 'peacefully', 'exchanges' and 'reconciliation' stand for peaceful inter-Korean relations in a straight manner, while the words 'Gaeseong' and 'summit' symbolise such relations in a relatively indirect way. The words 'unification' and 'compatriots' clearly show that Roh perceived North Korea as a country consisting of fellow nationals that should be unified with South Korea. To

[28] The excluded words, for example, are excellency, APEC, Gwangju, *Geonbae* (cheers), congratulatory, gentlemen, and so forth.

sum up, peaceful inter-Korean relations and a subsequent peaceful process of unification as referent objects are clearly shown in Roh's speeches.

With regard to this, the word 'Gaeseong', which is ranked 2nd, needs to be highlighted, as the 'Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)' is a symbol of inter-Korean cooperation. The GIC, located just across the DMZ from South Korea, was launched in 2003 in order to ease tensions between the two Koreas by founding an industrial park where South Korean finance and manufacturing businesses are combined with North Korea's relatively cheap labour. This is important because the meaning of Gaeseong is not only a path to peaceful inter-Korean relations, but is also an instrument for North Korea's reform and openness whereby Pyongyang can conform to the market economy in the long term. Roh's belief in liberal democracy and market economies, both of which were referred to as the core referent objects of the ROK, seems to be robust.

> I have been trying to apply democracy in every field of state administration–fundamental principles and trust, fairness and transparency, dialogue and compromise, […] It is my belief that democracy and the market economy are the two most successful systems devised by humanity. During the past century, nations of the world prospered or failed depending on whether they adopted a market economy or not.
>
> (Roh 2004c: 2 December)

Based on this perception of market economies, he urged North Korea to open its door while abandoning its nuclear programme. It goes without saying that he wanted the North Koreans to be exposed to a market economy.

> North Korea is now at a grave crossroads determining whether it will continue in isolation or opt for openness. The choice will not be easy for the incumbent North Korean leadership. I hope that North Korea will take this occasion to abandon its nuclear program and choose the path to coexistence and openness.
>
> (Roh 2003d: 13 May)

However, the way Roh persuaded North Korea to open its society appears to have changed since his visit to North Korea and meeting with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in October 2007.

> I had an important experience during my visit to Pyongyang. We have believed and said that reform and opening up is a good thing and that success of the GIC would bring about reform and openness in North Korea. In the North, I learned that the North Koreans are not pleased at such remarks by us, and now I think we were a little careless to seek to expedite the opening of North Korea through the success of the GIC.
>
> (Roh 2007d: 14 October)

This speech sounds a bit strange, inasmuch as almost everyone in South Korea was already well cognisant of the fact that North Korea had shown an adverse

reaction to the term ‘reform and openness’, and North Korea had been reluctant to open its society. Perhaps it might be Roh’s strategic remark to elicit more positive responses from Pyongyang in terms of economic cooperation; even so, it sounds somewhat unnatural to many South Korean audiences to hear that Roh ‘newly’ learned that Pyongyang is not pleased at the terms ‘reform and openness’. After all, Roh’s referent objects—making peaceful inter-Korean relations through a market economy system—were confronted with the DPRK’s *Juche* ideology. Roh had no option but to acknowledge that there is an ongoing ‘confrontation’ and ‘distrust’ between the two Koreas.

Second, the words ‘Wartime Operational Control (OPCON)’ and ‘United States Forces Korea (USFK)’, ‘friendship’ and ‘reaffirmed’ connote the importance of the ROK-US alliance in terms of South Korean national security. Regardless of the contexts in which these words are used, as mentioned, there is no doubt that the existence of USFK has been essential to all the ROK governments. The words ‘friendship’ and ‘reaffirmed’ were also Roh’s favourite ones when he emphasised the value of the alliance. The issue of ‘OPCON’, however, seems slightly different, because the progressive and conservative groups differed in opinion as to whether South Korea should get wartime OPCON back to the ROK.[29]

It is known that the Roh administration actively requested regaining wartime OPCON, resulting in an agreement with the Bush administration to a complete transfer by April 2012.[30] It is interesting that many of the conservative US securitising actors were also supportive of Roh’s plan (Niksch 2010; Klingner 2011; Rumsfeld 2011). The point here is that the OPCON issue had already been politicised, and the issue itself is security-related, hence the issue was well-framed as a security question within the South Korean discursive realm. The liberal bloc thought that getting back OPCON would be to regain the ROK’s referent object as national security, whereas the conservatives saw it as jeopardising the ROK’s security environment (Hwang 2010b). However, Roh was confident that the ROK armed forces would do very well with recovered OPCON.

[29] The US took OPCON shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. While peacetime OPCON was transferred to the ROK in 1994, wartime OPCON is still under the control of the Combined Forces Command led by a US Army four-star general.

[30] The transfer was delayed to December 2015 at the time of Lee Myung-bak’s presidency. In October 2014, however, the ROK and the US yet again reversed the decision: ‘the transfer will focus on South Korea achieving critical defensive capabilities against an intensifying North Korean threat. Therefore, no new date for transferring OPCON will be set’ (DoD 2014).

For him, the issue of regaining OPCON was to do with South Korea's referent object, as the following quotation indicates:

> Why should we hold back in exercising our own OPCON? Now, I would like to point out that the ROK faces the diplomatic reality of having to deal with North Korea and China. We certainly do not want any contingency situation to let alone war in our relations with North Korea, but sadly we have to presuppose and prepare for such a situation. […] When Korea discusses Northeast Asian security matters with China after having regained operation control, wouldn't China be more likely to listen to what we have to say?
>
> (Roh 2006b: 22 December)

Roh considered regaining OPCON a crucial diplomatic significance, but he did not provide the public with possible and cogent scenarios in which the ROK's decision-making process cannot function because of the absence of OPCON. Even though his contention—South Korea must not be engaged in any contingency situation against its will—was right, the visible existential threat was North Korea's nuclear weapon, rather than uncertain eventualities. In addition to that, deterring nuclear attack by the North should be placed at the centre of any kind of contingencies in the region. Seen from this perspective, the issue of regaining OPCON was not successfully securitised because Roh seemed to be short of having persuasive power to separate one referent object (regaining wartime OPCON as a way of strengthening South Korea's defensive and diplomatic capability in contingencies) from another referent object (the ROK-US alliance as a deterrent to the DPRK's sabre-rattling), as well as failing to show the urgency of recovering OPCON to the audience.

Third, more importantly, the words 'denuclearisation' and 'nuclear' allude to the fact that Roh tried to articulate the North Korean nuclear issue. In other words, Roh was well aware that the North's threat is existent, which can imperil the South's referent objects. As aforementioned, Roh's articulation of the relevant issues was consistent and frequent. In addition to this, an in-depth reading of the word 'substantive' shows that Roh attempted to find appropriate measures by which North Korea can be denuclearised. These words also imply that in order to maintain peaceful inter-Korean relations, Roh had to come to terms with a North Korea that held fast to developing its own nuclear programme. The issue of the substantive measures (how to deal with the DPRK and its nuclear threat) will be discussed in the following section.

Aside from this, the high keyness score of the words 'Northeast' and 'peninsula', each of which means Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula,

implies that Roh emphasised that South Korean referent objects ought to be thought of within the context of the international (or regional) system. His standpoint appears to be in line with the regionalist perspective that opines that 'the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars to explore contemporary security affairs' (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 10).

In sum, tying all the extracted keywords and pertinent quotations together shows that Roh struggled to match each referent object of the ROK: peaceful inter-Korean relations, ROK-US alliance, liberal democracy and market economy. No new referent objects of the ROK emerged within the extracted keywords. It also shows that the DPRK's nuclear weapons and its strong aversion to reform and openness are two of the biggest stumbling blocks that caused the collision among the ROK's referent objects. However, the table itself does not provide us with Roh's extraordinary measures whereby the issues of the conflicting objects and the DPRK's nuclear threat can be solved. This brings us to the next step of securitisation: what measures should the securitising actors take? What could 'substantive' measures be? What securitising moves can be legitimised by the audience even when the moves break the rules of the standard political system?

4.1.3 Limited extraordinary measures

The previous two sections of this research have shown that Roh, as the head of state, articulated the North Korean nuclear issue with a high frequency in a constant manner, and the issue was at the centre of the Roh administration's securitising moves. The gravity of the issue was clearly articulated from the very beginning of Roh's presidency:

> North Korea's nuclear development can never be condoned. Pyongyang must abandon nuclear development. If it renounces its nuclear development programme, the international community will offer many things that it wants.
>
> (Roh 2003a: 25 February)

His perception of this issue as an existential threat remained until the last year of his tenure:

> Korea is channelling its best efforts into the GIC project, a fledgling window of opportunity. The biggest impediment to this goal is the issue of the North Korean nuclear program, which has not been resolved yet. We have put a lot of effort into resolving this issue, but we don't hold the key.
>
> (Roh 2007e: 25 March)

This speech is interesting. Although he emphasised that the nuclear issue is still the biggest impediment, Roh acknowledged that South Korea does not hold the key to solving the North Korean nuclear issue. This is important because 'playing a leading role' in solving the issue was one of the three main principles that he put forward throughout his presidency (another two principles were no tolerance for the North's nuclear weapons and a peaceful resolution). Having no key for a solution does not necessarily mean that they forsook their original will to play a leading role. Nevertheless, his acknowledgment alluded to Seoul's limit when it comes to its capability to substantialise its securitisation against Pyongyang. In other words, the North Korean nuclear issue cannot be fully securitised by South Korea in a way that the CS originally intended.

According to the CS, 'securitisation is not fulfilled only by breaking rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimise the breaking of rules' (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). Why is breaking rules needed when securitising something? As mentioned in Chapter 3, ST is called a 'threat-urgency modality' (Donnelly 2013). Securitising actors assert that without taking extraordinary measures, the threat would significantly expand. Therefore, the securitisation process provides the actors 'with the special right to use exceptional means' (Emmers 2007: 114). In short, the securitising process is often apart from a standard political system, and the actors break a rule that is applied to a normal situation in the process of securitisation.

The Iraq War is often referred to as an example of securitisation which was not successful from ST's perspective in that securitising actors failed to persuade audiences. The main securitising actors of the Iraq War were US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and they justified their invasion of Iraq with the pretext of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that Saddam Hussein might have. Many audiences, either in the US/UK or in other countries, could not accept the actors' assertion that Saddam's WMD were an existential threat to the Western world. In this process, the US and the UK launched an attack on Iraq without getting a UN mandate: they broke an international rule (Emmers 2007; Donnelly 2013).

The ROK's securitisation process seems quite the opposite compared to the Iraq War case. The DPRK's WMD system, including nuclear weapons and

ballistic missiles, has been widely accepted as an existential threat to South Korea, Japan and the US. In this respect, Roh also pointed out that 'the North Korean nuclear problem is an issue requiring an urgent solution' (Roh 2003e). However, in the case of the DPRK's WMD threat, a boundary of extraordinary measures has fairly been circumscribed. As stated in Chapter 2, it is very hard to imagine a war with North Korea because of its considerable armed force and, in particular, the forward deployments of its troops near the DMZ. In 1993, the Pentagon concluded that 'a war in Korea could cost as many as 500,000 military casualties within the first ninety days, more lives than were lost throughout the 1950–1953 war' (Sigal 1999: 211). Even a surgical strike on North Korea's nuclear sites runs the risk of triggering a full-scale war.

What emerges from this brief account leads us to consider another possible extraordinary means: what can lead North Korea to come to a decision about denuclearisation? As mentioned, the form of breaking rules can have a variety of forms insofar as the means is adopted as a special tool by which an actor can lessen the level of existential threat. Hence, it does not necessarily need to be a form of breaking the positive law or international law. Instead, it may be either a form of enactment of special law or recognised as acts of state doctrine. The US Patriot Act after the 9/11 attack in 2001 could be one of the examples of this case.

As outlined in Table 3.1, possible extraordinary measures, which are relatively plausible, in the case of the North Korean nuclear threat can be either coercive policy (threats based on sanctions) or engagement (dialogue) policy. What is interesting is that both of these measures have a certain level of rule-breaking traits, in that coercive policy jeopardises the possibility of peaceful inter-Korean relations, which is guaranteed by the Constitution of the ROK (Article 4), whereas engagement policy impinges on Article 3 of the Constitution, which does not recognise North Korea as a legal state. This is why the ROK governments, regardless of whether they are based on conservative or progressive ideology, have so far indicated that their contacts with North Korea can be legitimised by the name of *tongchi-haengwe* (prerogative or acts of state; *acte de gouvernement*).

The point here is that every securitising actor in South Korea must accept the reality that they are performing the acts of state based on legal dualism (Kim 2014a). This is because they have no option but to acknowledge the fact that

North Korea is controlling half of the Korean peninsula as an actual country. In this respect, the legal dualism is predicated on the dual fact relationship in the peninsula. The relationship between the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act (IECA) and the National Security Act of South Korea (NSA) shows this situation well. For instance, Article 1 of the IECA stipulates that 'the purpose of this Act is to contribute to the peace and unification of the Korean Peninsula by prescribing matters necessary to promote reciprocal exchange and cooperation between the area south and north of the Military Demarcation Line'. Article 3 of the same Act specifies its relations with other Acts: 'With respect to any activities aiming to reciprocal exchange and cooperation between South Korea and North Korea, […], this Act shall prevail over other Acts, to the extent of the purposes of this Act'.

On the contrary, the NSA was made 'to secure the security of the State and the subsistence and freedom of nationals' (Article 1). Article 2 of the Act stipulates that 'for the purpose of this Act, the term "anti-government organisation" means a domestic or foreign organisation or group which uses fraudulently the title of government or aims at a rebellion against the State, and which is provided with a command and leadership system'. In the NSA, there is no doubt that the term 'anti-government organisation' refers to North Korea.

To sum up, there can be no common ground upon which both Acts might coexist unless the legal system introduces the concept of a dualistic structure. This might be read easily when we think of the relationship between international law and national law, as dualists emphasise that 'between internal and international provisions there cannot exist any kind of conflicts since these provisions don't have the same object' (Marian 2007: 17). However, just as international legal experts come to terms with a complicated reality to which such a dualistic view can rarely be applied, the ROK securitising actors also struggle with the reality in which they are facing the DPRK, which has a duplex feature. Consequently, this in part constitutes a discursive chasm that has made Seoul's securitisation implausible. In a sense, therefore, ROK actors have always been practising rule-breaking in their securitising moves.

As can be seen in his remarks at the inaugural banquet in February 2003, Roh clearly expressed that he would choose an engagement policy as an extraordinary means against the North Korean nuclear issue: 'no matter what

Table 4.4 T-scores and MI scores for collocate of *North*

Collocate	T-score	Collocate	MI score
nuclear	16.169	nuclear	8.399
Korean	15.138	dismantlement	8.241
Korea	14.080	missiles	8.104
(nuclear) issue	11.344	South (Korea)	8.075
South (Korea)	8.742	compatriots	7.978
(nuclear) problem	7.511	missile	7.978
(nuclear) programme	5.800	dismantling	7.978
resolve	5.620	abandon	7.756
peacefully	5.073	solution	7.756
peaceful	4.434	(nuclear) issue	7.630
help	4.005	peacefully	7.613
(nuclear) test	3.978	(nuclear) problem	7.592
dialogue	3.907	(nuclear) programme	7.574
solution	3.855	athletes	7.563
(nuclear) weapons	3.584	resolving	7.563
resolution	3.576	collapse	7.519
cooperation	3.545	attack	7.493
resolving	3.446	(nuclear) test	7.486
trust	3.180	(nuclear) weapons	7.393
peninsula	3.158	resolve	7.264

difficulty lies ahead, the issue should be resolved peacefully. Dialogue is the only way to a solution' (Roh 2003e). Two points arise from this: to what extent is an engagement policy (dialogue or negotiation) effective as an extraordinary measure? What kind of sub-measures were proposed and adopted to substantialise the measures? Had a securitising actor come up with real extraordinary measures against the enemy's existential threat, a corpus representing the actor's speech acts would have included some clues from which one could infer that the actor intended to lessen the level of threats.

Again, corpus-assisted DA can provide us with another significant entry point by giving collocated words that are closely related to the main issue. As this thesis directly deals with Seoul's discourses on Pyongyang's nuclear threat, the core terms would be 'North Korea' and 'nuclear'. It is expected that almost every speech act of the actors regarding extraordinary measures would be connected with these two words. Therefore, if the actors had had substantive means against the threat, there must have been some collocated words that indicate the means in one way or another. Regarding this, Table 4.4 gives the top-twenty collocates of 'North' (*Buk* in Korean, referring to North Korea) with the highest t-scores and MI scores respectively. Collocation refers to 'the habitual or characteristic co-occurrence patterns of words' (Xiao 2013). The node word here is 'North', and hence the twenty words can be called the node word North's collocates. A lexical

collocation allows researchers 'to generate lists of words that co-occur frequently with' the node word (SketchEngine 2015a). As the collocations are directly related to North Korea, one may closely notice how Roh perceived North Korea. In the t-score part of the table, function words (e.g. the, to, and, of, etc.) are excluded.

The MI stands for Mutual Information, which indicates 'the strength of the bond between two items, that is, whether there is a higher-than-random probability of the two items occurring together' (Mautner 2009: 125). Put differently, one can observe the strength of association between two items via the MI score. The t-score is to figure out the certainty of collocation. It is about 'the confidence with which we can assert that there is an association' (Collins 2008). Jem Clear (1995) opined that 'it is very safe to claim that there is some non-random association' between two items. In sum, both of these measurements are good supplements for finding an actor's discursive traits, as there is no way of distinguishing the collocates 'objectively from frequent non-collocates' (Collins 2008). The t-score (1) and MI-score (2) are calculated according to the following formula respectively (SketchEngine 2014):[31]

$$\frac{f_{AB} - \frac{f_A f_B}{N}}{\sqrt{f_{AB}}} \quad (1)$$

$$\log_2 \frac{f_{AB} N}{f_A f_B} \quad (2)$$

Richard Xiao (2013) pointed out that if the MI score is 3.0 or higher it can be taken as evidence, and a 2.0 or higher t-score is expected to be statistically significant.

The words extracted by these scores are important since not only can a researcher get information on a securitising actor's linguistic detail, but it also gives a researcher an additional direction in which the actor's speech acts should be analysed. In this sense, what Table 4.4 implicates is twofold. First, this is to show how strong and often it is that Roh related North Korea to its nuclear issues, since the top-ranked collocate is 'nuclear' in both the MI and t-scores. This demonstrates that Roh clearly articulated the relationship between North Korea and nuclear issues in his speeches so that the term nuclear could be discursively

[31] f_A refers to the number of occurrences of the keyword in the whole corpus (the size of the concordance), f_B refers to the number of occurrences of the collocate in the whole corpus, f_{AB} refers to the number of occurrences of the collocate in the concordance (number of co-occurrences), and N refers to the corpus size, respectively.

practised within the context of the DPRK issue. This also corroborates the reliability of the results that showed the keywords based on raw frequency and the keyness score in the previous sections. Moreover, most words in the table derived from both scores point to the DPRK's nuclear issues: 'issue', 'problem', 'programme', 'test', 'weapons', 'dismantlement', 'missiles', 'resolution', 'resolve', and so forth. In effect, it is within bounds to say that the greater part of the collocations on North Korea by Roh is directly related to the nuclear issues. To put it succinctly, in his speech acts, Roh virtually equated North Korea to the nuclear issues.

Second, this is to show how Roh thought about the way in which he can solve the North Korean nuclear issue. The t-score part of the table reveals that the words 'resolve (or resolving)', 'peacefully (or peaceful)', 'help', 'dialogue', 'cooperation', 'solution (or resolution)' and 'trust' might be closely related to a way of resolving the issue. What is problematic here is that none of these words manifestly point to a specific means of denuclearisation of the DPRK. In other words, in terms of extraordinary measures, these are more abstract than substantial. In the case of the MI score-based words, although many words in the right half of the table overlap with the words based on the t-score, some words (e.g. 'dismantlement', 'dismantling' and 'abandon') do not. However, these words still seem to be rather abstract and appear to be a part of categorical statements, which do not indicate any concrete measures by themselves. The words 'collapse' and 'attack' seem to be different, in that they allude to extraordinary measures in a relatively more direct way because causing the DPRK's collapse or a military attack on North Korea could be one of the radical measures that can lead to either the demise of the DPRK or an all-out war on the peninsula. Did Roh pursue these kinds of measures to solve the Korean Nuclear Crisis?

This is why we need to look into the keywords' collocational patterns. An in-depth analysis of the words 'collapse' and 'attack' tells us that Roh used these words in order to object to the ideas of harbouring such things (Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Corpus-assisted DA can show total cases of co-occurrences between collocates (keywords) and the node word, so that researchers can grasp the whole context in which the keywords are used. Although the tables here do not show the whole sentences due to the word limit of the thesis, they render the

Table 4.5 Co-occurrences of *attack* and *North*

any objection to a possible U.S. ***attack*** on	**North**	Korea in the future. Such reasoning represents
mentioned the possibility of an ***attack*** against	**North**	Korea. Some of them were responsible U.S.
mentioning the possibility of an ***attack*** against	**North**	Korea. Rather, they are actively voicing
objected to any possible U.S. ***attack*** on	**North**	Korea, and I repeatedly emphasised that
that Washington has no intention to ***attack***	**North**	Korea. When the Six-Party Talks resume,

Table 4.6 Co-occurrences of *collapse* and *North*

threat. Some people seem to look for	**North**	to ***collapse***. That, too, would cause an
asked was whether war would break out and	**North**	Korea would ***collapse***. When I said it would
potential outbreak of war and ***collapse*** of	**North**	Korea, but on the top of their list of
neither do we consider it feasible. As long as	**North**	Korea does not ***collapse*** suddenly, there

keywords more available, thereby making the contexts clearer. Here are some excerpts that include the entire sentence from the tables:

> Some people seem to look for the **North** to ***collapse***. That, too, would cause an enormous disaster for the people of the South. There is no guarantee that in the face of an impending threat to its system, the North would not make a dangerous choice.
>
> (Roh 2004a: 12 November)

> Believing that jitters over the possibility of war will weigh on our economy, I openly objected to any possible U.S. ***attack*** on **North** Korea, and I repeatedly emphasised that there will be no war on the Korean Peninsula.
>
> (Roh 2003b: 2 April)

These sentences make it clear that Roh considered the idea of the DPRK collapse to be dangerous one since it could lead to an enormous disaster for the ROK. When it comes to the word ‘attack’, the word was used by Roh because he thought that he had to prevent rumours of any possible US attack on the DPRK from spreading so that the ROK’s economy remained intact. This will be discussed in detail in the following section. In any case, in this way, each keyword can be understood while not being away from the core terms and, accordingly, a securitising actor’s discourse could become clearer.

What about the collocations of ‘nuclear’? Table 4.7 includes the top-twenty collocates of ‘nuclear’ according to the t-scores and MI scores respectively. This table shows considerable similarities with the table that indicated the same scores for the collocations of ‘North (Korea)’. What this table can tell us is as follows: first, considering all the keywords in Tables 4.4 and 4.7, it is evident that Roh manifestly linked North Korea with nuclear issues. Second, in terms of solving the issues, it seems that Roh preferred a peaceful way to measures based on sanctions or coercive policies (one cannot see any kind of sanction-related words

Table 4.7 T-scores and MI scores for collocate of *nuclear*

Collocate	T-score	Collocate	MI score
North (Korea)	16.138	abandon	9.591
Korean	13.827	weapons	9.350
issue	12.812	dismantlement	9.269
problem	7.913	North's	9.269
programme	7.333	dismantling	8.913
Korea	6.830	test	8.906
peacefully	6.231	programme	8.854
resolve	6.060	peacefully	8.810
weapons	5.736	dismantle	8.783
resolved	5.635	missiles	8.716
test	5.280	waste	8.591
resolution	4.106	issue	8.586
solution	3.989	solution	8.461
resolving	3.731	resolving	8.398
Pyongyang	3.724	North (Korea)	8.386
help	3.656	problem	8.349
power	3.653	plants	8.269
solve	3.144	resolve	8.086
give (up)	3.120	resolved	8.036
issues	3.094	conducted	7.928

in the tables). A frequent appearance of the word 'peacefully' corroborates this. The collocational link among 'North Korea–nuclear problem–missiles–resolving (or resolution)–peacefully' seemed to be firmly established in Roh's speech acts. Third, some words (e.g. 'give (up)' and 'conducted') show the level of Roh's determination to denuclearise North Korea as well as the level of consternation when Pyongyang finally 'conducted' its first-ever nuclear test in 2006. The following quotations show such traits:

> For North Korea, there is no choice other than to ***give up*** its **nuclear** ambition. **Nuclear** weapons will gain it nothing, and the only way to tide over the economic plight with the help of world assistance is to first ***give up*** **nuclear** weapons.
>
> (Roh 2004b: 7 December)

> We are now facing a grave challenge to peace on the Korean Peninsula. That is because North Korea ***conducted*** a ***nuclear*** test after all despite strong objections and warnings from the Republic of Korea as well as the international community. Peace on the Korean Peninsula can never coexist with **nuclear** weapons.
>
> (Roh 2006a: 6 November)

Fourth, most importantly, just as we have seen from the collocations of 'North', this table also lacks the keywords that can show us exceptional measures dealing with the DPRK nuclear issues in a concrete manner. As mentioned, Roh's speech acts were replete with the DPRK nuclear issue-related words; nevertheless, most of the words (e.g. 'peacefully', 'resolution', 'solution', 'give (up)', 'dialogue', 'trust', 'dismantlement', and so on) themselves cannot be seen

as extraordinary measures. They are at best important principles or categorical statements. Regarding this problem, additional in-depth analyses of the keywords will be shown in the following section. Aside from this, some of the words in the table, such as ‘power’, ‘waste’ and ‘plants’, are not related to the DPRK issue, for they point to the issues relating to nuclear power plants in the ROK in terms of electric power supply.

The reason why Roh’s speeches do not include more practical collocates may rest upon two possibilities: one is it might be true that Roh did not have sufficient practical means to make their slogan—peaceful resolution—available. Second, Roh possibly did have some practical means, but he was aware that those are short of becoming extraordinary measures that can forestall the North Korean nuclear threat. Hence, in terms of DA, there are at least two ways to avoid the potential pitfalls that might be caused by interpretation based only on the quantitative results. Firstly, as aforementioned, by looking into a word’s grammatical and collocational pattern a close-up of the features of each collocate can be identified. Secondly, the potential shortcomings of corpus-assisted DA can be complemented by qualitative analysis including documentary analysis and interviews. On the basis of the analysis of the core terms, and with the help of broad corpora and other key texts-based analysis, the next section further discusses what practical traits can be derived from Roh’s speech acts in regard to his securitisation process against the DPRK’s nuclear threat.

4.2 Main characteristics

As delineated in the previous section, corpus-assisted DA has given us some important points in terms of finding a certain pattern of speech acts made by Roh. It has also given an opportunity to initiate an in-depth analysis of specific words by providing concordances (a view of all occurrences from the corpus for a particular search word), statistically conspicuous terms and collocates, so that a researcher carries out DA in a more objective manner. In addition to this, ST, as a theoretical framework, seems to be meaningful, inasmuch as an actor’s security discourse could be understood in an organised way by classifying the actor’s perceptions into several stages according to the framework: perception of

existential threats, articulation of security-related speech acts, including referent objects and extraordinary measures.

4.2.1 The pursuit of double securitisation

The first thing to be considered as the characteristic of Roh's security discourse may be his securitising moves towards two *others*. In other words, in the process of securitising the DPRK's nuclear issue, Roh securitised North Korea and the US at the same time. Securitising the US was a serious issue because it could be seen as securitisation jeopardising the ROK-US alliance that represents an important pillar of South Korean referent objects. As was shown in the previous section, Table 4.5 included all co-occurrences of 'attack' and 'North'. What is interesting is that four out of the five sentences contain the word 'US' or 'Washington'. It connotes that Roh was more concerned about the US attack on North Korea. It was imperative for him to securitise this issue before securitising the DPRK's nuclear issue. Lee Jong-seok, former Unification Minister and the Chief of the National Security Council (NSC) of the ROK under the Roh administration, corroborates this in his memoir:

> President Roh was aware that the heightening tensions between North Korea and the US may spill over into a war. […] Regarding measures against North Korea, the US asserted that 'it would be inevitable to impose sanctions on North Korea once North Korea has started reprocessing plutonium', and 'they are not precluding a military option against North Korea'. […] Roh actually believed that the US might attack North Korea. Therefore he thought that he needs to get confirmation from the US that they would not choose a military option as well as risky action that might have led to a war.
>
> (Lee 2014b: 182–183)

Regardless of whether the US had a real intention to instigate a military attack against North Korea, it seems true that Roh firmly believed the possibility of a US attack. In order to achieve a 'peaceful' solution to the DPRK's nuclear issue, Roh had to securitise another threat—a war on the Korean peninsula—that might be caused by a US attack on North Korea. Roh faced a huge dilemma again: North Korea's nuclear programmes constitute a serious threat to South Korea. The ROK-US alliance is a strong deterrent to such a threat. However, at the same time South Korea should deter the US from taking military action against North Korea, as it is very likely to trigger a total war on the Korean peninsula that might lead to annihilation of the Korean people. In this sense, it can be said that Roh struggled with two securitising moves: that is, securitisation

against North Korea's nuclear threat to South Korea on the one hand, and securitisation against a US military attack on North Korea, which may result in a North Korean attack on South Korea, on the other hand.

Roh initiated double securitisation from the very first stage of his presidency. A short introduction to the situation at the time of Roh's inauguration may be helpful. The Roh administration officially began on 25 February 2003. Roh was inaugurated in the midst of the second North Korean Nuclear Crisis, which was sparked by North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and its clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme. From a broader perspective, the crisis was an outgrowth of the US's post-9/11 identity. For the US, the top priority in the post-9/11 period was to prevent WMD from reaching terrorist groups. In the Nuclear Posture Review in December 2001, the Bush administration formulated that America must be ready to use nuclear weapons against rogue states, including North Korea. In January 2002, at the State of the Union address, George W. Bush, America's 43rd President, included North Korea in the 'axis of evil', along with Iran and Iraq.

> Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with WMD. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September 11, but we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and WMD, while starving its citizens. […] State like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.
>
> (Bush 2002: 29 January)

Unsurprisingly, North Korea denounced this address, arguing that Bush's remark was no less than a declaration of war. Putting the DPRK's resistance aside, what is interesting is that with this as a momentum, the Bush administration has been branded as bellicose and radical across the world. In addition to that, the phrase 'axis of evil' was widely construed as a precursor of US attacks on North Korea, albeit depending on each viewpoint. The Roh administration was also deeply influenced by this term. For the high-ranking officials of the Roh administration, it was highly likely that the US would put its military attack on North Korea into action, given its capability and the traits of an administration that was well known for the influence of a group of neoconservatives on its formulation of foreign and national security policies. The Roh administration strengthened its perception that the Bush administration is a political group based on a religious sentiment by this term 'axis of evil' (Lee 2014a).

The term ‘axis of evil’ demonstrated how important political rhetoric is, and it had indeed a strong influence on the Roh administration’s perception of the US government as far as the DPRK issues are concerned. Whether the Bush administration had a real intention to launch a military attack against North Korea remains equivocal. Regarding this, there are conflicting records that indicate different policy implications. According to Bush’s biography, it seems that the US had been seriously considering carrying out a military strike:

> After a few months with no progress, I tried a different argument. In January 2003, I told President Jiang [Zemin of China] that if North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme continued, I would not be able to stop Japan—China’s historic rival in Asia—from developing its own nuclear weapons. […] In February, I went one step further. I told President Jiang that if we could not solve the problem diplomatically, I would have to consider a military strike against North Korea.
>
> (Bush 2010: 424)

However, Condoleezza Rice’s (former US Secretary of State and Bush’s national security advisor) account does not match with Bush’s memoir:

> Though they [South Koreans] might have feared that the US would use military force, they needn’t have worried: the Pentagon wanted no part of armed conflict on the Korean peninsula. We were without a workable policy.
>
> (Rice 2011: 159)

According to Rice, by the end of 2002, Bush had finally adopted a ‘tailored containment’, which aimed to change the North Korean regime through pressure, rather than announcing regime change (Rice 2011: 163). If this is true, it can be said that Roh overreacted to the uncertainties of a US attack against North Korea, to the extent that the ROK-US alliance is affected (Cha 2004; Gregg 2004; Kim 2004). Yet the problem was not that simple. What is clear is that there was a serious disagreement within the Bush administration as to a proper strategy for North Korea (Cheney and Cheney 2011; Rice 2011; Rumsfeld 2011), and the ‘military attack’ discourse had been expressed in several ways from both inside and outside of the government in the US until 2003:

> Some of the most secret and scariest work under way in the Pentagon these days is the planning for a possible military strike against nuclear sites in North Korea. […] Officials say that so far these are no more than contingency plans. They cover a range of military options from surgical cruise missile strikes to sledgehammer bombing, […] There’s nothing wrong with planning, or brandishing a stick to get Kim Jong-il’s attention. But several factions in the administration are serious about a military strike if diplomacy fails, and since the White House is unwilling to try diplomacy in any meaningful way, it probably will fail.
>
> (Kristof 2003: 28 February, New York Times)

In addition to this, on 4 March 2003, in an interview with American newspapers, Bush for the first time officially mentioned military action against North Korea (Matthews and Greene 2003). The Roh administration's concerns over US military action were not only caused by the realm of discourse but also by material factors. Early in March, an American RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft spying on international waters near North Korea was intercepted by North Korean fighter jets. Days earlier, a North Korean fighter jet swooped over the Northern Limit Line (NLL), which is a *de facto* military demarcation line on the Yellow Sea between the two Koreas, and returned to the north when South Korean fighter jets approached it. On 10 April, North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT came into effect. In the meantime, the NSC of the US announced that North Korea had restarted a plutonium-producing nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.

Roh's securitisation against the US was not just about its possible military solution; it was about the US's loathing for the Kim Jong-il regime, which is inextricably linked to the regime change discourse. The Bush administration rejected anything that the Clinton administration had agreed with North Korea, including the AF (Gregg 2004; Bush 2010; Rice 2011). They saw 'the negotiation itself as a reward to the outlawed North Korean regimes' (Kim 2004: 163). Bush publicly referred to Kim Jong-il as a 'pigmy', 'tyrant' and a 'spoiled child at the dinner table', whereas Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State under the Clinton administration, argued that 'we know very little of Kim Jong-il. Our intelligence said that he was crazy and a pervert. […] He's not crazy. […] Bush didn't listen to the talks the Clinton administration had with North Korea' (Fryer 2010). At any rate, it seems true that the Bush administration at least wanted to see that the Kim regime was overthrown if it was impossible to topple the regime militarily. They just could not accept North Korea as an appropriate counterpart.

> As long as Kim Jong-il was in power, I thought we had little prospect of inducing his regime to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. […] Instead of offering inducements of financial aid and heating oil, I thought there might be a remote possibility that if we put enough diplomatic and financial pressure on the country, some of its senior generals might overthrow Kim Jong-il.
>
> (Rumsfeld 2011: 642)

Bush's 'Kim Jong-il phobia' appears much stronger:

> One of the most influential books I read during my presidency was *Aquariums of Pyongyang* by the North Korean dissident Kang Chol-hwan. The memoir […] tells the story of Kang's ten-

> year detention and abuse in a North Korean gulag. […] Kang's story stirred up my deep disgust for the tyrant who had destroyed so many lives, Kim Jong-il.
>
> (Bush 2010: 422)

In regard to this, Kang Chol-hwan, whose book significantly influenced Bush's perception of Kim Jong-il, pointed out that 'even if North Korea gives up its nuclear programme, its political system would not be changed. Without regime change from the current one to one that is predicated on a rational system, its denuclearisation would be meaningless' (Kang 2014). The problem is that genuine regime change is not easy. Hwang Jang-yop, the highest ranking North Korean defector ever, best known for being the father of North Korea's *Juche* ideology, had already predicted that there were over 100 people who could replace Kim Jong-il's position, and hence there would be no such sudden change in North Korea even if Kim Jong-il died (Cheong 2011) (after Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011, Kim Jong-un, the third and youngest son of Kim Jong-il, took power). More importantly, China would never allow political turmoil to continue in North Korea, and China would be expected to intervene in North Korea if the US stepped into the North Korean tumult (Koo 2008; Song and Lee 2016). In other words, as China stubbornly opposes an armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, it is hard to imagine that the US would push ahead with a military strike on North Korea, which would run the risk of seriously worsening relations with Beijing (Lee 2012a: 120–121).

These situations raised Roh's dilemmatic situation once more: (1) the Bush administration obviously wants to see the Kim Jong-il regime be replaced; (2) the ROK-US alliance is essential for South Korea to defend itself from a North Korean attack; (3) in fact, the North Korean Kim regime is not only intractable but also durable, even in the case of Kim Jong-il's absence; (4) hence, the strategy of regime change or overthrow of the Kim regime is not only unreasonably idealistic but also dangerous to maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations; (5) given China's opposition, the probability of an American military attack against North Korea seems unrealistic, which can result in a terrible disaster of a total war; nonetheless, the spread of rumour concerning war and the possibility of war, which could have a significant impact on the ROK's sovereign credit rating, cannot be ignored.

Under these circumstances, as the corpus-assisted DA confirmed earlier, Roh appears to have decided to break a rule of the ROK-US alliance, which

needs to be strong and solid even in all possible contingencies. Roh thought that the US itself was becoming a source of an existential threat. Roh's own words confirm this:

> In early 2003, it's widely rumoured again that the US would attack North Korea. […] I publicly said that "bombardment on North Korea is not on". Conservative press and experts criticised that it was a rash comment that vitiates the ROK-US alliance. However, I decided that the president's remark was necessary at that time. […] I obviously spoke my mind that there would be no act of war against North Korea insofar as I am president. The military staffs of the Bush administration might properly understand my word. It meant that American military aircraft cannot land anywhere on South Korean soil, and that the US armed forces cannot launch an operation, as there would be no help from the ROK armed forces.
>
> (Yoo 2010: 250–251; Roh Moo-hyun's autobiography)

As this quotation directly indicates, Roh made peaceful inter-Korean relations the top priority that outweighs the importance of the ROK-US alliance. In that respect, it can be said that he regarded the Bush administration as a potential, but at the same time, existential threat.

> [On 31 October 2003] In a small Q-and-A session former defence secretary William Perry asked what could be done to stop the slide in trust and understanding between the US and South Korea, which had taken relations to the lowest point Perry had ever seen. President Roh replied without hesitation that North Korea is the only issue on which Washington and Seoul disagree, but that in regard to that issue a wide perception gap exists. Roh stated that half a century ago, Korea had endured a horrible fratricidal war in which millions had died. He said that any repeat of that tragic experience must be avoided at all cost.
>
> (Gregg 2004: 149)

What needs to be considered here is that Roh's securitisation against the US does not necessarily mean that they desecuritised the North Korean nuclear issue. What is meant by 'securitisation against the US' is that they adopted 'dialogue' as an extraordinary means so that they can resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in a peaceful manner. In this sense, one can say that the ST framework may be useful because it elucidates a tangible structure of a securitising actor's discourse. If one actor had desecuritised some threats, there would have been no perception of such threats, no referent object, no extraordinary measures regarding the threats. In the case of Roh, however, all of the core components of the securitisation were included, which are aimed to articulate the North Korean nuclear issue. Therefore, from ST's viewpoint, the argument that Roh desecuritised the DPRK's nuclear issue is misleading.

In effect, as noted earlier, Roh could not just disregard the ROK-US relationship, which forms a significant foundation of Seoul's referent objects. If anything, without the US's cooperation, securitising the North Korean nuclear



Figure 4.1 Roh's double (overlapping) securitisation

issue itself was impossible. What was more problematic to South Korea was that North Korea 'had been demanding that the US meet with them one-on-one' (Cheney and Cheney 2011: 474). This is called North Korea's *tong-me-bong-nam* strategy, meaning that North Korea 'values the US-North Korean relationship at the expense of South Korea's isolation' (Kim 2014b: 62). North Korea has consistently argued that the nuclear issue is a problem between the US and them, not an issue of inter-Korean relations. In his autobiography, which was posthumously published by his closest political aide, Roh acknowledged this contradictory situation into which South Korea could not help but fall in the process of securitisation (Figure 4.1):

> The DPRK-US relationship has had a crucial effect on the situation of the Korean peninsula as well as inter-Korean relations. The North Korean nuclear issue in itself arose from the DPRK-US relationship. It is difficult for South Korea to solve the issue while taking the leading role. I had severe heartburn throughout my presidency due to the conflicting situation in which we were not able to play a leading role in solving the issue, even though South Korea is directly involved with the conflict and peace. I got upset many times with North Korea and the US. The fact that I could not express my anger caused more stress.
>
> (Yoo 2010: 248–249; Roh Moo-hyun's autobiography)

4.2.2 Making dialogue extraordinary

As the corpus-assisted DA has shown, the collocational link in Roh's speech acts among 'North Korea—nuclear issue—missiles–resolving/resolution—peacefully' boils down to one word: 'dialogue'. Simply put, an in-depth analysis of each word that is closely related to the core terms 'North' and 'nuclear' demonstrates that the word 'dialogue' should be at the centre of all the collocations. Then what needs to be done now is to look into the word's grammatical or collocational

Table 4.8 Occurrences of *dialogue* following modifier

the peninsula. There have been ***frequent***	**dialogues**	and exchanges between the South and North
should be taken to prevent the ***inter-Korean***	**dialogue**	from being deadlocked due to circumstances
to the negotiation table. The ***three-way***	**dialogue**	in Beijing was a meaningful beginning of
. There is no denying that ***inter-Korean***	**dialogue**	, and human and material exchanges have
Cold War, the United States began ***positive***	**dialogue**	with China eventually resulting in the
resolve the nuclear issue, and ***inter-Korean***	**dialogue**	should be used to contribute to resolving
called for transparency in ***inter-Korean***	**dialogue**	and exchanges, which I accepted. The idea
flexible stance in channels of ***inter-Korean***	**dialogue**	and economic cooperation. With many North
a virtuous cycle of with the ***inter-Korean***	**dialogue**	. Progress in the Six-Party Talks is enlivening
dialogue between the two Koreas. ***Inter-Korean***	**dialogue**	, in turn, accelerates the success of the
, the Administration will seek ***faithful***	**dialogue**	and persuasion in order to have the proposal
easily as well. There is now ***full-fledged***	**dialogue**	on the North Korean nuclear issue, but
but this kind of view is not right. ***Only***	**dialogue**	, not only any form of pressure, will persuade
mutual trust. In my judgment, ***inter-Korean***	**dialogue**	will promote the success of the Six-Party

Table 4.9 Occurrences of *dialogue* as a subject

the issue should be resolved peacefully.	**Dialogue**	***is*** the only way to a solution. I will try
Last month in Beijing, the first phase of	**dialogue**	***was*** held in a bid to resolve the North
maintaining close coordination. It was good to see	**dialogue**	***started***. Yet it is hard to resolve the
of the North Korean nuclear issue through	**dialogue**	***is*** essential for the maintenance of peace
have been ups and downs, but channels of	**dialogue**	***are*** always open and economic cooperation
a show of power, and a precondition for	**dialogue**	***is*** to acknowledge the existence of the
implementation shouldn't disrupt dialogue.	**Dialogue**	***is*** the only viable option. The North made
normalisation of diplomatic relations and that	**dialogue**	***is*** the only way to solve inter-Korean issues

patterns, since it is expected that Roh's concrete extraordinary measures could be derived from this analysis if he had had a real substantive means.

The corpus used in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 is the same as the previous tables. The sentences that are not directly related to the North Korean nuclear issue are excluded, even though they have the term 'dialogue'. The word 'dialogue' is modified by other words in one table, and is positioned as a subject in the other one. These indicate Roh's discursive traits considerably. Several analytical points can be noted. First, as can be seen in Table 4.8, Roh put top priority on the inter-Korean dialogue concerning the North Korean issues. He seems to have firmly believed that inter-Korean talks could be a significant leverage in dealing with the DPRK's nuclear issues. Second, as shown in Table 4.9, dialogue was the only viable option that can be used as an extraordinary measure. He literally ruled out any other means. However, when North Korea carried out its nuclear test in 2006, Roh could not help participating in adoption of the UNSC sanctions against the North. A speech addressed two days after the North's first nuclear test shows his concern with this problem:

> There are two major ways in which we can do this, namely a relatively hard-line response of pressuring with sanctions on the one hand, or the current situation notwithstanding, a peaceful resolution through dialogue on the other. […] However, this is not a matter of choosing one policy alternative over another. A strategic situation of this nature entails the use of proper combination of both measures. […] What is clear for now is that both options are still valid. […] Either way, a peaceful approach is an important task and carries a substantial value.
>
> (Roh 2006c: : 11 October)

Nonetheless, as confirmed by the result of the corpus-assisted DA, Roh scarcely used the term 'sanctions' throughout his presidency, and as the above quotation demonstrates, even at the time of the DPRK's nuclear test, the supreme and sole task for him was to hold onto a 'peaceful approach'.

Third, Roh expressed the importance of multilateral talks. It can be easily found that he tried to construct a virtuous cycle between the multilateral and inter-Korean dialogues (Tables 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10) (in Table 4.10, the node word is 'North', 'dialogue' is a collocate, and the range between the node word and the collocates is ±5 words). To achieve this goal, China and the US's support was essential. Through the multilateral talks, Roh pursued a 'normalisation of diplomatic relations' among the countries directly involved. For Roh, therefore, the SPT would be an important process by which the North Korean nuclear issue can be successfully securitised in a peaceful manner through dialogue. It was a coordinated form of international community. Roh regarded SPT not only as a form of dialogue, but also as an extraordinary means aiming to securitise the DPRK's nuclear issue. In short, the SPT was the backbone of his securitisation process:

> Of great significance are their agreement on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, normalisation of US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK relations, cooperation in energy and economic affairs, and discussions on a peace and security regime in Northeast Asia. I hope that this accord will not only help resolve the North Korean nuclear issue but also bring lasting peace to the Korean Peninsula.
>
> (Roh 2007a)

This quotation is from Roh's address produced right after the February 13 Agreement of the SPT in 2007. As can be seen, Roh put an emphasis on 'peace and security regime' along with denuclearisation, normalisation of relations, economic cooperation, and so forth. This concept was one of the main points of Roh's securitisation process, but it was simultaneously controversial between conservatives and progressives. This will be discussed shortly.

Table 4.10 Co-occurrences of *dialogue* and *North*

international community, and through ***dialogue*** with	**North**	Korea. I am deeply aware of the fact that
all-out efforts, through ***dialogue*** with the	**North**	, to find a way in solving the problem.
without fail. We must revitalise ***dialogue*** with	**North**	Korea, coordination with the United States
Union. I will do my best to help resolve the	**North**	Korean nuclear issue through ***dialogue***.
should engage in the ***dialogue*** with sincerity.	**North**	Korea is now at a grave crossroad determining
first step in the ***dialogue*** for solving the	**North**	Korean nuclear issue and welcomed the role
view that the peaceful resolution of the	**North**	Korean nuclear issue through ***dialogue*** is
international community and ***dialogue*** with	**North**	Korea. Beginning in May, I visited the
will be no reason to reject ***dialogue*** if	**North**	Korea comes onto the path that China and
United States is engaged in the ***dialogue***.	**North**	Korea at first was against the Six-Party
we cut the channel of ***dialogue*** with the	**North**	. The government may adjust the speed and
principle and discontinue contact with the	**North**	when it disrupted ***dialogue*** and to reject
have worked toward building trust with the	**North**	through ***dialogue*** and persuasion while rising
our efforts to engage in a ***dialogue*** with	**North**	Korea and build trust by showing tolerance
there is now full-fledged ***dialogue*** on the	**North**	Korean nuclear issue, but negative views
never given up its efforts to engage the	**North**	in ***dialogue*** even when the going was tough

The road to SPT was not easy. In order to make dialogue an extraordinary means, Roh had to break through several points. At least two factors had been contestable regarding whether Roh broke rules, or whether his securitising move was effective enough to deter the North Korean nuclear threat. The first factor was about the Roh administration itself, particularly the way it was playing its role. As aforementioned, 'playing a leading role' was one of Roh's main principles vis-à-vis the DPRK's nuclear issues. As noted before, however, North Korea had insisted that the nuclear issue is a matter of the DPRK-US relationship. By contrast, the US no longer wanted to deal with North Korea one-on-one. The Bush administration thought that the US had been played off by North Korea as a result of the 1994 US-North Korea AF, which aimed to provide North Korea with two 1,000MW LWRs and 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year in exchange for freezing North Korea's ability to make nuclear arms and remaining in the NPT.

The confrontation between North Korea's bilateralism and the US's multilateralism resulted in the three-way dialogue (China-US-DPRK) in April 2003. The Roh administration explained that the three-way dialogue (*3-ja-hoeidam*) would soon be a form of multilateral dialogue including South Korea (Lee 2014b), but the fact that South Korea was excluded from the dialogue format caused controversy (NA 16/4/2003; NA 18/4/2003). Although the three-way dialogue was developed into the SPT in August of that year, the format itself showed the ROK's limit. Another contradicting point arises from here. The real impetus for achieving the dialogue format came from the US and China. Since the US alone did not have sufficient carrots to induce North Korea to take part in multilateral arrangements, the US could not help but persuade China, which had been

exercising its influence to North Korea, to bring North Korea to the negotiating table.

Ironically, the US used a military option for North Korea to motivate China, which is actually what Roh attempted to securitise against even as they had taken the trust between the ROK-US to the lowest point. Rice described the time when President Bush called Chinese then President Ziang Jemin with an eye to persuading him to bring North Korea to the multilateral table:

> I suggested that he raise the spectre, ever so gently, of a military option against North Korea. He [Bush] liked the idea, and when Ziang began to recite the timeworn mantra about the need for the US to show more flexibility with the North, President stopped him. A bit more directly than I'd expected, he told Ziang that he was under a lot of pressure from hard-liners to use military force and added, on his own, that one also couldn't rule out a nuclear Japan if the North remained unconstrained.
>
> (Rice 2011: 248)

This quotation implies that the political rhetoric of using military force against North Korea from the US was in part due to their aspiration to win China over to the US's side as far as the North Korean nuclear issue is concerned. Of course, this is written from the US perspective, and therefore no one knows exactly what kind of mechanism finally moved China to get North Korea to the multilateral negotiation table. However, what needs to be reiterated is that the Bush administration paid great attention to China's growing influence and they understood that the US-China relationship is critical to the international system (Bush 2010; Rice 2011; Rumsfeld 2011). It was also under the Bush administration that the US began to use the term 'responsible stakeholder' to refer to China. In other words, for the US, the North Korean nuclear issue could be a litmus test for the future US-China relationship that forms not only a regional system but also an international one.

Seen in this light, it can be said that the strategic room for South Korea was very small from the outset. Ban Ki-moon, former Foreign Minister of the ROK in the Roh administration, also acknowledged that South Korea's role is limited in solving the DPRK's nuclear issue (NA 6/7/2006). The broad outlines of the regional and international system tell us that there was no significant leverage that South Korea could take as a leading actor. In order to make a breakthrough under these circumstances, Roh found the inter-Korean relations invaluable, as he thought that the ROK would be able to take a leading role in the SPT based on stable inter-Korean relations. To put it differently, Roh tried to use inter-Korean

relations as diplomatic leverage of the SPT and its securitising process. This is why he inadvertently fell into yet another trait of securitisation: rule-breaking and the limit of discourse.

The second factor that caused controversy in Roh's securitising moves was whether it is possible for Seoul to acknowledge Pyongyang as a legitimate entity. This is a very sensitive and important factor. It may be safe to say that conservatives and progressives are divided on this point. This issue lasted for the entire period of the Roh administration, as the peace treaty, peace/security regime, and normalisation of US-DPRK relations had been at the centre of the SPT. The issue of acknowledging the DPRK as a legitimate political entity, as noted before, is closely connected to the principle of the Constitution of the ROK. Given that discourse is a kind of the aggregation of certain rules and meanings, one might observe what rules and meanings had been challenged during the Roh administration, and consequently what discourse had emerged as a result of Roh's securitisation against the DPRK's nuclear issue.

The following four debates, each of which is extracted from the minutes of the National Assembly of the ROK, reflect those conflicts concerning South Korea's identity that refers to a representation of the *other*, DPRK. All quoted texts are debates amongst members of the National Assembly (MP, a Briticism) and the Roh administration's cabinet members.

[A]
1. **CHOI BYUNG-KUK (MP)**: What is securing the North Korean regime? Doesn't that
2. mean that we attempt the adhesion of a divided nation? Doesn't that mean that
3. we forsake unification?
4. **YOON YOUNG-KWAN (Foreign Minister)**: What North Korea wants from the US
5. is not securing their regime but security assurance.
6. **CHOI**: What is the difference between security and regime?
7. **YOON**: Regime includes a country's economic and social system, while security
8. is a matter of whether they are invaded by external influences.
9. **CHOI**: You keep talking around. We should either adjust ourselves to North Korea or just
10. let this divided situation be fixed, if we secured the North's regime.
11. **YOON**: Every system in every country is likely to change as time goes by.
12. **CHOI**: You mean we must wait until they change?
13. **YOON**: ……

(NA 29/4/2003b: 23–24)

[B]
1. **CHOI BYUNG-KUK (MP)**: Where is the foundation of North Korea? Their ultimate goal is
2. to communise the entire Korean peninsula. It means you're saying that we should
3. secure their activities that try to communise the entire peninsula? […]
4. **CHUNG DONG-YOUNG (Unification Minister)**: I don't think so. Both Koreas have
5. already agreed to acknowledge each other's regime and system and cooperate in
6. *July 4th North-South Joint Statement*, *the Basic Agreement in 1991* and
7. *June 15th North-South Joint Declaration*. Inter-Korean cooperation is proceeding

8. on that basis. […]
9. **CHOI**: I didn't mean it. The point is whether we allow their activities aimed at
10. communising the entire peninsula under the name of securing the North Korean regime.
11. **CHUNG**: How can we allow that kind of activities given the mutual acknowledgment
12. between the two Koreas? Neither is it possible nor acceptable.

(NA 21/2/2005: 41–42)

[C]
1. **PARK JONG-GEUN (MP)**: On the condition that we agree to a permanent Korean
2. peace regime, will you ask North Korea to abrogate their unification theory of
3. communisation, which is still expressly stipulated in their regulation of the NKWP?
4. **SONG MIN-SOON (Foreign Minister)**: That kind of issue also needs to be dealt with
5. when we finish establishing the task of building trust politically and militarily.
6. **PARK**: North Korea is asking us to abrogate our NSA, isn't it?
7. **SONG**: Yes.
8. **PARK**: Then why aren't we asking North Korea to change their constitution or regulation?
9. **SONG**: We are doing that in the process of inter-Korean relations.
10. **PARK**: Are we? Minister, are you not slipping your tongue?

(NA 20/2/2007: 43–44)

[D]
1. **CHOI JAE-CHUN (MP)**: We're thinking peace too passively. Peace tends to be regarded
2. as an attainable goal, once either the military tension between the two Koreas is defused
3. or we're out of danger of the North Korean nuclear threats. But this idea makes us fall into
4. a trap; that is, it puts our divided peninsula into an unalterable form. […]
5. Therefore, although the SPT or a four-way summit is important, we need a more active
6. peace regime, which is led by South and North Korea themselves.
7. **LEE JAE-JEONG (Unification Minister)**: I do share with your overall opinion. What we
8. need to keep in mind is that the peace regime that is inclined to bring adhesion of division
9. is not desirable. The Peace regime should be unification-oriented. […]
10. **KIM WON-WOONG (MP)**: Given the situation in which American neocons are proactive,
11. I understand that the Roh administration has difficulties in dealing with North Korea;
12. nonetheless, you need to show your desire to make a breakthrough in order to
13. overcome a simple peace management.

(NA 13/4/2007: 36–37)

All of the above quotations raise the questions in relation to the divided status of the Korean peninsula. However, [D] is somewhat different from what [A], [B] and [C] implicate.

Let us look at quotations [A] and [B] first. Choi Byung-kuk, a conservative MP, is raising two points. First, he is arguing that concluding a peace treaty with North Korea and the resultant peace regime in Northeast Asia runs the risk of making the current divided status unalterable (lines 1–3, [A]). He seems concerned that any kind of agreements endorsed by surrounding powerful countries could make the DPRK regime legitimate. As noted above, this kind of viewpoint is in line with the ROK Constitution (Articles 3 and 4). For him, North Korea should be seen as an enemy that still tries to communise the entire peninsula (lines 1–3 and 9–10, [B]). Second, Choi seems very pessimistic about North Korea's change. He insists that securing the North's regime is equivalent

to abandoning the ROK-centred unification (lines 9–10, [A]). This shows that a perspective on the possibility of North Korea's change could be an integral part on which conservatives and progressives are divided.

In response to Choi's comments, then Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan made a division between regime security and security assurance, saying that guaranteeing North Korea's security does not mean securing its social or economic system (lines 7–8, [A]). By saying this, Yoon vindicates Roh's position: under no circumstances can the South Korean government tolerate North Korea as a nuclear state, and therefore securing the North's regime should be interpreted to the effect of halting its developing nuclear capabilities, not to the extent that the South condones a lasting divided situation on the peninsula. In addition to this, he seems to believe that North Korea would change (line 11, [A]). The Roh administration's basic perception of unification started with the belief that a change of the North Korean society is not impossible, even though the DPRK regime's will to change is weak (Yoon 2014).

In [B], Chung Dong-young, former Unification Minister, reminds Choi of *de facto* inter-Korean relations. Chung does not deny the fact that North Korea, which is still dreaming of unification under the flag of socialism, is an anti-government organisation. Yet he relates the issue of securing the North's regime to several inter-Korean agreements in which both Koreas agreed to acknowledge and respect each other's political system. Put differently, he integrates the North Korean security assurance issue into the unavoidable reality in which the two Koreas coexist. This shows exactly how the Roh administration legitimised its securitising moves towards the North Korean nuclear issue. In [C], conservative MP Park Jong-geun also brings up a question related to North Korea's *raison d'être*. He points out that the regulation of the NKWP is based on the aim of communising the entire peninsula, and wants the ROK government to demand that North Korea should abolish its hostile provision that repudiates the South's values (lines 1–3).

An excerpt [D] also deals with the issue of the divided status of the Korean peninsula. However, progressive MP Choi Jae-chun is demanding a more active peace regime, which is to be achieved beyond a simple absence of nuclear threat or military tension (lines 1–4). For him, the construction of the peace regime should be led by the two Koreas, not by surrounding powers, even though he

acknowledges the importance of the SPT or a four-way (South and North Korea, China and the US) dialogue (lines 5–6). This implies that the concept of establishing a peace regime in the peninsula as the Roh administration's extraordinary measures against the North Korean nuclear weapons remains vague, in the sense that it is not enough to resolve audiences' doubts about the future of a united Korea. As progressive MP Kim Won-woong points out, even to the liberal perspectives, the Roh administration's securitisation can be seen as an attempt at simply attaining a 'peaceful solution' that can lead to a long-lasting divided status on the Korean peninsula (lines 12–13).

In general, the progressives' view does not raise the question of whether the Roh administration broke a rule of the Constitution (Article 3). Admittedly, they encourage the government to interact with North Korea. At the same time, however, they have concerns that a period of the divided peninsula might be extended, which can be seen as an impediment to unification. To borrow legal terminology, Roh's extraordinary measures could be *dolus eventualis* (willful negligence); that is, concluding a peace regime with North Korea may be helpful to securitise the North Korean nuclear issue, but it would be conniving in an enduring division of territory. Furthermore, many conservatives raised a concern about the DPRK's real intention behind its calling for a peace treaty with the US: the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea (Terry 2013; Lee 2016). Of course, the main securitising actors of the Roh administration do not accept this logic. The following excerpts are from the interviews with high-ranking actors in the Roh administration:

> North Korea keeps developing its military capability and regime system even as inter-Korean relations are in bad shape. In the longer term, do you think that it is possible for us to prepare for the period of unification and to induce North Korea to change, if we are consistent in applying coercion or a hostile policy? We make North Korea's systematic conversion gradually through engagement. Of course, I think that the ultimate change of North Korea hinges on the change in China.
>
> (Interview: 20 June 2014)

> North Korea cannot help but change in the midst of the changes of world circumstances. Changes are predicated on the market economy. Basically, a political system based on the market economy cannot be monolithic nor a system based on communism. Therefore, we are pursuing a *de facto* unification; that is, economic community, through exchange and cooperation. And we think that the current North Korean regime style would not be possible in the process of such integration. […] We have to remember that North Korea has land boundaries not only with South Korea [238km], but also with China, which is 1,416km long. North Korea would not die even if we don't have any relationship with the North, as they are bound into China.
>
> (Interview: 3 July 2014)



Figure 4.2 Peace process as extraordinary measures

These quotations demonstrate the actors' perceptions of the possibility of change in North Korea. Firstly, they firmly believe that North Korea will be changed in the long/medium term through the process of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Secondly, they think that the current style of the North Korean regime cannot help being changed in the process of developing inter-Korean relations. Thirdly, they acknowledge that North Korea's change ultimately depends on China's attitude. To put it differently, insofar as inter-Korean relations are in unfavourable circumstances, even if the North Korean Kim regime is toppled, it is highly likely that a new regime which is hostile towards South Korea would take power in Pyongyang under the patronage of China. To sum up, for the Roh administration, securitising the North Korean nuclear issue by constructing a peace regime is to gain momentum to transform the DPRK system into a market-based one, which is supposedly to involve liberal democracy, albeit it far into the future.

With regard to this, what is more interesting is that the Bush administration started to see a peace treaty as a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue in its second term:

> We thought that the SPT might ultimately lead to a final resolution of the Korean War, even a peace treaty. This would have been a big leap from where we were presently, but it was worth contemplating. What if the North could be persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons—really give them up verifiably—in exchange for the recognition that would come from actually ending the Korean War legally?
>
> (Rice 2011: 524)

The problem is that even the US was not sure about the outcome of this new approach. The term 'verifiably' was a bigger problem. It was a harbinger of difficulties in agreeing on a verification system between North Korea and the US (e.g. conducting forensic measurement of nuclear materials and collecting samples of nuclear materials, etc.). Moreover, the Bush administration had no trust in the Kim regime. In an NSC meeting held in early 2005, when Secretary of State Rice laid out her thoughts that had been shared by Henry Kissinger, neither Vice President Dick Cheney nor Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld explicitly dismissed the idea (Rice 2011: 524). However, both of them felt a deep sense of scepticism at the suggestion:

> By 2006, Rice and the State Department envoy to North Korea, Christopher Hill, made clear that North Korea was the State Department's issue alone, […] Rice and Hill seemed to believe they could obtain an agreement with North Korea to end its WMD programmes.
>
> (Rumsfeld 2011: 642)

> When our actions don't match our rhetoric, diplomacy becomes much more difficult, and ultimately it becomes more likely that terror-sponsoring states will feel they can defy the will of the US impunity. […] there is often an inclination on the part of the State Department to make preemptive concessions to bad actors in the hope that their behaviour will change.
>
> (Cheney and Cheney 2011: 492–493)

What is more, what Bush actually wanted was to see the Kim regime toppled by the treaty, since he thought that Kim Jong-il would never survive if North Korea was opened up (Rice 2011: 525). In other words, signing a peace treaty was accepted as another way of regime change in North Korea. This is important, because this means that the Bush administration accepted, at least superficially, that SPT could be an extraordinary measure for securitising the North Korean nuclear issue. It also means that Roh succeeded in gaining American acknowledgment of his own version of securitisation (regardless of whether the SPT was a result of the US-China diplomatic mechanism). However, were Roh's extraordinary measures sustainable? This question leads to the last traits of his securitising move.

4.2.3 Stranded dialogue

A tangible result of such extraordinary measures that Roh achieved was the September 19 Joint Statement, which was signed in 2005 (as a concrete form of means). The Joint Statement was the first major result of the SPT. It included

almost all of the core points of what Roh had underscored throughout his speech acts. The main contents of the statement are as follows (italics are the principal collocations that are noted earlier as Roh's keywords): (1) verifiable *denuclearisation* of the Korean peninsula in a *peaceful* manner; (2) *normalisation* of the DPRK-US relationship; (3) promoting economic *cooperation* of the *Six Parties*; (4) negotiating a permanent *peace regime* on the Korean peninsula. Notwithstanding this achievement, as Roh himself thought that the North Korean nuclear issue essentially came out of DPRK-US relations (Yoo 2010: 248), its securitisation process was doomed to failure without the cooperation of both countries.

As expected, right after the agreement, Roh could not help but begin his second round of double securitisation towards North Korea and the US. Regarding the US role, its sanctions against a Macau-based bank, Banco Delta Asia (BDA), significantly influenced the process of the SPT. In September 2005, the US Department of the Treasury designated BDA an institution of 'money laundering concern' based on the Patriot Act (Article 311). It was known that the Kim Jong-il regime 'had used BDA for the majority of its international transactions', and the US asserted that the DPRK had been counterfeiting their money (Niksch and Weiss 2008: 6). As a massive bank run occurred, the authorities in Macau froze some $25 million related to the North Korean account of the bank. Not surprisingly, North Korea criticised the US, saying that the imposition of the Patriot Act is another way of pressurising them and the SPT would not progress without solving the issue of BDA. However, the US position was that the BDA problem should be separated from the nuclear issue, since the Treasury Department's action is just a matter of American law-enforcement. The following conversation, extracted from Bush's press conference in the White House, highlights the US's position:

1. **QUESTION**: Mr. President, last year, your administration imposed a package of economic
2. sanctions on North Korea. Now North Korea says it will not come back to the table
3. on the nuclear talks unless those sanctions go. […] Would you consider removing them,
4. suspending them, making some gesture to get North Korea back to the negotiating table?
5. **BUSH**: Actually, I think what you're referring to is the fact that we are cutting off the
6. transfer of monies generated by illicit activities. When somebody's counterfeiting
7. our money, we want to stop them from doing that. […] And we are working with others
8. to prevent them from illicit activity. That's different from economic sanctions.

(Bush 2006: 26 January)

Bush clearly emphasised that the BDA measures are unconnected to its economic sanctions on North Korea (lines 5–8). However, he inadvertently acknowledged later that the sanctions on the banking system were a part of the pressure on North Korea's nuclear programmes. The next quotation implies the context in which Bush connected the BDA sanctions to its nuclear issue:

> With support from all parties in the SPT, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1718. The resolution imposed the toughest sanctions on North Korea since the end of the Korean War. The US also tightened our sanctions on the North Korean banking system and sought to deny Kim Jong-il his precious luxury goods. The pressure worked. In February 2007, North Korea agreed to shut down its main nuclear reactor and allow UN inspectors back into the country to verify its actions.
>
> (Bush 2010: 425)

Bush seems to have believed that the February 13 Agreement in 2007, the second major agreement of the SPT, was caused by pressure and sanctions. Contrary to Bush's interpretation, however, the pressure did not work as much as he had expected. If anything, the implementation of the Agreement was possible only after the US dissolved the frozen North Korean money (PCPP 2008; Rice 2011).

What happened in February 2007 can be regarded as the second concrete form of Roh's extraordinary measures against the nuclear threat. The February 13 Agreement was dubbed 'initial actions to implement the 2005 Joint Statement'. In the Agreement, North Korea agreed to shut down and seal the nuclear facility at Yongbyun, and to invite IAEA personnel for monitoring and verifications in exchange for getting emergency energy assistance of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. In addition to this, all parties agreed to establish working groups concerning the issues of normalisation of the DPRK-US/Japan relations and the peace regime in Northeast Asia. The Agreement was supposed to be conducted within 60 days. However, it took 120 days for the parties just to 'start' part of the initial actions, and Pyongyang announced it only when they could see that the 'illicit' funds in Macau were finally transferred to their Foreign Trade Bank on 25 June via the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Russian Central Bank.

In this process, the US State Department was criticised for buckling under Pyongyang's demand. Indeed, as the US bank itself engaged in transferring North Korea's illicit funds that they had already frozen, it could be interpreted that the Bush administration broke its own rule so as to make a breakthrough for the Agreement. In regard to this, 'a group of Republican lawmakers asked the US

Government Accountability Office to examine whether' the involvement of the Federal Reserve, which transferred the North Korean assets, violated the money-laundering and counterfeiting laws (Kessler 2007). From the Roh administration's perspective, the implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement was largely stymied by the US government's BDA measures (Lim 2008; Jeong 2014; Lee 2014a; Suh 2014). Nevertheless, although the US did not appear to genuinely want to have a dialogue with North Korea, the Roh administration successfully made them sit on the negotiating table with the DPRK in one way or another, even to the extent that the Bush administration was accused of breaking its own rules as to withdrawing BDA sanctions.

The second parameter that scuttled the ROK government's securitisation was North Korea itself and its typical brinkmanship tactics, and it made Roh frustrated. Roh's securitising move was structurally fragile as its extraordinary measures hinged totally upon the *other*'s good faith. As noted before, it was important for Roh to maintain a close relationship with North Korea because inter-Korean relations could have significant diplomatic leverage in the process of its securitisation that is developed within the context of the SPT. Therefore, whenever North Korea made provocative remarks and actions, it was inevitable that Roh would face criticism for his 'seemingly' weak-kneed policy.

What is worse, Roh was not able to show that his administration had enough political leverage by which they could deter Pyongyang from taking actions that exacerbated the tensions. With the benefit of hindsight, although the Roh administration stressed that they had a phased or preconceived plan for solving the North Korean nuclear issue in 2003 (NA 29/4/2003a: 9), one cannot easily grasp what kind of phased plan (which should be developed and introduced to the audience (public) in an organised manner) they have conducted while North Korea kept heightening tensions on the peninsula from declaration of a nuclear state to test its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapon. In other words, despite its frequent speech acts about the North Korean nuclear issue, Roh's attempts at securitising the issue were short of material capabilities whereby he could substantialise the discourses. Later, the dilemmatic situation is clearly expressed by Roh in his memoir: 'I had feelings of helplessness and was deeply angered by the situation in which the ROK cannot play a leading role in a dangerous battle between the DPRK and the US' (Yoo 2010: 252).

The following quotations demonstrate how the Roh administration 'discursively' dealt with each situation:

[A: DPRK's declaration of nuclear power (10/2/2005)]
1. **RYU GEUN-CHAN (MP)**: I felt that the Roh administration seems to be obsessed with
2. consistency or humanitarian parts in terms of economic cooperation with North Korea.
3. **CHUNG DONG-YOUNG (Unification Minister)**: It doesn't mean that we maintain the
4. keynote of our North Korea policy no matter what happens. It means that there should be
5. no more actions that exacerbate the current situation.

(NA 24/2/2005: 12)

[B: DPRK's ballistic missile test (5/7/2006)]
1. **LEE JONG-SEOK (Unification Minister)**: We'll considerate necessary actions while
2. standing on the issue, and examine actions that can give North Korea substantive pressure […]
3. We'll take a cautious approach not to make the current tensions be heightened.

(NA 6/7/2006: 3)

[C: DPRK's announcement of conducting a nuclear test (3/10/2006)]
1. **LEE JONG-SEOK (Unification Minister)**: We'll focus our energy on managing the
2. current situation not to be exacerbated, given that a real preparation for the North's
3. nuclear test has not been detected yet. […]
4. **YOON GWANG-UNG (Defence Minister)**: We'll strengthen the cooperation system
5. via military diplomacy, which is in collaboration with other Governmental Departments'
6. measures, so that North Korea cannot make the situation worse.

(NA 4/10/2006: 3–4)

[D: DPRK's nuclear test (9/10/2006)]
1. **LEE JONG-SEOK (Unification Minister)**: We regard North Korea's nuclear test as a
2. grave challenge to the international nuclear order and peace, so we'll cope with this issue
3. with resoluteness and cool-headedness. […] We'll focus our energy on managing
4. the current situation not to be exacerbated. […]
5. **BAE KI-SEON (MP)**: The people who have pursued the peace and prosperity policy are
6. now in an awkward situation. Nonetheless, we still have to solve this issue through
7. dialogue and cooperation, don't we?
8. **LEE**: Dialogue is important but now coordinated action of the international community
9. is also important. However, inter-Korean relations include several sections that are
10. still needed to be solved by dialogue.

(NA 10/10/2006: 6–9)

The excerpts above clearly show the Roh administration's limit to its securitising measures. Each quotation implies the moment when North Korea maximised its brinkmanship tactics with discourse and material power. Excerpt [A] reflects the situation of February 2005. On 10 February 2005, North Korea declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons in the strongest terms, and it would withdraw indefinitely from the SPT. It is known that Roh was outraged by this, and he raised the question of whether it would be contradictory if South Korea keeps pursuing inter-Korean economic cooperation at the GIC, while North Korea is developing its own nuclear programme (Lee 2014b: 307). Roh's anger is understandable given that he had tried to set up the SPT as the main part of extraordinary means for his securitisation.

Despite his wrath, Roh could not help pursuing consistent economic cooperation with the North as it was one of only a small handful of businesses that bridge the two Koreas, something which is seen as an important tool for peaceful inter-Korean relations, and more importantly the GIC could be utilised as South Korea's political leverage in the long term. Therefore, it can be said that former Unification Minister Chung's comments reflect Roh's rage and dilemma (lines 3–5). In the same quotation, Chung underscores that North Korea must not take more actions exacerbating the tensions between the two Koreas. However, a discursive chasm was too deep to be reclaimed. As can be seen from [B] to [D], even though the Roh administration officials underlined that they would 'focus on managing current situations not to be exacerbated', the situation continued to deteriorate as Pyongyang built up its nuclear capabilities.

There were few things that Roh could do in terms of substantively deterring the North's nuclear provocation. On 5 July 2006, when North Korea tested a ballistic missile called Taepodong-2, which was carried out in two or three stages with an estimated range of 4,000km, the Roh administration expressed its deep regret and deferred the decision to provide rice and fertilisers. The Taepodong-2 test also led Seoul to support UNSC resolution 1695, but these measures were not able to prevent North Korea from carrying out further nuclear-related activities. Three months later, when North Korea pledged their first-ever nuclear test, the Roh administration again stressed that they would manage the situation and keep it from worsening. However, less than one week after this, on 9 October of that year, North Korea pushed ahead with a nuclear test.

Excerpt [D] demonstrates the dilemmatic situation that Roh faced. Lee Jong-seok acknowledged that the coordinated action of the international community is definitely needed to deter North Korea's further provocation (lines 8–10). The problem for Roh was that the coordinated action of the international community essentially required teamwork between the ROK and the US. Again, he had no choose but to ask for the US's understanding for keeping the SPT as the main frame for the extraordinary measure, taking the opportunities of the ROK-US summits held in September and November 2006 respectively. In the meantime, however, the US congress passed the North Korea Nonproliferation Act on 25 July and Bush signed it in October of that year, while Roh agreed with Chinese President Hu Jintao on 21 July that they would not take part in the US-

led coercive diplomacy against North Korea (PCPP 2008; KINU 2013a). For Roh, his double securitisation seemed to be never-ending, as long as the US Neocons were in power.

An inter-Korean summit held in October 2007 between Roh and the DPRK's supreme leader Kim Jong-il was the culminating point for Roh in terms of articulating the DPRK's nuclear threat. Roh made it clear that the inter-Korean summit could not be held unless the SPT had some success (Roh 2007c), and in any case he kept his promise as the summit was held with the October 3 Agreement in 2007 being successfully produced. The Agreement could be seen as an additional tangible result that Roh gained in his securitising moves.[32] At the summit, Roh confirmed again his view that the DPRK's nuclear issue could be securitised within the SPT framework. Interestingly enough, Kim Jong-il agreed with Roh about the value of the SPT:

> Our perception is that our nuclear programme has become an issue due to the US's hostile policy towards us [North Korea]. Sometimes they say "we'll change our [hostile] policy", but they did a flip-flop on that at other times blurting out harsh language. This is the first problem. The second one is that we want the entire Korean peninsula denuclearised, but they think that the denuclearisation would be finished once they rob us of nuclear weapons. The third one is that while we need to keep a peaceful nuclear energy program, the US forbids us to do every nuclear-related activity. However, we're still observing them closely to see whether there's a change of attitude. So I think this problem can be solved within the SPT framework, and the framework is actually really good. In this sense, I think we have a common thread.
>
> (Kim Jong-il, 3 October 2007)

The above excerpt is from the summit transcript, therefore it gives Kim Jong-il's perception of the Korean Nuclear Crisis in a most direct way, which was not embellished by the North Korean media or a third party.[33] From this excerpt, one may observe that Kim acknowledged the necessity of the SPT. More importantly, however, Kim emphasised that there were still wide discrepancies between the DPRK and the US in terms of the denuclearisation issue. Contrary to Roh's expectations, this became a mark of the failure of the implementation of the October 3 Agreement, and the DPRK nuclear issues relapsed after Pyongyang and Washington could not reach an agreement about the way of nuclear verification.

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[32] A formal title of the Agreement is 'Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement'. Under the terms of this Agreement, North Korea agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities and to provide a complete declaration of its nuclear programmes by the end of 2007. The main contents of the October 3 Agreement was actually agreed beforehand at the bilateral working-level talks between the US-DPRK, in Geneva, Switzerland, 1–2 September.

[33] The summit transcript was supposed to be closed, but in June 2013, Nam Jae-joon, the director of the NIS, disclosed a full text of the transcript, and it caused a huge amount of controversy.

4.3 Conclusion

What are the motivations of Roh's securitisation? Roh was sworn in as president in the midst of the division between conservativism and progressivism that was partly caused by Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy. Roh basically inherited the policy of his progressive predecessor and developed it as a peace and prosperity policy. Although Roh clearly preferred engagement to coercive policy, he was somewhat indecisive between the two options when North Korea carried out its nuclear test. In general, Roh advocated the social reform (Yoo 2010). In that respect, it would be correct to say that he is a progressivist. In terms of inter-Korean relations, Roh wanted to change the conservative-centred anticommunism (or anti-North Korea) discourse. For him, by overcoming the anticommunism discourse South Korea could become an active actor that can decide its own future-oriented security agenda (Yoo 2013). However, it did not mean that he condoned the nuclear threat posed by North Korea. He claimed that the threat must be dealt with instantly. From his perspective, however, the way of pursuing the denuclearisation of North Korea should not be based on the assumption that the regime in Pyongyang could collapse soon (Yoo 2010; Yoo 2013). In this regard, Roh took up the mantle of progressivism that Cho Bong-am initiated in the 1950s.

Roh's securitising move could be summarised as follows. First, from the perspective of discursive practice, particularly from ST's viewpoint (the articulation of the threats and extraordinary measures), Roh manifestly and plainly securitised the DPRK's nuclear threat throughout his presidency. The North Korean nuclear issue was actively and consistently manifested 'as security problems on the political agenda' by Roh's speech acts (Buzan and Hansen 2009). In other words, securitising actors and the audience were considerably exposed to Roh's discursive practices, which led them to articulate the risk of the DPRK's nuclear ambitions.

Second, in the process of the securitising move, Roh put top priority on dialogue and, accordingly, he considered it an extraordinary measure. While dealing with the nuclear issue within the SPT framework, he also held fast to the concept of the peace and security regime, which in turn brought about the issue of the legality of the DPRK regime. Meanwhile, he also securitised the US (the Bush administration) in regard to its possible military action against the DPRK.

However, his discourse seemed to be short of persuasive power whereby the issue of the ROK's conflicting referent objects could be resolved.

Third, and lastly, even though Roh's attempts to securitise the DPRK's nuclear issues were stymied not only by a structural factor, such as DPRK-US relations, but by a discursive limit that could not alleviate the immediate threat level, it is still interesting to see that his efforts resulted in relatively unambiguous forms of extraordinary measures, including the September 19 Joint Statement and the February 13 and October 3 Agreements, all of which aimed to acquire the establishment of a peace and security regime in Northeast Asia. Nonetheless, neither had Roh substantive power of implementation of the measures nor his securitising move was successful, and this in part contributed to the launch of the Lee Myung-bak administration that repudiated the validity of Roh's securitisation and wanted to show toughness in the face of Pyongyang's nuclear threat. Having outlined the main elements of Roh's securitisation, the following chapter will trace the details of Lee's.

5.
Lee Myung-bak's Security Discourse

5.1 Did Lee securitise the DPRK's nuclear issue?

In this chapter, readers may conceivably see how President Lee Myung-bak's security discourses on the DPRK's nuclear threat both differ from yet are also similar to those of Roh. Just as has been shown in the previous chapter, through this chapter one can grasp again how ST, as a theoretical framework, can be applied to the Korean Nuclear Crisis within the context of the Northeast Asian regional system. This chapter is split into two parts. The first part deals with the discursive traits of Lee based on the conceptual components of ST, which need to be complemented by corpus-assisted DA. On the basis of that, the second part explores several points that could be said to be the main characteristics of Lee's securitisation. Through this process, it may also be possible to grasp the ROK's style of security discourse, as well as the effectuality of the ST in regard to analysing seemingly complicated security discourses.

5.1.1 Security as speech act

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide points of entry to this chapter. They show the most frequent patterns of word usage by Lee during his presidency (February 2008 ~ February 2013). The former is based on a trigram, while the latter is based on 4 and 5-grams.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the latter may be better to understand the broader context in which Lee's words were used. The words shown in these tables are taken from the same corpus (253,106 words): Lee's official speeches, which were originally written in Korean and later translated into English by the Presidential Office team. It is expected that every single word used in the presidential speech was carefully selected, hence the corpus represents the crux of Lee's thoughts. Differently put, no matter how many of the speeches were embroidered or embellished, they can show the points upon which Lee and his speechwriting team wanted to put more weight at the time of writing. As was the

Table 5.1 Lee's top-twenty patterns of word usage (3-grams)

2008		2009		2010	
word	**Freq.**	**word**	**Freq.**	**word**	**Freq.**
as well as	43	be able to	77	Republic of Korea	77
Republic of Korea	42	as well as	42	the Republic of	61
the Republic of	38	will be able	39	be able to	43
of the Republic	35	I would like	30	as well as	39
the United States	32	the Government will	29	of the Republic	36
The Government will	32	one of the	29	in the world	35
be able to	30	would like to	28	of the world	34
the National Assembly	27	**the intl. community**	28	around the world	34
the Government will	26	The Government will	27	**the intl. community**	32
the Korean people	20	you very much	25	you very much	31
would like to	19	the fact that	25	Thank you very	30
the Korean Peninsula	19	Thank you very	25	will be able	29
one of the	18	around the world	23	of the Korean	29
President Hu and	18	the National Assembly	20	**the United States**	27
I would like	18	My fellow citizens	20	I would like	27
of the nation	17	the end of	19	the government will	26
you very much	16	the same time	18	The Government will	26
Thank you very	16	of the world	17	the same time	25
Hu and I	16	will not be	16	of the nation	25
the intl. community	15	will continue to	16	the Korean people	23

2011		2012		Total	
word	**Freq.**	**word**	**Freq.**	**word**	**Freq.**
Republic of Korea	92	Republic of Korea	69	Republic of Korea	295
the Republic of	60	as well as	54	as well as	224
in the world	48	in the world	50	be able to	220
as well as	46	the Republic of	47	the Republic of	218
the Government will	40	The Government will	42	in the world	162
be able to	40	the Government will	40	the Government will	161
the United States	37	around the world	37	The Government will	158
you very much	31	the Korean Peninsula	33	**the United States**	135
the intl. community	31	you very much	30	you very much	133
of the world	31	the National Assembly	30	**the intl. community**	133
The government will	31	be able to	30	of the Republic	133
Thank you very	31	global economic crisis	28	Thank you very	130
of the Republic	27	Thank you very	28	around the world	128
around the world	27	**the intl. community**	27	will be able	126
a fair society	26	members of the	27	one of the	119
The Republic of	26	the Government has	26	would like to	118
would like to	25	**the United States**	25	I would like	118
one of the	25	the Korean people	24	of the world	117
will be able	24	one of the	24	the same time	98
I would like	24	of the Republic	24	the Korean people	98

case for Roh, the corpus used in these tables is not limited to security issues. It covers all issues, such as economy, social problems, culture and so on. That is, it covers all speeches made by Lee during his presidency, which range from congratulatory messages to his periodical radio and internet addresses.

In both tables one can find the raw frequency of the words used in Lee's speeches in the second column of each year. Even though the corpus covers all issues, one of the most noticeable traits in these tables, however, is that there is

Table 5.2 Lee's top-twenty patterns of word usage (n-grams)

4-grams		5-grams	
word	**Freq.**	**word**	**Freq.**
the Republic of Korea	211	of the Republic of Korea	88
Thank you very much	130	we will be able to	31
will be able to	126	to take this opportunity to	29
I would like to	114	like to take this opportunity	25
of the Republic of	92	I would like to take	23
The Republic of Korea	59	would like to take this	22
At the same time	55	Now is the time for	21
as well as the	51	As a matter of fact	21
on the Korean Peninsula	41	members of the National Assembly	20
for the sake of	37	the Republic of Korea will	19
the global economic crisis	36	the Republic of Korea is	17
take this opportunity to	36	the Republic of Korea has	17
Republic of Korea is	34	**men and women in uniform**	17
the end of the	33	in the years to come	17
On top of this	33	stand on their own feet	16
of the National Assembly	32	The Republic of Korea is	16
Now is the time	32	will do all it can	15
we will be able	31	to stand on their own	15
one of the most	31	**peace on the Korean Peninsula**	15
in the international community	31	the March First Independence Movement	15

no indication of using words, such as 'North Korea' or 'North Korean nuclear issues'. This seems rather unusual, since it has long been known that the DPRK nuclear issue was of great importance to Lee and, therefore, relevant words were expected to be shown in the tables. Even though the tables include various kinds of function words and self-referencing words (e.g. as well as, will be able to, would like to, Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea is, etc.), given that they contain some lexical words (e.g. a fair society, global economic crisis, the United States, etc.), the results of the tables based on *n*-grams seem to be beyond expectations. This would particularly be the case for those who are aware of Lee's policy 'Vision 3,000: Denuclearisation and Openness', which was one of the major flagships of Lee's policy. Vision 3,000 was a process by which South Korea would actively assist North Korea in achieving a US$3,000 per capita income within 10 years once the DPRK regime makes a resolution to denuclearise (Moon 2012: 119; MoU 2013: 17).

Of course, being excluded from the above tables does not necessarily mean that Lee dealt carelessly with the DPRK's nuclear issue, nor was the issue totally neglected in terms of practising security discourse. In the trigram table, for example, the frequency of terms 'the North Korean' is 36, and 'North Korean nuclear' is 19 during Lee's presidency (February 2008~ February 2013), albeit not shown in the table because of its low frequency. These somehow show that

the DPRK's nuclear issue was not adequately articulated by Lee (in a relative sense). Even though there are several actors who can officially do the speech acts about the same issue, including the Unification Minister, Foreign Minister and Defence Minister, given their limited power compared to that of president, it can be said that the DPRK's nuclear issue was paid relatively little attention to by Lee at least in terms of his speech acts pattern, which in turn would have major effects on the security discourse among the public.

Despite this, there might be another way for Lee to articulate his concerns about the North's nuclear programme as an existential threat. Perhaps a bigram or other *n*-grams based on statistics that ruled out function words can shed light on this problem—lack of speech acts on the DPRK's nuclear issue—or possibly, Lee tried to express the threat by way of articulating other subjects that are closely related to the DPRK. Therefore, one needs to delve into each word that has lexical meaning in the above tables. In the tables, although function words, such as 'be able to', 'as well as' and 'would like to', are ranked in high positions, one can still find several lexical words that indicate Lee's discursive practice. Apart from words indicating self (in this case, 'Republic of Korea', 'the Korean people' and 'the Government will'), some words, including 'the United States', 'the international community', 'Hu and I (former Chinese President Hu Jintao and Lee himself)' are worthy of further investigation.

First of all, the high frequency of 'the United States' is not surprising, given its influence upon South Korea throughout many quarters. This means that Lee's speeches on the subject of the US cover various issues, such as the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the ROK-US summit, and the 2008 financial crisis emanating from the US. Collocational behaviour of the words 'the United States' used regarding the DPRK's nuclear issues will be examined later in this chapter. Secondly, the appearance of former Chinese President Hu Jintao is interesting, for this implies China's influential role in solving the DPRK issues. In the trigram-based table, the term 'President Hu and' is recorded 18 times in 2008. Further analysis of this shows that many of the sentences including these terms are related to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, the DPRK's nuclear issue, and strategic cooperative partnership between the ROK and China, which again would be connected to the DPRK issues (Table 5.3). In light of this, one can infer that Lee articulated the nuclear issues by way of the

Table 5.3 Selected sentences including *President Hu (Jintao)*

Today, **President Hu** and I engaged in candid and extensive discussions on the future direction of friendly and cooperative ties between South Korea and China, issues surrounding the Korean peninsula such as the ***North Korean nuclear problem***, regional and international circumstances and ways to cooperate in the global arena. (Lee 2008d)
President Hu and I engaged in extensive and in-depth discussions on the future direction of the development of ties between Korea and China, issues regarding the Korean Peninsula such as the ***North Korean nuclear problem*** as well as ways to cooperate in the region and the global arena. (Lee 2008d)
During the visit, I held separate meetings with **President Hu Jintao** and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and had very useful discussions […] We reaffirmed the common goal for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, including ***denuclearisation of North Korea***, and agreed to continue to work together toward that goal. (Lee 2012b)

ROK-China partnership. This implies that Lee acknowledged the importance of China's role in the issue.

Thirdly, the word 'international community' also appear oftentimes. A few of the sentences that contain this term are used to mention the DPRK's nuclear issue or the DPRK itself. For instance, at the 53rd Memorial Day's address, Lee said 'I think it is a particularly positive move that the North is working together with the *international community* for its denuclearisation' (Lee 2008b). In 2009, he said 'North Korea must fully give up their nuclear ambitions and become a member of the *international community*' at his remarks held at George Washington University (Lee 2009b). At the 66th session of the UN General Assembly, he said 'It is my hope to see the DPRK enjoy peace and prosperity by becoming a responsible member of the *international community*' (Lee 2011b).

Fourthly, it goes without saying that the term 'peace on the Korean peninsula' would be closely related to the DPRK's nuclear issues, as Lee stressed that the root cause of the instability of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia is the DPRK's nuclear ambitions (Lee 2009c; Lee 2011b). Lastly, the term 'men and women in uniform' appear 17 times in the 5-grams table. Although Lee did not use this term to link with the DPRK's nuclear threats in any case, it might be reasonable to think that the existence of the ROK Armed Forces is one of the foundations upon which Lee relied in terms of taking extraordinary measures.

Judging from the above discussion, several points come to the fore when it comes to Lee's speech acts. First, it is unexpected that Lee did not articulate the DPRK's nuclear issue enough to be seen in the tables. As mentioned, the frequencies of the terms directly linked to the DPRK's nuclear threats are

relatively low compared to other lexical chains. Second, Lee expressed his concerns about the DPRK's nuclear issues by way of articulating other terms, such as 'President Hu Jintao', 'the international community', and so forth. This means that Lee was fully cognisant of the fact that the DPRK's issue is not only the ROK's problem but also that of the international community, and thereby demands a coordinated effort based on an international or regional system.

Third, in this sense, it can be said that Lee firmly regarded the DPRK's nuclear programme as an existential threat that had caused instability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Fourth, despite this recognition, it seems that Lee's speech acts based on absolute frequencies are not enough to show his perception of referent objects and extraordinary measures that can deter North Korea's further threats. This issue might be supplemented by additional corpus-based DA and qualitative DA including documentary analysis and interviews. The sections following this section deal with the issues of referent objects and extraordinary measures that Lee tried to regulate in the process of establishing his security discourse.

5.1.2 Uncongenial referent objects

The previous section has shown the big picture of Lee's speech acts, as it only dealt with the absolute frequency that includes all areas, including the economy and social issues. In that sense, Table 5.4 provides a useful groundwork for an in-depth analysis whereby one can see Lee's way of constructing security discourse. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the keywords in this table are extracted using the keyness score, which has a higher statistical significance in terms of contextualising languages. The keywords not directly related to North Korea are excluded, so that readers may focus on Lee's perception of the DPRK's nuclear issues. The main corpus is the same with the preceding tables in this chapter and the reference corpus *enTenTen [2012]* is comprised of 11,191,860,036 words. Keywords shown in the table indicate Lee's speech acts pattern on North Korea in a comprehensive manner. As the keywords range from the words directly linked to the DPRK's nuclear issue to wider ones that surround the issue, this table may clarify the way in which Lee practised his language in the process of securitising moves against the DPRK's nuclear threats.

Table 5.4 Extracted keywords in Lee's speeches

keywords	keyness score	main corpus frequency	reference corpus frequency
Cheonan	143.63	43	885
democratisation	82.15	41	10,132
denuclearisation	63.65	19	958
provocations(provocation)	59.06(27.89)	27(17)	4,374(15,519)
reunification(unification)	58.19(37.06)	27(28)	8,584(22,111)
Yeongpyeong	52.21	15	487
peninsula	51.41	124	98,153
compatriots	42.80	20	8,815
bilateral(diplomacy)	40.96(26.62)	63(34)	58,047(46,231)
prosperity(coprosperity)	40.88(32.89)	123(9)	125,671(5)
Pyongyang	37.46	21	13,149
Myanmar	37.18	36	31,886
cooperation(cooperate)	32.10(26.05)	227(44)	312,508(65,167)
Hu(Jintao)	31.89(31.69)	40(13)	45,097(6,229)
countermeasures(watertight)	27.13(20.99)	12(9)	7,842(7,359)
unwavering	26.92	17	16,545
coexistence	25.75	13	10,739
sacrificed	24.24	28	40,677
armed	22.67	149	289,726
Geumgangsan	18.70	5	15

The first word that stands out in this table is 'denuclearisation', since this word was not shown in those tables based on absolute frequencies. This means that the word 'denuclearisation' was meaningfully articulated by Lee. However, the appearance of this word does not guarantee that there were enough speech acts as a form of securitisation against the DPRK's nuclear threats. The in-depth analysis of this keyword will be dealt with later in this chapter. Second, the table shows that Lee was not free from the values of the Constitution that was mentioned in the previous chapter: peaceful unification based on a fair market economy and democratic order, and maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations. The words 'unification', 'compatriots', 'prosperity', 'cooperation' and 'coexistence' can be subsumed under this category. In other words, even though North Korea kept engaging in provocative acts, Lee could not forsake the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the DPRK until unification is achieved.

At the same time, the other side of the Constitutional value—national security—could not be ignored, for the ROK government must not let a DPRK regime that holds on to the *Juche* ideology pose a threat to the South either by nuclear weapons or by other means. Keywords like 'countermeasures' and 'unwavering' clearly show that Lee regarded national security as one of the most important referent objects, and that he recognised the North's regime as something that should be controlled, because otherwise it would cause another

problem. The following quotations reflect both sides of the Constitutional value, each of which includes some of the keywords (in italics):

> My fellow Koreans and our ***compatriots*** in North Korea. The overriding goal of the ROK is not military confrontation. Our goal has always been the attainment of real peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Our goal is to bring about ***prosperity*** for all Koreans. Our vision is to realise the peaceful *reunification* of the Korean Peninsula.
>
> (Lee 2010d: 24 May)

> We have learned an invaluable lesson from the North's shelling of ***Yeonpyeong*** Island. All of us have yet again demonstrated ***unwavering*** determination, after keenly realising the fact that if we merely let the North have its own way, national security and peace cannot be guaranteed.
>
> (Lee 2010b: 27 December)

In essence, the issue of conflicting referent objects of the ROK governments mentioned in Chapter 4 lingered in the Lee administration. Differently put, in the process of establishing security discourses, Lee was also struggling with the fundamental issue that represents contradictory facets of the ROK's referent objects. This vital gap between the DPRK as compatriots whom the ROK should somehow embrace and the DPRK as the main enemy that causes grave concerns for the ROK's security matters seems not to be well bridged in Lee's speeches, just as it had not been in Roh's speeches. With regard to this, as suggested before, Roh tried to make dialogue extraordinary in order to bridge the gap, which was absolutely limited in controlling the threats. What about Lee? Can other keywords shed light on this problem?

Thirdly, perhaps most importantly, many of the keywords shown in the table implicate the DPRK's provocative behaviours and the potential ways in which the DPRK's bad behaviours could be altered. The words 'Cheonan', 'provocation(s)' and 'Yeonpyeong' are directly suggesting the DPRK's negativity, whereas 'Myanmar' and 'Hu (Jintao)' are the words that partly represent a model of reform and openness for the DPRK:

> Since the end of the Korean War, the North has perpetrated incessant armed ***provocations*** against us, including the bombing attack against the presidential delegation at the Aung San Martyr's Mausoleum in ***Myanmar*** and the bombings in midair of Korean Air Flight 858. The North Koreans, however, have never officially admitted the crimes they committed.
>
> (Lee 2010d: 24 May)

> Even though ***Myanmar*** is rich in natural resources, the country has long remained underdeveloped since it gained independence because it has walked on the socialist path. Quite recently, however, the nation has embarked on economic development by deciding to ***democratise***, reform and open its doors. There is no reason for the North not to do likewise.
>
> (Lee 2012e: 16 April)

Table 5.5 T-scores and MI scores for collocate of *North*

Collocate	T-score	Collocate	MI score
Korea	11.932	brethren	9.528
Korean	7.876	perpetrated	8.876
South (Korea)	6.455	principled	8.791
nuclear	6.283	pushed (ahead with)	8.791
Koreans	3.569	rocket	8.721
(nuclear) issue	3.562	residing	8.721
time	3.356	resolution	8.635
North (Korea)	3.316	persuade	8.528
help	3.015	provocative	8.528
compatriots	2.991	anytime	8.528
provocations	2.990	compatriots	8.376
brethren	2.825	tourists	8.359
attack	2.819	attack	8.281
engage	2.804	provocations	8.239
(nuclear) weapons	2.801	Yeonpyeong	8.207
(nuclear) program	2.784	long-range	8.069
change	2.719	provocation	8.026
perpetrated	2.640	South (Korea)	7.955
resolution	2.639	Six-Party (Talks)	7.943
dialogue	2.625	denuclearisation	7.850

These keywords may provide useful ground to test both referent objects and extraordinary measures of the Lee administration. The ratio of this type of keyword—emphasising the DPRK's bellicosity and the need for it to change—leads us to delve into Lee's perception of North Korea, and this can be supplemented by another type of corpus-assisted DA.

Table 5.5 provides the top-twenty collocates of *North* (*Buk* in Korean, referring to North Korea) with the highest t-scores and MI scores respectively (The range between the node word and the collocates is ±5 words). The corpus is the same as the previous ones. As aforementioned, both scores are measured to prove the strength or certainty of association between a node word and collocates. In this table, since the word *North* is used as a linguistic node, one can see the list of words that appeared frequently with the node word. In other words, through this table, readers can grasp the way in which Lee described the DRPK regime by using his own words. The way of extracting the collocations is exactly the same as Roh's case. In the t-score part of the table, function words, including prepositions and conjunctions, are excluded. Except for the general words like Korea, Korean(s) and North, this table gives us an additional opportunity to identify how North Korea was perceived by the Lee administration.

First, it can be said that the DPRK's nuclear issues were articulated during Lee's presidency. Relevant collocates are 'nuclear', 'issue', 'programme', 'resolution', 'Six-Party', 'pushed', 'rocket', 'long-range', 'denuclearisation', and so

on. This implies that Lee's discourse on North Korea was essentially linked to its nuclear activities (including launching long-range missiles) just as it was during the Roh administration. Second, the words 'compatriots', 'engage', 'brethren' and 'dialogue' demonstrate that Pyongyang is an object with which Seoul must engage in order to maintain peaceful inter-Korean relations. In that regard, it is right that Lee's North Korea policy can be recognised as engagement in diplomacy. This table in part proves Lee's discursive propensity for engagement policy. This view is also corroborated by Pyongyang watchers who themselves were engaged in the Lee administration. They adamantly denied the contention that the Lee administration was inclined to sanction or isolate the North:

> No government can survive in the ROK without the North Korea policy based on engagement and dialogue. There is no policy saying that "if you don't do this, we'll hit you". Can the ROK government strike the DPRK first due to the mere fact that the DPRK does not give up their nuclear weapons? It is not possible. What the Lee administration did was that when they said "we'll assist you when you do this (give up the nuclear weapons)", the DPRK responded "we won't", so they said "then we cannot assist you". I think all South Korean governments have had engagement policies towards the DPRK since the Park Cheong-hee military regime.
>
> (Interview: 9 July 2014)

> The Lee administration's 'denuclearisation first' policy sparked the North's strong opposition. The North blocked off everything (inter-Korean dialogue) in the early phase of the Lee administration, while claiming "do not mention our nuclear weapons". The persons in the liberal bloc do not see the incident in which South Korean employees were kicked out from the GIC in less than a month after Lee's inauguration. In July of that year, a South Korean tourist was shot dead at Mount Keumgang on the same day when President Lee proposed an inter-Korean dialogue. Under this circumstance, then North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had a stroke. One should look at these circumstances and contexts before criticising the Lee administration's North Korea policy.
>
> (Interview: 4 April 2014)

> To my knowledge, it is North Korea and not us that blocked and repudiated the inter-Korean relations. We offered food assistance last year, and we also proposed the inter-Korean dialogue through which to negotiate the problems for implementing the June 15 and October 4 declarations based on the respect for those declarations, but Pyongyang kept rejecting our suggestions.
>
> (Yoo Myung-hwan, Then Foreign Minister: NA 26/5/2009)

The problem, however, comes out of the third point, which seems to have made the Lee administration's North Korea policy more hawkish. As shown in the above table, many of the words are related to the concepts aiming to show the DPRK's belligerence or to mention its negative behaviours. These words are 'attack', 'perpetrated', 'provocation(s)', 'provocative', 'Yeonpyeong', 'tourists', and so forth.[34] It is worth noting that these words are also included in Lee's keyword list.

[34] With regard to 'tourists', on 11 July 2008, Park Wang-ja, a middle-aged South Korean tourist

What needs to be taken into account here is to understand how this kind of pattern influenced his articulation of the DPRK's nuclear threats. Differently put, it is highly likely that North Korea's provocations and resultant measures are inextricably linked with Lee's security discourse on North Korea's nuclear issues. This is important in that not only did it transform Lee's referent objects—maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations along with the achievement of the DPRK's denuclearisation (establishing a nuclear-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula)—into another realm, but it also regulated the entire direction of extraordinary measures on the issue of DPRK's nuclear threats, which will be investigated in the next section. Below are some excerpts from Lee's addresses which show his perceptual change in terms of dealing with North Korea. The words included in the above table and the keywords are in italics:

> I would like to make myself very clear. The highest priority of my administration's North Korea policy is to ensure the ***denuclearisation*** of North Korea and in tandem, we will seek mutual benefit and co-prosperity of the two Koreas. In the interest of genuine reconciliation and ***cooperation*** on the Korean peninsula, it is essential that the North Korean ***nuclear issue*** be first resolved.
>
> (Lee 2008c: 11 July)

> During this single year when we marked the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, North Korea ***perpetrated*** two armed ***provocations***. […] We have thus far shown patience time and again. We have struggled hard to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula one way or another because we do not want to see any more national tragedies. […] The North Koreans, however, have misread our intentions and aspiration for peace and committed ***provocations*** against us without the slightest hesitation.
>
> (Lee 2010b: 27 December)

One might argue that Lee had already established his 'hawkish' perception of the North Korean regime even before the two incidents—the sinking of the *Cheonan* corvette and the shelling of *Yeonpyeong* island—like many progressivists assert. However, it is not actually an assertion based on facts, at least according to Lee's discursive practice. He had hardly used such words indicating the North's negativity—e.g. provocative and provocations—before the outbreak of the incidents (Table 5.6). Lee's speech act pattern clearly shows that the words indicative of the North's negativity (except for the nuclear and long-range missile issues) had not been standing out on a large scale before 2010,

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was shot dead by a North Korean soldier while walking along the beach near Mount Keumgang (The Mount Keumgang is a special tourist administrative region of the DPRK). The North asserted that Ms Park intruded a military zone, but South Korea suspended the Keumgang Tour project after the North's refusal to conduct an on-the-spot survey and offer an official document for preventing a recurrence.

Table 5.6 Occurrences of *provocation(s)/provocative*

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
0 (0)	2 (40.42)	25 (385.40)	12 (195.70)	6 (113.70)

* () is per million

when the two incidents occurred. In other words, Lee's speech acts on the DPRK issue have shifted from the North's nuclear issue itself to a mixture of Pyongyang's provocative characteristics and nuclear-related activities. This could be the very point where his securitisation against the nuclear threat is distracted. In the end, for Lee, the DPRK's Kim regime was just not compatible with the process by which the ROK pursues its referent objects.

> A channel of dialogue with North Korea needs to be open at all times. Basically, however, I think that dictators cannot be changed, inasmuch as reform and openness mean the end of dictatorship. I believe that a motive power to change the North Korean society will arise from the North Korean people, not from the regime.
>
> (Lee 2015: 220)

Lee seems to have come to the conclusion that the DPRK regime, which itself should be partnered with the ROK, is uncongenial in the process of achieving Seoul's referent objects. As a result, this drastically led his security discourse to the ROK's ultimate referent object without considering the DPRK's existence: peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula based on a liberal democratic order. This change of security discourse seems to have made the ROK's extraordinary measures against the DPRK's nuclear threats much more ambiguous. This problem will be dealt with in the next section, for Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 also include several (in-) direct hints of extraordinary measures that Lee accentuated. What practical measures were frequently articulated by Lee to keep the ROK's referent objects safe and to deter the DPRK's nuclear threats? If there is something that Lee bore in mind as extraordinary measures, it must have been exposed in his speech act patterns. The next section discusses that issue.

5.1.3 Equivocal extraordinary measures

The preceding section introduced several notable keywords. Some of them helped readers to examine Lee's way of thinking about the DPRK regime and his perception of its nuclear threats. It reflected the reality of the ROK's referent objects that Lee had faced, which are not only conflicting but also uncongenial.

As mentioned, from ST's perspective, securitising actors have the special right to use extraordinary measures when they think that a threat would considerably increase without taking immediate action. Therefore, there are some activities that could be differentiated from a standard or normal political process. It was also suggested that in the process of taking exceptional means, the actors often legitimise the breaking of rules—the rules that are applied to a process by which standard or normal political activities are conducted—and the form of breaking of rules can vary: breaking the positive law or international law, enacting a special law that circumvents existing laws, purporting to being an act of state doctrine, and so forth. As quoted earlier, Lee clearly expressed that the highest priority of his administration is to denuclearise North Korea. He made it absolutely clear that the North's nuclear weapons and programmes are existential threats. What then could be chosen as extraordinary measures? What are Lee's keywords telling us about his measures on the threats?

This research has already shown that dialogue itself was chosen as an extraordinary measure during the Roh administration in terms of the discourse level. It was also suggested that even this could be seen as a securitising actor's activity related to the breaking of rules, given that the DPRK is an anti-government organisation according to the ROK's Constitution. As noted before, this is where the concept of *tongchi-haengwe* (prerogative or acts of state) arises from. Since the 1990s, inter-Korean dialogue has come to be known as part of a standard political process with the introduction of the IECA. At the same time, however, political tensions between the IECA and the NSA still remain, and this is why Roh was not able to be free from the criticism made by the conservative bloc, that the Roh administration's dialogue with the DPRK ended up strengthening the DPRK's Kim regime. For Roh, as noted in the previous chapter, dialogue was the sole solution as far as the North's behaviour is concerned. That was evidently expressed throughout his speech acts. In that respect, the Roh administration's extraordinary measure was an engagement policy based on consistent dialogue.

What is interesting, however, is that the basic situation in which Lee was placed was exactly the same as that of Roh. In other words, the boundary of the ROK's extraordinary measures was fairly and fundamentally circumscribed due to its limitations. As mentioned, owing to the risk of war, any type of pre-emptive

Table 5.7 Co-occurrences of *dialogue* and *North*

of peace in Northeast Asia. The South and	**North**	have so far continued ***dialogue***, exchanges
I hereby make the following proposals to	**North**	Korea. Full ***dialogue*** between the two Koreas
am willing to engage in ***dialogue*** with the	**North**	at any time and am ever ready to cooperate
, South Korea has striven to resolve the	**North**	Korean nuclear issue through ***dialogue*** and
is ready to engage in ***dialogue*** with the	**North**	anytime with an open mind. Peaceful unification
agreement that we must also pursue ***dialogue*** with	**North**	Korea. However, we must also maintain our
the inauguration of a new leadership, the	**North**	resumed ***dialogue*** with the United States

strike could not be imagined in South Korea. Such offensive action could not guarantee the denuclearisation or dissolution of the DPRK regime, nor could they gain support from China, with which the ROK should be partnered when it comes to reunification under Seoul's control. Even showing just a little sign of pre-emptive strike would increase the possibility of the North launching nuclear missiles (Kim 2015a).

What then can be seen as Lee's 'rational' extraordinary measures on the DPRK's nuclear threats? As shown in the previous quotations, the government officials in charge of the inter-Korean relations during the Lee administration insisted that their North Korea policy was principally based on an engagement policy. Is engagement itself not a policy that is predicated upon dialogue? As the word 'dialogue' is central to the engagement policy, which is one of the collocations of 'North (Korea)' in Lee's speeches, we need to look into how Lee used this word within the context of the DPRK issue (Table 5.7). Table 5.7 includes all co-occurrences of 'dialogue' and 'North' from the corpus. What this table is indicating is that Lee acknowledged the importance and inevitability of dialogue with North Korea. Although this table does not show it, the top-five collocates of 'dialogue' are all the DPRK-related words according to the MI scores (Pyongyang, inter-Korean, engage, open, North).

This table shows, at the same time, a slightly changing pattern of Lee's perception of dialogue as well. For example, the sentences from the first to the third line were spoken by Lee before the outbreak of the *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* incidents. In these sentences, Lee showed his belief in the usefulness of dialogue, albeit not satisfactorily processed. He also showed his willingness to engage in dialogue with the North at any time. This kind of thought can be found even after the incidents of 2010, as shown in the fifth and the sixth lines. This means that Lee could not help but keep looking for a way for the North's denuclearisation through dialogue. Nevertheless, the two incidents

caused by North Korea seemed to have made Lee's perception on dialogue with the North different, just as was shown in the previous quotations. The whole contexts of the fourth line and the sixth line of this table demonstrate his position in a clearer way:

> Over the past 20 years, therefore, South Korea has striven to resolve the **North** Korean nuclear issue through ***dialogue*** and collaboration while at the same time providing unstinted humanitarian assistance. North Korea, on the other hand, responded with a series of provocative acts, including the development of a nuclear programme, the sinking of the Navy corvette *Cheonan* by an explosion and the shelling of *Yeonpyeondo*. At long last, we came to a realisation that it no longer makes sense for us to anticipate that the North would abandon its nuclear programme or its policy of brinkmanship on its own.
>
> (Lee 2010a: 29 November)

> We are in full agreement that the SPT is an effective way to achieve tangible progress. We are in full agreement that we must also pursue ***dialogue*** with **North** Korea. However, we must also maintain our principled approach. A North Korea policy that is firmly rooted in such principles is the key that will allow us to ultimately and fundamentally resolve the issue. North Korea's development is in our collective interest and this is what we want; however, this depends on its willingness to end all provocations and make genuine peace.
>
> (Lee 2011c: 14 October)

In his 2010 address, Lee bluntly expressed his disappointment with North Korea. He even said that there is no point in anticipating the North's denuclearisation on its own. This logic led him to think about a more principled approach, as is shown in his 2011 address. He still seems to acknowledge the necessity of the SPT as a dialogue form for the North's denuclearisation. At the same time, however, he put more weight on the principled approach, which he thought was essential to resolve the nuclear issue in a fundamental manner. This makes us think about the relationship of the SPT and Lee's principled approach in the process of the DPRK's denuclearisation. With regard to this, Robert Gates, former US Secretary of Defence, clarified this matter:

> Lee was adamant that there could be no return to the SPT on the North's nuclear programme "until they admit their wrongdoing and renounce it." I concurred: "Resumption of the SPT would be seen as a reward—the sequence must be consequences, then talks."
>
> (Gates 2014: 416)

In short, particularly after the *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* incidents, Lee was determined that the SPT could not be held until the North's regime sincerely apologised for the provocations and altered its hitherto characteristics. Although dialogue was still an important option for Lee, a dialogue between the two Koreas must be based on the North's sincerity and genuineness. This analysis leads us to consider the next step. If the SPT, which is virtually the sole and viable option

for resolving the North's nuclear threat by means of dialogue, is not possible, what then could the extraordinary measures be that could induce North Korea to seriously consider its own denuclearisation? What could the principled approach be that might correct the North's 'provocative' behaviour?

The words like 'Myanmar' in Table 5.4 and 'persuade' in Table 5.5 in part show Lee's way of thinking in terms of the denuclearisation of the DPRK. It is worth noting that 'Myanmar' occurred 36 times in Lee's speeches. This is nearly twice as much as the frequency of 'denuclearisation' (19 times). It is interesting to see that the frequency of Myanmar is higher than those of 'Yeonpyeong' (15 times) and 'Pyongyang' (21 times). An in-depth analysis of the sentences including 'Myanmar' reveals that this word is closely related to the words 'persuade' and 'time'. The link is identified by the following quotations from Lee's other addresses.

> [Myanmar's] progress has stagnated due to the closed socialist economic system and the long-standing rule of the military authorities. Making matters worse, international sanctions over the past 20 years have left his country disconnected from the world. As a result, its national per capita income stands at around US$700, similar to North Korea. Against all the odds, however, ***Myanmar*** changed its constitution in 2008, and last year saw the inauguration of a civilian government.
>
> (Lee 2012c: 28 May)

> At the summit meeting with President Thein Sein, I said, "Just as ***Myanmar*** has opened a new age, I hope ***Myanmar*** will be able to ***persuade*** the North to learn from its experience and follow suit." Recently, a wind of liberalisation, reform and opening has been sweeping the whole world. The wind now blows toward Asia through North Africa after originating in Eastern Europe constituting a historic trend against which no one can stand.
>
> (Lee 2012d: 6 June)

In these addresses, Lee compares Myanmar directly to North Korea. It is no exaggeration to say that every single situation in which Myanmar was placed could be replaced by North Korea: closed socialist economic system, long-standing rule of the military authorities, international sanctions, national per capita income, and so forth. In that sense, the logic of Lee's Vision 3,000 policy was perfectly in sync with his opinion on Myanmar's change. Lee emphasised that the Pyongyang regime must follow Myanmar's example, saying that Myanmar saw 'a civilian government'. Moreover, he seemed to firmly believe that a wind of liberalisation, pointing to the collapse of the Eastern European communist bloc and the Arab Spring alluding to the demise of the authoritarian regimes, would blow towards North Korea. Simply put, Lee wanted the DPRK to be transformed.

As an interim conclusion, it seems clear that Lee had originally had hope for the resolution of the DPRK's nuclear threat by means of continuing dialogue (e.g. SPT) with North Korea. However, the consecutive incidents that occurred in 2010 made him much more sceptical about the DPRK's willingness to denounce its nuclear weapons. As a consequence of this, Lee's security discourse on North Korea seems to change to a way in which he put top priority on changing the North's behaviour before its denuclearisation. In particular, his Myanmar speeches were inevitably alluding to the change of the North Korean ruling elites themselves. This is because Lee thought that the DPRK's nuclear issue could only be resolved this way. However, this does not give any answer to the following questions: how can we change the North's behaviour? In what way can Lee persuade North Korea? However much Lee stressed the significance of 'persuasion', 'Myanmar' and 'principled' policy, it would not be possible to deter North Korea's nuclear armament without substantive measures that could fundamentally change the North's perception. Even though military responses (e.g. purchasing advanced weapons from abroad and extending the range of ballistic missiles) are to some degree able to deter the DPRK's nuclear adventurism, this kind of military response cannot dissuade the DPRK from developing its own nuclear weapons, nor can it enfeeble the already heightened security dilemma in the region.[35]

One might see at this point why Lee oftentimes mentioned 'Hu Jintao'. As shown in Table 5.4, President Hu was mentioned 40 times in Lee's speeches. The number is higher than the appearance of Myanmar. As noted earlier, Lee acknowledged the importance of the Chinese role in dealing with the DPRK issues. Apart from the numerical result of Lee's speech acts, his memoir also shows how much effort he exerted during several meetings with Beijing's ruling elites in order to press Pyongyang for its provocative activities. It was essential for the ROK government to collaborate with China, particularly regarding the DPRK issues, through which Lee intended to make the North's regime change. Although Lee himself struggled with the Chinese position on the DPRK's attacks on the South Korean Navy ship *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* Island, he seemed to believe that China's perception of North Korea would change. This logic

[35] The US allowed South Korea to extend the range of its ballistic missiles to 800km in October 2012. South Korea had only been able to develop its ballistic missiles with the maximum range of 300km since 2001. Before that, South Korea's ballistic missile range was 180km.

eventually led him to the concept of the inevitability of reunification on the Korean peninsula driven by South Korea:

> As China is trying to expand their influence in the world, they may felt burdensome to stand up for North Korea's provocations that are condemned by the international community. From my early tenure, I concentrated my efforts on altering China's thoughts about North Korea. Although I could not disclose the episodes one by one, throughout my presidency, the most important agenda for the ROK-China summits was North Korea. […] China's change of view on North Korea is also revealed, given that there have been discussions on the collapse of the North's regime and South-led unification in China.
>
> (Lee 2015: 297)

One may notice from the keywords (Table 5.4) that the words 'reunification' and 'unification' (55 times) were also frequently used by Lee. Lee used these words nearly twice as often as Roh (29 times). As both words translate into the same word in Korean (*Tong-il*), they can be regarded as one word. The unification discourse was very important for Lee, for it gives the ROK government an opportunity to solve the DPRK's nuclear threat once and for all, as long as it takes place under the South's control. Although Lee used these words throughout his presidency, the raw frequency of his reference to (re)unification increased in particular after 2010 when the two accidents occurred. In short, Lee's speech acts on the DPRK's nuclear threat can be the sequence of his perception leading up to the ROK-led unification.

Unfortunately, Lee's hope—making North Korea's perception alter by means of China, which is relatively more realistic—does not seem to have been achieved. Contrary to Lee's evaluation, Chun Young-woo, former National Security Advisor to Lee, who was one of the closest aides to the president, came to a different conclusion:

> I think there has been a lot of change in China's rhetoric and attitude toward North Korea. But I see no basis and grounds to conclude that China's fundamental policy toward North Korea is changing or it's likely to change anytime soon. […] I don't think they are willing to use any of the leverage they have to push North Korea into denuclearisation. They are giving more effusive lip service to the virtues of denuclearisation. […] I'm not seeing their harsh language translated into real action to change North Korea's behaviour or policy.
>
> (CSIS and KF 2015)

To summarise, all the relevant keywords frequently used by Lee have not so far provided any measures whereby the audience can regard them as convincing. In this sense, Lee's extraordinary measures which had hitherto been suggested (e.g. dialogue, Myanmar, President Hu, unification, persuade, etc.) are the concepts based on a mid/long-term aim at best, not on a threat-urgency

Table 5.8 T-scores and MI scores for collocate of *nuclear*

Collocate	T-score	Collocate	MI score
weapons	6.921	dismantle	10.229
North (Korea)	6.432	weapons	9.956
power	5.816	missiles	9.867
summit	5.790	ambitions	9.814
security	5.735	plants	9.801
plants	5.093	safety	9.381
Korea	4.713	proliferation	9.381
Korean	4.560	terrorism	9.296
safety	4.223	security	9.296
energy	3.965	arms	9.229
issue	3.579	plant	8.949
world	3.425	construct	8.814
terrorism	3.311	test	8.744
program	3.294	materials	8.644
Seoul	2.945	power	8.644
international	2.871	resolution	8.114
security	2.772	accident	8.059
development	2.749	safety	7.727
missiles	2.643	threat	7.693
plant	2.640	construction	7.644

Table 5.9 Co-occurrences of *dismantle/ambitions/resolution* and *nuclear*

Talks so that the North will ***dismantle*** its	**nuclear**	programme. We will try to persuade Pyongyang
to have Pyongyang totally ***dismantle*** its	**nuclear**	arsenal. We need to be convinced of the
imperative that the North ***dismantle*** its	**nuclear**	arsenal and take the path of openness and
survive is to voluntarily ***dismantle*** its	**nuclear**	weapons and to cooperate with the international
goal. North Korea must fully give up their	**nuclear**	***ambitions*** and become a member of the international
their best interest to fully give up their	**nuclear**	weapons ***ambitions***. When North Korea takes
to encourage North Korea to give up its	**nuclear**	weapons ***ambitions***. Up until recently,
too late for North Korea to give up their	**nuclear**	***ambitions***. It is never too late to embark
exchange for North Korea fully giving up their	**nuclear**	weapons ***ambitions***. Let us not concern
Peninsula. And North Korea must give up their	**nuclear**	***ambitions***. Korea and the United States
expediting a ***resolution*** of the North Korean	**nuclear**	issue and expanding the scope of economic
peaceful ***resolution*** of the North Korean	**nuclear**	issue and to bring about peace and stability
support for a ***resolution*** to the North Korean	**nuclear**	impasse through the Six-Party Talks and

modality. Given that Lee put the top priority on the DPRK's nuclear threat, this is a quite interesting result. According to an in-depth analysis of each keyword, other words in the above tables do not say much about the way that Lee tried to construct a substantive method for this problem.

There might be some reasons for this. One possible reason is that Lee just failed to come up with extraordinary measures that could deal with the threat in an urgent manner. Another possibility is that they were able to produce something resembling extraordinary measures, but Lee did not articulate these enough due to some confidential reasons. Either way, the absence of articulation means that there was no room for securitisation. In other words, it means that there was no language practice. It also means that there was the absence of a process of

constructing a set or system of meanings that could give rise to more discussion between securitising actors and audiences.

Let us move on to the collocates of 'nuclear' (Table 5.8). This table includes the top-twenty collocates of 'nuclear' in the corpus representing all of Lee's speeches. The collocates are presented by t-scores and MI scores respectively. Had Lee's extraordinary measures against the DPRK's nuclear threat been articulated in a substantive manner, the relevant concepts should have come to the front at the table. First, the words 'North', 'weapons', 'programme', 'development', 'test', 'missiles', 'arms' and 'threat' clearly show that Lee recognised North Korea's nuclear weapons as a threat and he linked the North with its nuclear programme. Second, many words in this table, such as 'summit', 'security', 'world', 'terrorism', 'Seoul', 'proliferation', 'materials', and 'accident' are closely related to the 'Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)' held in Seoul in 2012, rather than referring to Pyongyang's nuclear issues. Apart from this, the reason why the words 'power', 'construct(ion)' and 'plants' are frequently seen is that Lee placed a high priority on building nuclear power plants overseas.

Third, more importantly, the words 'dismantle', 'ambitions' and 'resolution' are possibly linked to some potential extraordinary measures on the issue. However, what an in-depth observation of these words shows is that most of the contexts are about Lee's style in terms of demanding the denuclearisation of North Korea; that is, the DPRK should fully give up their nuclear weapons and open up to countries like China, Myanmar and Vietnam in order for them to become a responsible member of the international community (Table 5.9). Although the SPT and dialogue can be seen in his early speeches, it seems difficult to figure out what could be regarded as Lee's real extraordinary measure. Nonetheless, one concept that is found from these contexts is 'Grand Bargain', which can be regarded as an extraordinary measure that Lee came up with in 2009. The whole sentence of the fifth line of the second row (among collocate *ambitions*) is as follows:

> 'Our Grand Bargain proposal aims to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue by providing security assurance and economic assistance in exchange for North Korea fully giving up their **nuclear** weapons ***ambitions***'. Let us not concern ourselves with when the SPT resumes. Instead, we must hammer out a grand bargain to fundamentally resolve the North Korea issue through the SPT.
>
> (Lee 2010c: 5 June)

In this excerpt one can see that Lee put the Grand Bargain before the SPT, although he still recognised that the SPT would be the ultimate framework to securitise the DPRK's nuclear issue. According to this definition, the Grand Bargain seems to be similar to the contents of the several important agreements signed during the Roh administration, in that there is a kind of transactional relation between the complete denuclearisation of the DPRK and the security assurance plus economic assistance to the North. The Lee administration acknowledged that the Grand Bargain is in line with the principle of the September 19 Joint Statement. However, they differentiated the Grand Bargain from the February 13 and the October 3 Agreements, for they thought that the two agreements were just in charge of a partial process of dismantling the DPRK's nuclear programmes. The core argument of the Grand Bargain initiative was that it pursued irreversible steps from the initial stage so that North Korea cannot reverse a denuclearisation procedure (Ha 2013: 89–92).

As a more comprehensive and fundamental approach for resolving the North's nuclear issue, the Grand Bargain, however, failed to be positioned as one of the major security discourses in Lee's speech acts. This may be due to several reasons, including the *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* incidents that happened in the following year and the DPRK's continuous rebuff to that initiative. As has already been suggested in the tables indicating keywords and collocates, particularly after the two incidents in 2010, Lee shifted his discursive weight from the North's nuclear issues to its provocative traits and the necessity for its change.

What makes the Grand Bargain initiative more ambiguous was that both the initiative and Lee's other principal North Korea policy, Vision 3,000, were considered in the same vein (Ha 2013: 90). Since Vision 3,000 was predicated on the political value that seeks liberal democracy, market economy and human rights, all of which are fundamentally based on the ROK's referent objects, it would somehow be contradictory to the core part of the Grand Bargain (remember that the Grand Bargain's core argument was that the international community secures the DPRK regime in return for denuclearisation). The discursive relationship between Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain will be further investigated along with the May 24 measures in the following section.

In effect, the problem of 'equivocal extraordinary measures' was always controversial throughout Lee's presidency. Regarding this, the National

Assembly Minutes demonstrate that even ruling party members often brought up this problem. All quoted texts below are debates between MPs and the Lee administration's cabinet members.

[A: DPRK's ballistic missile test (5/4/2009)]
1. **YOO SEUNG-MIN (MP)**: Our government's response to this situation is equivocal, and
2. the government seems like 'The Boy Who Cried Wolf', because we had said that
3. "we would impose sanctions on you", even when we didn't have any means to
4. do that. […] What kind of concrete things do you have to impose sanctions? Do you?
5. **LEE SANG-HEE (Defence Minister)**: What I said was that we need to consider
6. both international measures and bilateral measures in a comprehensive way
7. to get a balance in the process of imposing sanctions.
8. **YOO**: Is the GIC not a powerful measure for us? You should insist that we need to
9. shut down the GIC at the NSC meeting. -- It's no use saying these things
10. because we don't have any measures to impose sanctions.

(NA 5/4/2009: 21–22)

[B: DPRK's announcement about confiscation of the South's assets in Mt. Keumgang]
1. **CHUNG OK-IM (MP)**: I'm very sceptical about the efficiency of our government's
2. principled policy, because it seems not to be based on action.
3. **HYUN IN-TAEK (Unification Minister)**: We think that our measures should be something
4. whereby North Korea ultimately realises that what they're doing at the moment would
5. not be helpful for them. […]
6. **SONG MIN-SOON (MP)**: How long would it take for the North to realise that?
7. **HYUN**: Well, that question is really difficult to be answered. […]
8. **SONG**: Why then did you bring up such a concept that cannot be answered? […]
9. Regarding Vision 3,000, I think the concept of 'denuclearisation' turned into
10. *de facto* admitting the North's nuclearisation. […] and 'openness' is turning into the
11. one, which is not between inter-Korean relations but between China and North Korea.
12. **HYUN**: Would you mind if I suggest that you seem not to understand the
13. Vision 3,000 policy thoroughly. This is not a policy aiming for the North's isolation or
14. based on coercion. This is rather close to exchange, dialogue and engagement. […]
15. **SONG**: You should first get the North denuclearised. Without measures that can
16. denuclearise North Korea --

(NA 13/4/2010: 11–13)

[C: North Korea's third nuclear test (12/2/2013)]
1. **PARK JOO-SEON (MP)**: The Lee administration was launched with Vision 3,000, but
2. during this period the North conducted nuclear tests twice along with long-range rockets.
3. Don't you think this government's North Korea policy is a failure?
4. **RYU WOO-IK (Unification Minister)**: You've always demanded me to admit that
5. our North Korea policy is unsuccessful, but I can't agree with you. It is clear that it is
6. the North that should be blamed for strained inter-Korean relations, not us. […]
7. **PARK**: You mean that the policy is still in the process of success?
8. **RYU**: Yes. Our policy would be effective when we push it forward in a consistent manner.

(NA 13/2/2013: 15–16)

The most conspicuous point that can be extrapolated from the above excerpts is that MPs are complaining about the lack of substantive measures that can change the DPRK's provocative pattern. In quotation [A], Yoo Seung-min, a conservative MP, criticises the government for not implementing sufficient measures in order to impose sanctions on North Korea for its missile provocation. He even proposed to scrap the GIC, which is virtually the sole symbol of inter-Korean cooperation, but right after that insistence he seemed to realise that it is

in fact not a plausible option and acknowledged that the ROK government does not have substantive measures (lines 8–10).[36]

In [B], another conservative MP Chung Ok-im also expressed her scepticism about the so-called 'principled North Korea policy' for its lack of substantial means (lines 1–2). In the same quotation, Hyun In-taek, then Unification Minister, emphasised that Vision 3,000 was based on engagement that aims to make North Korea 'realise' their wrongdoings. In response to this, progressive MP Song, former Foreign Minister under the Roh administration, pointed out that Vision 3,000 does not guarantee the North's realisation of what they had done, nor its denuclearisation. The same controversy occurred again in [C], when the DPRK carried out the third nuclear test at the end of Lee's term. Then Unification Minister Ryu Woo-ik nonetheless showed his firm belief that the Lee administration's policy would be capable of changing the North's behaviour with a proviso: that this policy needs to be pushed ahead with.

In sum, two points can be briefly suggested as a result of the uncovered pattern of Lee's speech acts. First, the relatively low frequencies of the terms related to the DPRK's nuclear issue clearly show that the articulation of the nuclear threats was not made enough to be discursively practised. Second, nevertheless, the previous results also show that Lee did try to solve the nuclear issue comprehensively and fundamentally by adopting Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain. Differently put, despite launching these policies, Lee failed to securitise the DPRK's nuclear issue to the level of animated discourse due to the unexpected events, such as the *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* incidents and North Korea's unchanging traits. However, what we need to put more weight on is the fact that Lee's speech acts did not show a clear way that audiences can understand: how can the problem of the contradictory goals—making North Korea open society (Vision 3,000) and securing the DPRK regime (Grand Bargain)—be solved in the securitising moves towards the North's nuclear threat? Under these circumstances, Lee tended to securitise the North's 'bad' behaviour itself, rather than focusing on securitising its strengthening nuclear capabilities. Subsequently, this made Lee's extraordinary measures more equivocal in terms

[36] The ROK's Park Geun-hye administration closed the GIC in February 2016, which has sparked ongoing controversies afterwards.

of security discourse. Further analysis of these issues will be dealt with in the following section.

5.2 Main characteristics

Having provided a certain pattern of Lee's speech acts, there is an opportunity to highlight more particular aspects of its security discourse. The main purpose of this section is to elucidate Lee's discursive characteristics by means of analysing supplementing texts, leading up to a comprehensive delineation of his security discourse on the DPRK's nuclear issue.

5.2.1 The pursuit of complete securitisation

According to the white papers and the policy reports, the Lee administration put the top priority of their security policy on 'denuclearisation of North Korea'. This is the very point where they wanted to differentiate themselves from the Roh administration, for they thought that the former administration's approach to the DPRK's nuclear issue was not strong enough to make North Korea renounce nuclear weapons; if anything, Roh fortified the North's willingness to become a nuclear state by supplying economic assistance. For Lee, therefore, the nuclear issue should be seen as a problem that must be solved once and for all. To borrow his expression, a 'paradigm shift' in North Korea policy was needed (Ha 2013: 54–56). It was against this backdrop that Vision 3,000 was proposed. Vision 3,000, which represents Lee's North Korea policy, was at the centre of the process of denuclearisation. Lee and his aides called this a policy based on strategic thinking, since it manifested a clear benefit that North Korea can enjoy once they make a decision on denuclearisation in a complete manner (MoU 2013: 17). Their perspectives on Vision 3,000 can be found from many sources, and they regarded this as an epoch-making and realistic policy that could induce North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons:

> The North Korean regime would not change its current path unless there is an epoch-making and tremendous policy that can make them abandon nuclear weapons. North Korea may start to think that they can use nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip once this kind of policy is proposed. This is why the Lee administration came up with the 'Vision 3,000' policy as an epoch-making one.
>
> (Interview: 9 July 2014)

When we thought about the idea, we brought very prominent economists for our team, thinking whether we can really make North Korea a country of having $3,000 within ten years. The economists said “yes” and I trusted their calculation. There was a comprehensive task, and we finally came to the conclusion that we can change North Korea within ten years.

(Interview: 9 June 2014)

The interviewees quoted above were all in the loop on making and implementing North Korea policy during the Lee administration. They regarded Vision 3,000 not only as measures to develop the North’s economy and inter-Korean relations, but also as extraordinary measures whereby the North can make a decision about abandoning nuclear weapons. This kind of thinking can also be found from the National Assembly minutes:

1. **HYUN IN-TAEK (Unification Minister)**: The issue of the Korean peninsula is not only
2. a problem between the two Koreas but also an international one. In terms of policy tools,
3. I think that we’ve got plentiful measures.
4. **KWON YOUNG-SE (MP)**: I did not think that the government has plentiful measures.
5. Can you let me know what could be the plentiful measures?
6. **HYUN**: For example, with regard to the Vision 3,000 policy,
7. I think that it’s a grand plan whereby we assist North Koreans in making a US$3,000
8. per capita. This is a very forward-looking plan that has never been attempted.

(NA 19/2/2009: 34-35)

In this quotation, when conservative MP Kwon Young-se showed his doubts about whether the government had had measures to persuade North Korea, then Unification Minister Hyun In-taek mentioned Vision 3,000 again, claiming that it is very forward-looking and it had never been attempted. Why then was this ‘epoch-making’ policy not able to forge its discursive domain? Why did the Vision 3,000 discourse fail to make itself conspicuous among other keywords or terms? As suggested above, even conservative party members were often in doubt about the feasibility of the Lee administration’s North Korea policy. Below is another example of such a discussion between a conservative MP and Hyun:

1. **HYUN IN-TAEK (Unification Minister)**: I think North Korea’s policy that keeps developing
2. nuclear weapons while at the same time choosing isolation has double dilemmas.
3. **HONG JUNG-WOOK (MP)**: It seems to be our arbitrary interpretation. If I put myself in
4. Kim Jong-il’s position, his desire for nuclear weapons would be increasing as he is seeing
5. [Muammar] Gaddafi standing on the edge of a precipice. […] In that sense, many other
6. MPs concur with me that Vision 3,000 is becoming a policy
7. that does not have any practicality, nor influences on the inter-Korean relations. […]
8. **HYUN**: I have a different point of view on that. I think that kind of thought—
9. the regime can survive by developing nuclear weapons—is totally wrong.
10. If anything, I think it is developing nuclear weapons that creates the root causes
11. anxiety over their regime. […] The North’s regime can be secured by abandoning
12. their nuclear weapons and opening the country to foreign intercourse.

(NA 4/3/2011: 26)

The logical structure between the two discussants here is simple. MP Hong Jung-wook thinks that North Korea would not abandon nuclear weapons, for they recognise it as the sword of the State that can sustain the Kim regime. Therefore, Vision 3,000, which demands the North's denuclearisation first, cannot be applicable nor reliable anymore, particularly while the Kim regime is seeing the collapse of a Gaddafi regime that forsook nuclear programmes. By contrast, Minister Hyun argues that the very reason that causes North Korea's concerns about regime survivability is its obsession with nuclear programmes, since it keeps them isolated from the international community and isolation itself causes another unstable factor towards the regime.

Put differently, the Lee administration launched Vision 3,000 predicated on the logic that the DPRK's regime can be secured by abandoning nuclear weapons and adopting an open-door policy. However, can the DPRK regime, which has secured its legitimacy and political authority by isolating its own society, accept this logic? According to the Lee administration, Pyongyang at first expressed its interests in the South's proposal on Vision 3,000, which means there was strategic room for the Lee administration to manoeuvre that policy. One of the core members of the Lee administration said that the North Korean counterparts, Kim Yang-gon and Won Dong-yeon, Pyongyang's top point men on the South, took a deep interest in the South's proposal:

> I met Kim Yang-gon and we talked about a lot of things. I first explained about our policy, Vision 3,000. It was almost a one hour and forty minutes conversation. After finishing our conversation, when we came out of the room, Won Dong-yeon, Kim's right arm, asked me, "Is Vision 3,000 really a serious policy? Can we trust it?" I told him "You should trust me. This is really a serious policy. We can help you." I mean, they were very much seriously considering whether they had to accept our policy or not. Of course, after that, they finally declared that Vision 3,000 is a bad policy. […] What I felt was that at least they were seriously calculating it under their specific conditions: Kim Jong-il's illness, bad domestic situations, and social instability, especially in local areas, etc.
>
> (Interview: 9 June 2014)

What these excerpts have so far shown us is that the purpose of Lee's North Korea policy was actually to show the DPRK regime's compatibility with the process of its denuclearisation and openness, at least according to their official speech acts. This logic led him to propose another method of extraordinary measures, Grand Bargain: a negotiation plan for the DPRK's denuclearisation. As noted before, the Grand Bargain was first and foremost for the DPRK's irreversible denuclearisation. According to the Foreign Ministry under the Lee

administration, the Grand Bargain aimed at capturing all steps of the DPRK's irreversible denuclearisation and corresponding measures by the international community, such as security assurances, normalisation of relations, and economic assistance (MOFA 2010). For Lee, initiating Grand Bargain also means enhancing the ROK's stature as a leading party in this process:

> Now we should push forward with a package settlement, Grand Bargain, which dismantles the core part of the DPRK's nuclear programme while at the same time providing a certain security assurance and international assistance. […] The North's regime should not misunderstand this process as threatening or isolating policy towards them. North Korea can create new relationships with the US and international community by abandoning their nuclear programmes, and this will be the sole path for the North to make themselves live and develop. There are no countries that would take a hostile policy toward the North when you make a resolution to discard nuclear weapons.
>
> (Lee 2009a: 22 September)

In this quote, Lee stressed that the DPRK regime does not have to be concerned about the intention of the Grand Bargain initiative, in that it is not antagonistic to their regime. Both Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain policies are extraordinary measures in an ironic way, for both policies aim to secure the DPRK's regime, which ultimately goes against the ROK's Constitutional value, as suggested in the previous chapter. What is more, these policies could not be meaningfully carried out, because Lee failed to devise a discursive process by which the North Korean regime survives while abandoning their nuclear weapons. In other words, the logical process that Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain laid out—the DPRK's irreversible denuclearisation in return for corresponding measures such as securing its regime and economic assistance—did not tell enough about Pyongyang's real concerns: the regime's stability in the case of abandoning their nuclear programme and adopting an open-door policy. In sum, this point raises a contradiction in regards to Lee's security discourse: (a) denuclearisation of the DPRK must be prioritised; (b) the denuclearisation can secure the DPRK regime, meaning the incumbent Kim regime; and (c) the DPRK's nuclear issue can be fundamentally solved by implementing Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain, which pursues 'universal' values, that is, liberal democracy and a market economy (Ha 2013: 88; Lee 2015: 318).

Among these arguments, (b) is against the ROK's referent object or its Constitutional value, but (c) is based only on the ROK's referent object (materializing a society of liberal democracy and market economy). As aforementioned, the current North regime is essentially against the value

emphasised in (c). Pyongyang has been extremely vigilant ever since the end of the Cold War owing to fear of regime collapse or absorption. North Korea looks rather like a country that bears all the hallmarks of socialism (perhaps it would be more accurate to say that it is operated by the North Korean style of socialism: *Juche* Ideology). For the DPRK, on one hand, there is no reasonable point that can explain the relationship between securing their regime and founding a society based on liberal democracy. For Lee, on the other hand, referent objects written in (c) must be secured, but it also broke its own rule by proposing measures that include (b). To reiterate, Lee's security discourse did not explicate enough about a discursive point that should be located somewhere between (b) and (c). One of the discursive chasms of the Lee administration arose from this point.

The contradictory security discourse ended up coming down to the 'May 24 measures' in 2010, when North Korea carried out an unparalleled provocation: the sinking of the South's Navy ship *Cheonan* in March of that year, leading to the death of 46 ROK sailors and one military rescue diver. Since the incident occurred in a surprise attack by the North, the South was not able to find who was behind the attack at first:

> As president, I promise that every detail concerning the cause of the sinking of the corvette, the ***Cheonan***, will come to light. I will resolutely deal with the outcome and make sure this sort of incident never recurs in the future. We will safeguard our nation with watertight security measures and make our armed forces stronger.
>
> (Lee 2010e: 19 April)

On 24 May, after an investigating team consisting of South Korea, the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Sweden concluded that *Cheonan* was sunk by a torpedo attack, Lee announced the 'May 24 measures'.[37] The May 24 measures are an important discursive point for Lee, for it officially changed his representation of the DPRK:

> Starting from the ***Cheonan*** incident, the Lee administration changed its perspective on North Korea that caused military provocation trampling the ROK government's goodwill. In order to make the North realise that there are consequences to such provocative acts and to urge North Korea to change its belligerent attitude, the ROK government convened a NSC meeting on 21 May, immediately after the findings of the ***Cheonan*** investigation were released, and decided to take systematic and stern measures in order to prevent any reckless provocations by the North in the future.

[37] The main contents of the 'May 24 measures' are as follows: (1) not allowing North Korean vessels to enter into the South's waters; (2) suspending trade between the two Koreas; (3) not allowing South Korean citizens to visit North Korea; (4) prohibiting new investment in North Korea; and (5) suspending assistance programmes towards North Korea except for humanitarian aid for vulnerable groups (MoU 2011: 49).

(Ha 2013: 111)

This quotation corroborates Lee's previously suggested changing speech acts patterns. From the discursive or ST's viewpoint, the May 24 measures mark a watershed in that it changed Lee's rule-breaking point in his securitising moves towards the DPRK's nuclear threats. To put it differently, before the *Cheonan* incident, as stated, Lee put more weight on a dialogue framework that included the exchange of securing the North's regime and accomplishing its denuclearisation. After the incident, however, the discursive weight was sharply changed to criticism of Pyongyang, which was belligerent and obsessed only with nuclear weapons without caring for its people. At this stage, Lee put top priority on altering North Korea's behaviour and, therefore, its value outweighed peaceful inter-Korean relations and the denuclearisation of the DPRK. For him, unless the Kim regime transforms themselves into more responsible actors in the international community, any kind of securitising moves on the DPRK's denuclearisation would be meaningless.

What is worse, the North's artillery attack on *Yeonpyeong* Island of the same year made Lee's security discourse on North Korea more critical. This perhaps led to an important reason that explains why his original extraordinary measures—Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain—failed. To summarise, although it does not seem that Lee intended to do so, his rule-breaking point for the DPRK's denuclearisation ended up as something that denies the current regime in North Korea altogether; that is, Lee concluded that the North's nuclear threats could be fundamentally solved by maintaining the principled North Korea policy at the expense of peaceful inter-Korean relations. This point also indicates the reason why the '(re)unification' discourse became popular in terms of North Korea policy in the latter half of Lee's presidency, which consequently seemed to replace the DPRK's nuclear issue.

One big discursive difference between Roh and Lee arises from this point. Roh emphasised that the DPRK regime needs to be recognised as a normal country, even if it would be very difficult to change the regime's characteristics, whereas Lee virtually denied it because he firmly believed that the dictatorship in North Korea cannot be accepted as a normal one, nor can it survive in the long term. Even though Lee's official security discourse was not the same as the Hegelian perspective, he changed it into the Hegelian one: a goal-oriented

account of history. Lee's hope—inevitability of the dissolution of the current DPRK regime—is seen several times in his memoir (Lee 2015: 298–299), and finally he seems to acknowledge that the purpose of his North Korea policy was to topple the DPRK regime:

> Why are the North's regime concerning about the unification discourse coming out of the South, even though they themselves have stressed the importance of unification under a federal system? Perhaps they are afraid of being absorbed into the South and being replaced by the change of the North Korean citizens and society, which can be caused by our consistent North Korea policy.
>
> (Lee 2015: 380)

5.2.2 Unarticulated securitisation

As suggested above, the focus of Lee's security discourse on the DPRK's nuclear threats saw a change, and it has some contradictory points. In this process, the extraordinary measures—Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain—were not seen enough in his speech acts pattern. The previous section has shown that the major reason for this falls on the two incidents: the sinking of *Cheonan* and the shelling of *Yeonpyeong*. These events changed the points of Lee's speech acts from articulating the imminent necessity of denuclearisation to criticising the North Korean regime. This section further investigates some factors that affected Lee's securitising move.

The analysis of Lee's speech acts pattern suggests that the international system in which China and the US are competing for hegemony, particularly over the Korean peninsula, put a huge constraint on Lee's securitising move. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the role of China, as a 'responsible stakeholder' in the world, was continually increasing during Lee's presidency. This is why the word 'Hu (Jintao)' often appeared throughout Lee's speeches. What is interesting is that just as Roh struggled with Washington in the process of making an SPT framework as an extraordinary measure, Lee also strived to persuade Beijing to get them involved in the process of changing Pyongyang's behaviour. As Lee's extraordinary measures were inextricably linked to the DPRK's strategic decision—abandoning nuclear weapons and adopting an open-door policy—China's role in inducing North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons was vital.

Moreover, it was not just the persuasion that China could do. Lee was eager to seek China's help to put pressure on North Korea, particularly after the North's

provocations in 2010. When Lee came up with the May 24 measures after the *Cheonan* incident, he also strived for extending the measures' effect onto the international level by adopting a UNSC statement that clearly denounces the DPRK. However, the UNSC statement of denouncing North Korea was not able to be adopted due to the fact that China, holding veto power in the UNSC, was reluctant to criticise Pyongyang. Beijing's reluctance recurred when North Korea attacked *Yeonpyeong* Island. When South Korea and the US decided to carry out a joint military exercise after the North's attack, China even officially objected to the naval exercise, as a US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *George Washington*, which symbolises the US's military might, had been scheduled to be dispatched to the Korean peninsula (Page et al. 2010). Not surprisingly, China's seemingly lukewarm responses to the North's provocation enraged Lee:

> President Hu Jintao still kept taking an equivocal attitude on the *Cheonan* incident, in which our 46 sailors were killed. It made me so furious that I even used some strong words. "I wish South Korea and China could not be red in the face with anger because of this problem." It was a strong expression that is seldom used at a summit meeting. Hu seemed embarrassed and looked to other attendees including Dai Bingguo and Li Keqiang[38]; all of them talked in whispers about my words.
>
> (Lee 2015: 292)

This excerpt shows how much effort Lee exerted to get China involved in the measures that aimed to put pressure on North Korea so that the North's combatant traits could be altered. It has been evident through these incidents that even though China might have begun to reassess the strategic value of North Korea and there is a difference in the way that they talk about North Korea, they have not made any fundamental strategic changes on the DPRK. China's equidistance policy to both Koreas, which they think is conducive to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula, remains (Hill 2013; Cha 2015; Song and Lee 2016). Maintaining regional stability is one of the most important policies that constitute China's core interests (Oster et al. 2013; Feng 2014). Despite the North's intrusive attitude, China's tendency to offer 'minimum-security assurance for Pyongyang' is likely to continue, given that a sudden collapse of the DPRK could give rise to a big threat to China's stability (Chung 2007: 120; Bluth 2011a; Yu et al. 2016). This point raises fundamental questions about Lee's securitising

[38] Dai Bingguo, a Chinese politician and diplomat, was President Hu's special representative to the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Li Keqiang served as the first-ranked Vice-Premier from 2008 to 2013. On March 2013, he was elected as Premier.

Table 5.10 Co-occurrences of *the US* and *North* (whole sentences)

US President Barak Obama remarked that though he is aware that ***North Korea*** wants a direct bilateral channel with the **United States**, ***North Korea*** will not be able to drive a wedge between the **United States** and the Republic of Korea. (Lee 2009d)
[…] they are saying that the **United States** military mistakenly fired at the ship and caused it to sink. Such outlandish assertions are laughable and they continue to say that the Republic of Korea and the **United States** are trying to frame ***North Korea*** by calling on them to take responsibility. (Lee 2010c)
Earlier this year, with the inauguration of a new leadership, the ***North*** resumed dialogue with the **United States** and was given a precious opportunity to transform. It is therefore, regrettable that it is again losing another opportunity by launching the missile. (Lee 2012e)

move. The reason why Lee tried to persuade China was because he believed that the DPRK's nuclear provocation could ultimately blow out only by changing its behaviour, and China's role was essential in order to modify the nature of the North Korean regime.

In the process of exercising measures against North Korea, it was not just China that circumscribed the ROK's area of activity. The US, which should be partnered with China in terms of making a 'New Type of Great Power Relations', also needed to manage the situation in a stable fashion:

> South Korea's original plans for retaliation were, we thought, disproportionately aggressive, involving both aircraft and artillery. We were worried the exchanges could escalate dangerously. The president [Barack Obama], [Hillary] Clinton, [Michael] Mullen, and I were all on the phone often with our South Korean counterparts over a period of days, and ultimately South Korea simply returned artillery fire on the location of the North Koreans' batteries that had started the whole affair.
>
> (Gates 2014: 497)

In the case of the US factor, as quoted, although they also limited the ROK's military action radius in terms of responding to the two incidents, their security discourse on North Korea was generally in line with that of the Lee administration. For Lee, at least as far as the North Korean issue is concerned, the US discourse should represent an unshakable ROK-US alliance. Table 5.10 shows all three cases in which the words the 'United States' and 'North (Korea)' are used in one sentence in Lee's speeches (the node word is the 'United States' and 'North' is a collocate, the range between the node word and the collocates is ±5 words). What is interesting in this table is that although Lee emphasised that North Korea would not have direct bilateral talks with the US in 2009, he seemed to have conceded the US-DPRK bilateral talks at his 2012 address.

What then made Lee change his keynote of the nuclear negotiation? It needs some background. Lee's original objection to the US-DPRK bilateral talks

was partly because of the North's persistent *tong-me-bong-nam* strategy, as mentioned in the previous chapter, which aims to rule out South Korea in the course of negotiation for its denuclearisation with the US. This is of course unacceptable for any heads of state of the ROK. Hence, one of the most important principles for Lee was to hold inter-Korean nuclear talks first because South Korea must be the party directly involved in the process of the DPRK's denuclearisation. This principle was embodied by establishing a 'three-stage process (inter-Korean talks → US-DPRK talks → SPT)', as a principle for denuclearisation talks, in collaboration with the US (Ha 2013: 126). As noted above, after the military collisions in 2010, Lee made it clear that there would be no SPT until North Korea apologised for its actions.

There was an important change in the DPRK's nuclear issues. North Korea disclosed its Uranium Enrichment Programme (UEP) in November 2010, confirming the previous allegation that the North had been secretly developing its UEP. The absence of an alternative to the SPT was another big reason. The US-China summit held in January 2011, in which the North Korean nuclear issue was high on the agenda and then Presidents Hu Jintao and Barack Obama agreed on the importance of 'sincere and constructive inter-Korean dialogue', 'the need for concrete and effective steps to achieve the goal of denuclearisation', and 'calling for the necessary steps that would allow for early resumption of the SPT', etc. (WhiteHouse 2011), put more pressure on South Korea. It was against this backdrop that Lee put forward the three-stage process.

In terms of holding nuclear talks, Lee demanded that the DPRK show its sincerity for denuclearisation first as 'pre-steps', by suspending its UEP and reinstating IAEA inspectors. South Korea's effort was not in vain: the two Koreas held two rounds of talks on denuclearisation respectively in 2011 (July and October). It was indeed an opportunity for Lee to explain the Grand Bargain and the pre-steps for denuclearisation to North Korea (MOFA 2012; Ha 2013). What is interesting is that even the South seemed to hold out little hope for accomplishing such an approach (having inter-Korean nuclear talks before moving on to the US-DPRK talks), given that the North has held fast to bilateral nuclear talks with the US. With regard to this, after the first inter-Korean talks on denuclearisation in Bali, Indonesia, one high-ranking official, who directed the ROK's nuclear talks with the North in the Lee administration, recalled that they

had been a bit surprised to hear that the North had accepted the South's suggestion.[39]

Despite the two rounds of the working-level inter-Korean talks, the pertinent issue could not be elevated to the level of Lee's speeches. This may be partly because the talks failed to lead to substantive results, such as the SPT. The ROK's 'three-stage process' plan did not last for long. Meanwhile, the third US-DPRK nuclear talks were held in Beijing, China, in February 2012, bypassing inter-Korean talks, which should have been held before that. With regard to this, Lee's 2012 address in Table 5.10 refers to the agreement between the US and North Korea signed on 29 February 2012 (Leap Day agreement). In this agreement, North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests and nuclear activities including uranium enrichment activities in return for 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance along with the US's commitment to respect the DPRK's sovereignty and equality (Nuland 2012). This was the sole agreement signed with North Korea regarding the DPRK's nuclear issues during Lee's presidency.

There are at least two points that this Leap Day agreement implies in terms of limitations of Lee's security discourse. First, however much the ROK justifies the agreement by claiming that the ROK government had been maintaining a close contact with the US regarding the US-DPRK talks, strictly speaking, it was an agreement between the US and DPRK, not between the two Koreas. Second, even though the Leap Day agreement was a stage that aimed to substantialise the pre-steps towards the SPT, it was not able to lay any groundwork pointing to a complete and comprehensive solution to the DPRK's nuclear programme. If anything, the Leap Day agreement also ended up with a phased approach, just like the February 13 and October 3 Agreements of 2007, which Lee had always tried to avert.

What is more, it also did not include any measures that could make the North apologise for its military provocations, which was a prerequisite to resuming the SPT. What is worse was that the Leap Day agreement itself was stranded after the North launched its long-range missile in April 2012 (Swenson-Wright 2013: 148). The point here is not that the agreement was not enough to

[39] In an interview with a high-ranking government official in charge of nuclear negotiations with the DPRK (September 2011).

denuclearise North Korea, but that Lee's security discourse on denuclearisation of the DPRK fell short of a stage in which his discourse can be implemented.

5.2.3 Elusive representations

Another factor that affected Lee's securitisation was the o*ther* (North Korea). To reiterate, identity is a perspicuous representation or interpretation of the *other*, and it is 'defined as self-ascription to a particular group' (Julios 2008). For instance, Victor Cha, former Director for Asian Affairs in the White House's National Security Council, referred to North Korea as the 'Impossible State', a regime which is fraught with contradictions and Cold War anachronism (Cha 2012). According to the above definition, it can be said that Cha sees the *self*, here, the US or South Korea, as the 'Possible States', which are neither contradictory nor anachronistic in the post-Cold War era. The image of the DPRK, as the impossible state, is well reflected in the Lee administration's discourses. This kind of image, subsequently, was used to vindicate its North Korea policy by claiming that the reason why the inter-Korean relations during Lee's presidency were not smooth was not because of the extraordinary measures, such as Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain, but because of the *other*. The following excerpts show the cabinet members' perceptions of the North's behaviour:

[A]
1. **RYU WOO-IK (UNIFICATION MINISTER)**: I can't agree that our government is
2. responsible for the North's missile test. This is because the North has consistently
3. pursued with its nuclear development programme. But you said --
4. **SIM JAE-KWON (MP)**: What I call this government to account is that what you
5. have done for the last five years. I think we should hold this administration accountable.
6. I'm not saying that the North is not responsible for the launching of its missile. […]
7. **RYU**: It is the North that has aggravated the situation. I can't agree with the opinion at all
8. that the South had made the situation worse. We have coherently --
9. **SIM**: Look. It goes without saying that the North should be blamed for the missile test.
10. I'm saying that our government is incompetent in terms of responding to it.
11. **RYU**: So the situation is --

(NA 6/12/2012: 19–20)

[B]
1. **HONG IK-PYO (MP)**: […] Everyone can impose sanctions and use force, but the
2. Foreign Ministry's role is to prevent and manage these situations. In terms of military
3. response, Defence Ministry can do that. What is your role?
4. **KIM SUNG-HWAN (FOREIGN MINISTER)**: If you insist that the Foreign Ministry is
5. dealing with diplomatic matters wrongly, I'll not argue that. What I want to say, however,
6. if you think … the Ministry did well the North wouldn't have developed its missiles
7. or nuclear weapons, I cannot agree with that 100%.

(NA 6/12/2012: 24)

Both excerpts include debates between progressive party members and conservative cabinet members. When MPs Sim and Hong raised questions about whether the Lee administration had coped well with the DPRK's missile and nuclear threats, the Ministers all argued that North Korea should be held liable for its military provocations. What needs to be taken into account here is that they were struggling with the absence of 'effective' extraordinary measures. Minister Kim acknowledges that there are virtually no immediate measures to deter the North from engaging in further provocations (lines 6–7, [B]). Several days after this discussion, North Korea launched a long-range rocket, and two months later, on 12 February 2013, the North carried out its third nuclear test.

As mentioned, Lee's ambitious measures, shown as extraordinary measures against the North's nuclear threat at the initial stage of his presidency, could not be effectively implemented. Accordingly, his denuclearisation discourse failed to gain momentum to be shown in his speech acts. Perhaps, just as the Lee administration argued, it was mainly because of the DPRK's intransigence. Indeed, apart from its already established recalcitrant image, the DPRK regime was caught in a vortex of leadership transition from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un.[40] Regarding this, Stephen W. Bosworth, former US special representative for North Korea policy, recalled that the reason why the Obama administration was not able to engage the DPRK was 'because of the internal situation in North Korea'. He said that since Kim Jong-il became visibly ill in 2008, 'there was a predisposition on the part of North Korea to make sure everybody understands the US was the enemy'; hence, there was no possibility for compromise (CSIS and KF 2015). This perspective can be seen throughout the Lee administration's speech acts. In other words, a continual usage of the concepts pointing to the 'North Korea's intransigence' and 'internal situation (e.g. death of Kim Jong-il)' has been forming another security discourse through which the securitising actors justify their own policy measures:

> The reason why Vision 3,000 policy was not able to be implemented during President Lee's tenure was because North Korea did not make a decision on denuclearisation. The reason why North Korea never gave up its nuclear weapons was not because they felt the lack of the security assurance or economic assistance from the international community, but because they regard nuclear weapons as a last resort that insures the hereditary dictatorship.

[40] After Kim Jong-il had a stroke in August 2008, North Korea accelerated its hereditary succession. Following the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, Kim Jong-un was formally appointed as the Supreme Commander of the NKPA, and subsequently became First Secretary of the NKWP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the NKWP.

(Ha 2013: 58)

In the above quotation, it can be seen that the Lee administration ascribes the failure of the Vision 3,000 policy to North Korea that put the supremacy of value on its autocracy. The following quotes show how they perceived the death of Kim Jong-il:

> It wasn't because of the Lee administration that the North carried out repeated nuclear and missile tests and resorted to those acts of military provocation. Pyongyang suffered its gravest crisis in history in the summer of 2008 when Kim Jong-il fell ill, and this period lasted until his death in December 2011. The need to bolster the regime internally had everyone on edge, and Pyongyang had to fabricate an external threat, even, literally, by force. That period just happened to coincide with the first four years of the Lee administration. Had Kim Jong-il been in good health, the *Cheonan* sinking and the *Yeonpyeong* attack would not have occurred.
>
> (Hakoda 2013)

Kim Tae-hyo was one of the most influential security policy advisers to Lee, who also had a secret meeting with the DPRK. For him, the death of Kim Jong-il was the prime variable that determined the inter-Korean relations during the Lee administration period. This kind of perception is corroborated by another high-level official:

> We started working level meetings in late 2009, and interestingly enough, when they bombed the *Cheonan* warship, there were still conversations going on between the two Koreas. It was a kind of sudden attack. You have to look at the domestic situation in North Korea. Kim Jong-il was very weak, and in order to succeed his power to Kim Jong-un, he had to rely heavily on the military; in other words, the military at that time had very strong power to control the regime.
>
> (Interview: 9 June 2014)

In sum, according to the Lee administration's security discourse, their measures against the DPRK's nuclear threats were doomed to be obstructed by North Korea and some unexpected variables.

> It is clear that the North regime believes our policy measures (except for providing cash, rice and fertiliser, all of which are needed to maintain their power) like a comprehensive economic assistance that can fundamentally change the North Korean economy could cause more dangerous results such as an open society and bringing social change.
>
> (Ha 2013: 58)

This kind of assessment—the DPRK regime's averseness to reform and openness—is exactly the same as Lee's:

> Since taking office, the North showed interest in our Vision 3,000 initiative for a time. They even asked for detailed data on the progress plan. I think this was because they needed some time to explore whether they could keep receiving strategic materials while leaving the nuclear issues behind.
>
> (Lee 2015: 319)

However, at the same time, this perception is at odds with the original intention of his extraordinary measures, because he actually thought that the Vision 3,000 initiative was a policy that is tailored to dictatorship like North Korea:

> I thought that this kind of opinion [President Roh's opinion about the DPRK's nuclear weapons] emanated from a lack of understanding regarding dictatorship. We can rarely see examples in history in which dictatorship itself changes. A more active strategy that can induce North Korea to reform and open was needed. Moreover, we should take the initiative in dealing with the North's nuclear and relevant military issues that are directly connected to the peace on the Korean peninsula.
>
> (Lee 2015: 316)

In this quote, Lee emphasised that his extraordinary measures against the North's nuclear threat were introduced based on his understanding of the traits of dictatorship. He also said that the measures were active, thereby giving the ROK a leading role in dealing with the nuclear issue. However, this kind of assertion is different from what he realised about the 'real' dictatorship—a regime filled with uncertainty and recalcitrance—during his presidency. In the above quote, Lee concluded that Pyongyang just tried to take advantage of his Vision 3,000 initiative while putting aside the nuclear issue. To put it differently, Lee inadvertently acknowledged that his extraordinary measures were not based on a practical perception of the regime in Pyongyang in dealing with the North's nuclear issues.

The image of the *self* (South Korea) that Lee held was another issue that affected his securitising move. Broadly speaking, in terms of the *self*, there were two conflicting points in the Lee administration's security discourse on North Korea. Firstly, one of the important principles that the administration adhered to was the concept of sincerity (NA 29/11/2010: 25; MoU 2013: 15, 21). They consistently demanded the DPRK to show its sincerity, while arguing that Vision 3,000 is firmly based on liberal democracy and a market economy. Given that Lee himself knew about the DPRK's traits well, which would never accept such liberal values that can endanger its dictatorial regime, the ROK's sincerity initiated by the Vision 3,000 could not be accepted by the DPRK regime. In other words, regardless of the DPRK's sincerity, Lee was confounded by his own sincerity, which was actually caused by the ROK's ambiguous situation. That is, the ROK's Constitutional value was just incompatible with the DPRK's.

Pertaining to the previous point, the administration confirmed that Vision 3,000 is a policy that regards the DPRK regime as its counterpart (NA 15/6/2011:

48). In this context, the Grand Bargain aiming at securing the DPRK regime on condition of its complete denuclearisation was able to be introduced. At the same time, however, the Lee administration did not give adequate reason for why and how the DPRK regime should be secured. Furthermore, as shown before, the increasing use of the word '(re)unification' obscured the ROK's discourse that connects the DPRK's denuclearisation with providing security assurance to Pyongyang. Secondly, the Lee administration seemed to be lacking consistency in judging the North's willingness to renounce its nuclear weapons.

1. **KIM YOUNG-WOO (MP)**: Do you think that the North would renounce nuclear weapons
2. once the peace regime is settled?
3. **RYU WOO-IK (UNIFICATION MINISTER)**: That is the same as the North's demand.
4. Our position is that we can discuss such things after the North denuclearises first. The
5. time is not yet ripe for discussing the peace regime while they are developing
6. nuclear weapons and conducting missile tests.
7. **KIM**: […] What do you think about this opinion, 'The North would've somehow developed
8. nuclear weapons even if we hadn't assisted them' then?
9. **RYU**: […] For the last two decades, what North Korea has consistently done was
10. to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. They did this even when
11. inter-Korean relations were invigorating in the early 2000s. […] Therefore it would be
12. correct that the North's policy for becoming a nuclear state has been proceeding as ever.

(NA 25/7/2012: 44–45)

In this discussion, Unification Minister Ryu Woo-ik responded to a conservative MP Kim Young-woo that negotiation for the peace regime on the Korean peninsula cannot be imagined before the North's decision on denuclearisation (lines 4–5), while saying that the North is not likely to give up its nuclear programme, given its past behaviour (lines 9–12).

This reflects another contradictory point of the Lee administration's security discourse: having confidence that their extraordinary measures can induce North Korea to give up nuclear weapons, while at the same time having mistrust of the North's willingness to denuclearise. The following interview with one of the exponents of Vision 3,000 also shows a similar perception:

Q: Was Vision 3,000 not an ambitious policy aiming to denuclearise North Korea? I heard that you had prepared a lot for that when you were in the Presidential Transition Team.
A: Economic incentives are an important condition for North Korea policy. However, there would be no temptation whatsoever—whether it is a political or economic incentive—for the North to give up its nuclear programme. They just cannot give up nuclear weapons.

(Interview: 8 July 2014)

The interviewee expresses utter disbelief. Perhaps he became more pessimistic about the DPRK's behaviour after he had some direct experiences in dealing with North Korea. Indeed, it is quite interesting to match the Lee administration's

extraordinary measures filled with confidence in changing the North's behaviour to its later scepticism about the possibility of the DPRK regime's capacity and willingness to change.

5.3 Conclusion

The most fundamental reason for starting a war lies within an individual mindset that harbours a hostile intention (Clausewitz 1976). What Lee's speech act pattern shows is that Lee's hostility towards the North Korean regime kept growing as time went by. Of course, Lee was not in a position where he could wage a war against Pyongyang. However, he was in a position where he could articulate his negative perception of Pyongyang regardless of the efficacy of such an articulation. For him, inter-Korean relations must be reciprocal. However, in his speech acts, the reason for the lack of reciprocity must be placed upon North Korea's irresponsibility. In his discourse, the North Korean regime is rogue, reckless and irresponsible. In that regard, it could be said that Lee inherited Rhee Syngman's conservativism—anticommunism (or anti-North Korea in a more contemporary sense)—that insisted North Korea must be held solely accountable for the division of the Korean peninsula as well as the Korean War.

Lee's way of dealing with the nuclear issue was therefore ineluctably linked to his perception of the DPRK. Security discourse on the DPRK's nuclear threats was not effectively articulated in his speech acts. Lee's ambition was to eradicate the nuclear threat once and for all, but his securitising move resulted in a mixture of inconsistent articulation of the threat and ambiguous representations of the DPRK regime. However, since this was not solely Lee's fault, it is fair to say that the reason for the repetitive securitisation should be distributed over several factors.

The first factor was the international (or regional) system. During Lee's presidency, the way the DPRK issue was handled has had 'great significance for the new type of major power relations taking place' (Dong 2015: 9). What the *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* incidents proved was that the ROK's extraordinary measures based on security discourse were strongly circumscribed by the structural system. Consequently, Lee's security discourse on the DPRK's nuclear threats was blocked by China's reluctance, which should be interpreted in the

context of the US-China relationship. Secondly, it was not just China that obstructed Lee's securitising move. North Korea's unexpected provocations, including *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* events, and internal factors, such as the death of Kim Jong-il, were additional obstacles to Lee's road to securitisation.

However, the third factor emanated from the ROK itself. Lee was not able to articulate a clear discursive connection between the DPRK's ontological illegality and the necessities of providing security assurance to the DPRK's regime, nor could he have final confidence in the North's willingness to denuclearise. More to the point, Lee's extraordinary measures—Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain—did not provide a practical path how the current regime in Pyongyang could maintain its current grip on power once they open their society. As a result, although Lee aimed to reach a concluding stage of securitisation (the complete denuclearisation of the DPRK), his speech acts on measures about the DPRK's nuclear weapons could not be articulated in a consistent fashion. Now that we have discussed the main characteristics of both presidents' security discourses, Chapter 6 will provide a comparative analysis between the two securitising actors in a more direct manner, so that the similarities and differences can be more easily shown. The causes of the discursive chasms will also be discussed in detail according to the ST framework.

6.
Practical Concerns: Evaluating Security Discourses

6.1 Comparison between Roh and Lee

The previous two chapters have attempted to sketch out the main characteristics of the Roh and Lee administrations' security discourses on the DPRK's nuclear threat. This chapter, firstly, will explore some general patterns of the speech acts used by Presidents Roh and Lee on the basis of core terms: 'North Korea' and 'nuclear'. The following section analyses similarities and differences of the two actors' speeches by extrapolating from key terms, MI scores and T-scores respectively. This may provide a clue to the causes of repetitive securitising moves (or institutionalised securitisation), which connote the discursive chasms embedded in the security discourses of the ROK. After an assessment of the core terms, this study then appraises the grounds that stymied the ROK's practice of securitisation according to the ST's framework.

6.1.1 The general pattern of speech acts

As many critics have pointed out, and as aforementioned, speech acts cannot explain all phenomena related to security matters (Stritzel 2007; Wilkinson 2007). A major proposition of this study, however, is that security activity, in particular when it comes to securitisation (or prioritisation of the security agenda), cannot be conceivable without the use of language. That is, if an actor keeps a certain security issue in mind, with the aim of persuading audiences and creating measures against threats, the source of threat and the relevant objects should be articulated in the actor's speech acts. This is why a securitising actor's language—speech acts—is highlighted in ST (Buzan et al. 1998: 40). A common thread that binds all positions on the constructivist spectrum together is the power of discourse that is characterised as the 'use of language' (Chilton 2004: 16). Therefore, 'looking for patterns' of language used by an actor is important, in that it provides us with a certain entry point whereby analysts can outline comprehensive traits of the actor's speech acts. Furthermore, it gives analysts



Figure 6.1 The frequency of 'North Korea'



Figure 6.2 The frequency of 'nuclear'

additional analytical points for further investigation into the actor's use of language (Wetherell et al. 2001: 6).

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 represent the frequency (per 10,000 words) of the core terms—'North Korea' and 'nuclear'—spoken by Roh and Lee, respectively. As both figures show, for most of the presidency (except for the third year), Roh used these words significantly more than Lee did. Regardless of the contents and contexts in which the words were used, therefore, it is expected that pertinent discursive practice was more active during Roh's period. The aberration seen in both figures in the third year—the year 2005 of the Roh administration and the year 2010 of the Lee administration—may denote two points: one is that inter-Korean relations experienced about one year's recession from July 2004 (PCPP

2008: 39–54) and the other is the *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* incidents that sparked 'the North's provocation(s)' discourse throughout the year 2010 (Figure 6.1). The gradual increase in the 'nuclear' discourse of Lee is also noticeable (Figure 6.2); however, as briefly discussed in the previous chapter and as will be discussed in detail in the next section, one of the main causes of the rise was because Lee hosted the second NSS. Another reason rested upon winning a deal to build and operate nuclear plants for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in late December 2009, which was of great importance to the Lee administration. Lee emphasised that he devoted himself to winning the deal in the UAE and further deals in the wider region (Lee 2015).

By contrast, as will be shown in the following section, most 'nuclear' discourses used by Roh were focused on the DPRK's nuclear issue. Given this difference, an actual gap between Roh and Lee in terms of articulating the DPRK's nuclear issue is likely to be bigger than the above figure indicates. For example, although it is not seen in the figures, the frequency of the term 'North Korean nuclear (*Buk-haek* or *Bukhan-haek* in Korean)' reflects a stark difference between the two (190 times by Roh and 19 times by Lee; absolute frequency).

An additional point is the pattern of the word 'denuclearisation' (Figure 6.3). This word was used 21 times in Roh's speeches and 19 times in that of Lee's respectively. Although the number of times the word appears is similar, what is interesting here is a pattern of the word usage. While Roh used this word increasingly as he was into the second half of his tenure, Lee's usage of the same word saw a sharp decrease as time went by. Given that the DPRK's first nuclear test occurred in 2006, Roh's pattern is understandable as the issue of denuclearisation came to the fore in his latter days. However, the pattern of Lee's usage of the word 'denuclearisation' seems incomprehensible given that his policy was based on the concept of 'denuclearisation-first'.

Regarding this, the previous chapter has already shown why this kind of pattern is possible. That is, the pursuit of complete securitisation of Lee (the complete denuclearisation of the DPRK) was mainly thwarted by two incidents (the sinking of the *Cheonan* and the shelling of *Yeonpyeong*), and subsequently Lee's discursive points towards North Korea were changed from 'the hope of



Figure 6.3 The frequency of ‘denuclearisation’



Figure 6.4 Mean frequency of the core terms

denuclearisation’ to ‘a feeling of hopelessness about the DPRK’s incorrigibility’. Figure 6.4 represents the mean frequency of each core term of both presidents’ speech acts throughout their presidency, which indicates an average of per 10,000 words. As shown in the above figures, this figure confirms that the core terms of ‘North Korea’ (standard deviation = Roh 7.7 / Lee 4.4) and ‘nuclear’ (standard deviation = Roh 5.0 / Lee 3.0) were more active in Roh’s speech acts, whereas ‘denuclearisation’ (standard deviation = Roh 0.6 / Lee 0.9) saw a similar level between the two presidents.



Figure 6.5 The flow of Roh's security discourse



Figure 6.6 The flow of Lee's security discourse

Figures 6.5 and 6.6 characterise each president's security discourse on the DPRK's nuclear issue in a more comprehensive way. Every single word was extracted by the keyness scores, and the keywords are qualitatively extracted since there are many other words that are not relevant to North Korea. The keywords were already shown in the previous chapters in the form of a table.[41] Several points can be extrapolated from these figures.

Firstly, both Roh and Lee articulated the same goals based on the same perceptions of the structure (regional system) that surrounds the Korean peninsula. In the case of Roh, the word 'OPCON' is seen. As aforementioned, the 'OPCON' was a thorny issue between conservative opposition party and the progressive Roh administration, but Roh did not push ahead with this issue to the extent that the backbone of the ROK-US alliance was swayed. This is why he sent troops to help the US-led war in Iraq.[42] Both Roh and Lee were cognisant of the fact that the Korean peninsula is a key to sustainable peace of Northeast Asia. They were also well aware that Pyongyang's denuclearisation is a key to the peace of the peninsula. Both argued that the DPRK's nuclear issue was a major stumbling block to acquiring a true sense of coexistence and co-prosperity between the North and South, which should be a prelude to the two Korea's unification. In that respect, as far as the structure and goals are concerned, there is no significant difference in terms of using discourse between the two securitising actors.

Secondly, Roh tended to use words subsumed under the ameliorating events and measures based on sympathy, whereas Lee's speech acts were inclined to deteriorating events. Of course, Lee also used the words of measures based on sympathy, such as 'diplomacy' and 'cooperate', but they are not as direct and diverse as Roh's words. Roh's security discourse shows the absence of any measures based on antipathy, instead it includes various means based on sympathy such as 'normalisation (of relations between the US and the DPRK)' and '(inter-Korean) summit'. Perhaps it is this point that has made conservatives and progressives different from each other. That is, it would be fair to say that progressive government attempted to invigorate the ameliorating events between

[41] See Table 4.3 and Table 5.4.

[42] Later, Roh recalled that this was 'a historic error': 'Americans could have felt betrayed (if we didn't send troops), which would not have been good for us […] though we reluctantly sent them, I think it was very effective diplomacy' (Yoon 2007).

the two Koreas, whereas conservatives tended to put emphasis on the deteriorating events claiming a further securitising move.

Lastly, and most importantly, both presidents failed to bridge the gap between measures and goals (displayed as a dotted line). As mentioned, both presidents' words were exactly the same in terms of the goals and ultimate goal 'unification'. Roh did not articulate how South Korea would attain the ROK-led unification when the DPRK regime is secured by a peace and security regime. Nor could he persuade the conservative bloc that the DPRK was determined to denuclearise. Lee, on the other hand, was not able to persuade Pyongyang how they could survive when they open their society and reform the economic system. Lee did not demonstrate how the contradictory mechanism between securing the DPRK's regime (as the Grand Bargain initiative argued) and the DPRK society's transformation (as Vision 3,000 suggested) could be compatible. In that respect, both securitising actors were not able to articulate in what way and how the goal/ultimate goals could be achieved by way of their own measures.

The figures provide an overall picture of security discourses used by the actors. There are certainly some differences between the two in terms of events and measures. However, can we really say that the two actors' security discourses are meaningfully distinct? Are they different enough to make it possible to discern a different level of securitisation against the DPRK's nuclear threat? If so, can the difference overcome the structure (international/regional system) that surrounds the ROK? Put differently, do the differences give the ROK securitising actors any specific reasons for changing their national strategy towards regional powers, including China and the US? Can the difference overcome the issue of the ROK's identity (conflicting referent objects)? In other words, do the differences give the ROK securitising actors any specific reasons for changing their representation of the *self* (as a sole legitimate government based on democracy and a market economy in the Korean peninsula)? The following section discusses similarities and dissimilarities between the speech acts pattern of the two presidents, which will imply the current structure that puts constraints on South Korean actors' security discourse.

Table 6.1 Top-twenty key terms

Roh Moo-hyun (2003.2–2008.2)		Lee Myung-bak (2008.2–2013.2)	
Terms	**Score**	**Terms**	**Score**
nuclear issue	408.48	green growth	375.70
North Korean nuclear issue	366.11	fair society	172.38
Korean nuclear issue	365.02	advanced nation	171.10
Korean government	251.48	Korean government	146.62
Korean economy	238.30	Korean economy	139.90
nuclear problem	186.37	Good morning	138.57
economic cooperation	166.69	common prosperity	128.31
Korean nuclear problem	160.75	global economic crisis	123.26
North Korean nuclear problem	160.75	advanced country	99.81
common prosperity	146.86	international community	96.15
Participatory government	130.62	foreign exchange crisis	78.75
Constitutional revision	129.85	exchange crisis	78.59
national defence	124.57	economic crisis	78.13
bilateral cooperation	102.67	international arena	70.13
balanced development	96.30	global financial crisis	69.65
defence reform	95.07	school violence	69.15
Korean business	94.41	leading nation	63.60
self-reliant defence	89.20	ecosystemic development	61.26
peace regime	78.85	Korean War	59.85
national development	77.48	global economy	56.65

6.1.2 The discursive divergence and convergence

The above figures based on the frequencies of each president's speech acts can be corroborated by a list of 'key terms' extracted by the keyness score. As Table 6.1 shows, the DPRK nuclear issue is at the very centre of Roh's speech acts. Many of the terms in the upper ranks of the left column in the table are related to North Korea's nuclear issues (in bold), whereas one can see no relevant terms in the right part of the table that represents Lee's speech acts. It seems clear that the DPRK nuclear issue was much more verbally animated during the Roh administration. Of course, this does not mean that Roh practically securitised North Korea's nuclear threat. Although the verbal activity was far more visible during Roh's presidency, this alone does not show how Roh's articulation of the issue relates to the referent objects and extraordinary measures against the nuclear threat. If one could find effective and cogent measures in Lee's speech acts about the same issue, the abundance of the relevant speech acts of Roh would end up in vain. In that respect, the tables indicating the collocates of 'North Korea' and 'nuclear' give us a clearer map from which one can analyse the actors' linguistic patterns in terms of their securitising moves towards the North's nuclear threat.

Table 6.2 MI Scores for collocate of *North*

Roh Moo-hyun (2003.2–2008.2)		Lee Myung-bak (2008.2–2013.2)	
Collocate	**MI score**	**Collocate**	**MI score**
nuclear	8.399	brethren	9.528
dismantlement	8.241	perpetrated	8.876
missiles	8.104	principled	8.791
South (Korea)	8.075	pushed (ahead with)	8.791
compatriots	7.978	rocket	8.721
missile	7.978	residing	8.721
dismantling	7.978	resolution	8.635
abandon	7.756	persuade	8.528
solution	7.756	provocative	8.528
(nuclear) issue	7.630	anytime	8.528
peacefully	7.613	compatriots	8.376
(nuclear) problem	7.592	tourists	8.359
(nuclear) program	7.574	attack	8.281
athletes	7.563	provocations	8.239
resolving	7.563	Yeonpyeong	8.207
collapse	7.519	long-range	8.069
attack	7.493	provocation	8.026
(nuclear) test	7.486	South (Korea)	7.955
(nuclear) weapons	7.393	Six-Party (Talks)	7.943
resolve	7.264	denuclearisation	7.850

Table 6.3 T-scores for collocate of *North*

Roh Moo-hyun (2003.2–2008.2)		Lee Myung-bak (2008.2–2013.2)	
Collocate	**T-score**	**Collocate**	**T-score**
nuclear	16.169	Korea	11.932
Korean	15.138	Korean	7.876
Korea	14.080	South (Korea)	6.455
(nuclear) issue	11.344	nuclear	6.283
South (Korea)	8.742	Koreans	3.569
(nuclear) problem	7.511	(nuclear) issue	3.562
(nuclear) program	5.800	time	3.356
resolve	5.620	North (Korea)	3.316
peacefully	5.073	help	3.015
peaceful	4.434	compatriots	2.991
help	4.005	provocations	2.990
(nuclear) test	3.978	brethren	2.825
dialogue	3.907	attack	2.819
solution	3.855	engage	2.804
(nuclear) weapons	3.584	(nuclear) weapons	2.801
resolution	3.576	(nuclear) program	2.784
cooperation	3.545	change	2.719
resolving	3.446	perpetrated	2.640
trust	3.180	resolution	2.639
peninsula	3.158	dialogue	2.625

Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show the top-twenty collocates of 'North (Korea)' according to the MI scores and T-scores, which have already been shown in previous chapters. What is different here is that Roh and Lee's cases are lumped together in each of the tables so that the differences can be easily seen. The words included in these tables are all expected to be statistically significant (MI≥3.0 and T-score≥2.0). Therefore, through the collocations one can see how

securitising actors perceive North Korea, which in turn leads us to grasp a big picture of each actor's perception of existential threat, referent objects and extraordinary measures. With regard to the perception of the DPRK's nuclear weapons as an *existential threat*, these tables clearly show that Roh linked North Korea to the nuclear issue. The word 'nuclear' occupied the first place in both tables during Roh's tenure. Moreover, many of the MI score-based collocations in Roh's speeches are directly related to the DPRK's nuclear issues. The same is true for the collocations based on T-scores. In essence, in terms of discursive practice, Roh put North Korea and the nuclear issue together.

By contrast, it is a bit surprising that the word 'nuclear' is relatively less associated with North Korea in Lee's speech acts. The overall impression of the collocations included in Lee's speeches seems complicated. In other words, instead of directly enunciating the North's nuclear issue, Lee articulated the issue in an indirect manner. Insofar as the MI score is concerned, the notion that North Korea is a nuclear threat is not conspicuous. Although some words (e.g. 'principled', 'pushed', 'resolution', etc.) indicates the North's nuclear threat, the threat itself is shown rather indirectly. Rather, the threat from North Korea is delineated as a whole, by mentioning a variety of words and events (e.g. provocative, attack, Yeonpyeong, etc.) that remind us of the North's bellicosity. Nonetheless, with regard to the T-score table, several collocations point to the linguistic relevancy between North Korea and nuclear issues in Lee's speeches. In the right column of the table, the term 'nuclear' itself is ranked high, and the words 'issue', 'weapons' and 'programme' are directly associated with the North Korean nuclear threat. In sum, although the DPRK's nuclear issue was more actively and consistently articulated by Roh compared to Lee, the issue can still be seen as one of the most important security matters in Lee's speech acts, as the T-score table demonstrates.

Secondly, these tables provide the actors' perceptions of *referent objects* concerning the DPRK's nuclear issue. As there is no clear line of demarcation between the DPRK regime and its society, South Korean actors' perceptions of North Korea as a whole are of importance to the way in which they securitise the North's nuclear issue. Interestingly, the collocations in these tables show that both presidents felt ambivalent about North Korea. The word 'compatriots' dramatically shows how Roh and Lee perceived North Korea. A similar

expression, ‘brethren’, is seen only in Lee’s speeches. What is more interesting is that this word occupied the top position of the MI score table in Lee’s speeches. The words ‘brethren’ and ‘compatriots’ are seen in both tables, whereas in Roh’s speeches the word ‘compatriots’ is seen only once. The point here is that this kind of perception—North Korea is our enemy but at the same time it is our compatriot—constitutes a root cause of elusive representations and equivocal extraordinary measures. As long as the ROK actors must acknowledge the current DPRK regime as the chief interlocutor representing the northern part of the Korean peninsula, the concept of compatriots or brethren should encompass the North Korean regime regardless of its bellicosity or illegality from the South Korean perspective.

It might not be impossible for South Korean actors to officially designate the DPRK regime as an incorrigible one, but this would lead the current security discourse in Seoul in such a way that inter-Korean relations cannot be improved as long as Pyongyang’s Kim regime remains intact. For example, what if South Korean presidents regularly use the political rhetoric such as ‘rogue state’ or ‘outpost of tyranny’ towards North Korea just as the Bush administration did? The word rhetoric is often used in a pejorative sense in relation to the use of words. As Taylor (2013b: 35) put it, political rhetoric ‘attempts to redefine the nation in order to exclude a negatively valued group’. However, can Seoul bear all the political, diplomatic and military reverberations from using such rhetoric? Insofar as South Korea cannot control the regional order in Northeast Asia by itself, excluding the DPRK regime is neither responsible nor realistic. This is why the words ‘compatriots’ and ‘brethren’ should be recognised as important, in that they constitute not only one of the important principles of South Korea’s referent objects but also a stumbling block for devising an extraordinary measure.

In other words, a dichotomy between ‘the good ordinary people in North Korea’ and ‘an evil regime’ cannot easily be made in the formal ROK security discourses. In fact, neither the Roh nor Lee administration adopted this kind of viewpoint. Even if they had a deep sense of repugnance of the North Korean regime, they simply could not cast the Pyongyang partnership away. To put it differently, conflicting referent objects—defending the South from the malevolent North and embracing them as our compatriots—reflects a foreseeable failure of complete representation (or conceptualisation) of North Korea.

Lastly, these tables also give us clues in terms of assessing similarities and differences between the two president's *extraordinary measures* against the nuclear threat. First of all, as aforementioned, these tables show a lack of concrete measures whereby Seoul can prevent Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons. As can be seen in both tables, the single most conspicuous word in Roh's speeches is 'peaceful(ly)'. According to Roh, to achieve a 'peaceful resolution' of the North's nuclear problem, 'dialogue', 'trust' and 'cooperation' between the two Koreas are essential, and by focusing on these measures we can make North Korea 'abandon' or 'dismantle' its nuclear 'programme'. Chapter 4 has already shown this. Roh also often asked for 'help' from the international community, particularly from the SPT members, to solve the issue. In essence, what these tables show is that Roh struggled with measure deficiency in terms of deterring the threat, despite a high rate of his mentioning the North's nuclear issues. For him, the only way to solve the threat should be limited to 'peaceful' ways, and he articulated this very clearly throughout his presidency. The biggest problem here is that the process and outcome of this is too murky and uncertain not only because of the North's unpredictable behavioural pattern but also because of the characteristics of the international system (balance of power or a rivalry between world powers).

The same is true for Lee's speeches in two ways: peaceful measures and ambiguity. Although Lee did not use the certain term 'peaceful solution', 'SPT' and 'dialogue' constitute an important pillar as a medium of attaining the North's denuclearisation in his speeches. An in-depth analysis tells us that the words 'persuade', 'anytime' and 'engage' were all used to underpin the peaceful ways in Lee's securitising moves. Again, the notion that North Korea itself constitutes one of South Korea's referent objects might have affected the discursive pattern. In fact, when it comes to North Korea's nuclear threat, one cannot easily find a tangible form of extraordinary measures in Lee's speeches other than the SPT, which in turn puts us in an awkward position: what are the substantial discursive differences that make extraordinary measures distinct between the progressive and conservative administrations?

Whereas many of the collocates that Lee articulated are related to the DPRK's negative facets as noted above, the words indicating possible solutions to the DPRK's nuclear threat seem lacking in concreteness. For example, the

words ‘principled’, ‘persuade’, ‘anytime’, ‘help’, ‘engage’ and ‘change’ are all relevant to the principal points that Lee put stress on in regard to inducing the DPRK to denuclearise. As Chapter 5 has shown, although Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain initiative were suggested as fundamental ways to denuclearise North Korea, these policies were only focused on the goal of denuclearisation itself, and thereby overlooked the way in which North Korea can be persuaded. According to an in-depth analysis of each of the words mentioned above, none of them provide concrete ways to achieve such policy initiatives. In other words, Lee’s security discourse was limited to a form of a categorical proposition and, therefore, the praxis of his words remained unpractised.

Last but not least, there are certain differences between the two presidents in terms of word usage: ‘attack’ and ‘resolution’. Roh used the word ‘attack’ to refer to the Bush administration’s possible military action against North Korea, which may trigger an all-out war on the Korean peninsula, while Lee used this word in order to specify the attacks ‘perpetrated’ by North Korea. Regarding the word ‘resolution’, whereas Roh only used the word to signify the act of solving (13 out of 13 times), Lee used this to refer to the UNSC resolution (3 out of 7 times). However, even when mentioning the UNSC resolution after the DPRK’s second nuclear test in 2009, Lee pointed out that the sanctions ‘are not aimed at threatening the North Korean regime by swamping it with criticism’ (Lee 2009c). In other words, Lee’s original and fundamental official remarks on extraordinary measures were centred on paving ‘the way for candid discussion’ with the DPRK regime, which should be peaceful (Lee 2009c).

Tables 6.4 and 6.5 include the top-twenty collocates of ‘nuclear’, which are also arranged by MI and T-scores. Since the word ‘nuclear’ is at the centre of the DA of the thesis, alongside ‘North Korea’, exploring collocates of this could further flesh out the elements of securitisation: what source is threatening us? What values are at stake? And what measures should be chosen to halt the threat and protect our values? This time again, however, the collocations (and a subsequent in-depth analysis of the collocations) included in these tables do not tell us much about lucid answers. ‘North Korea’, as a lexical word, is seen in both presidents’ speeches. However, even this word seems to need a clearer description as to whether it should be acknowledged as a legitimate counterpart, at least in terms

Table 6.4 MI scores for collocate of *nuclear*

Roh Moo-hyun (2003.2–2008.2)		Lee Myung-bak (2008.2–2013.2)	
Collocate	**MI score**	**Collocate**	**MI score**
abandon	9.591	dismantle	10.229
weapons	9.350	weapons	9.956
dismantlement	9.269	missiles	9.867
North's	9.269	ambitions	9.814
dismantling	8.913	plants	9.801
test	8.906	safety	9.381
program	8.854	proliferation	9.381
peacefully	8.810	terrorism	9.296
dismantle	8.783	security	9.296
missiles	8.716	arms	9.229
waste	8.591	plant	8.949
issue	8.586	construct	8.814
solution	8.461	test	8.744
resolving	8.398	materials	8.644
North (Korea)	8.386	power	8.644
problem	8.349	resolution	8.114
plants	8.269	accident	8.059
resolve	8.086	safety	7.727
resolved	8.036	threat	7.693
conducted	7.928	construction	7.644

Table 6.5 T-scores for collocate of *nuclear*

Roh Moo-hyun (2003.2–2008.2)		Lee Myung-bak (2008.2–2013.2)	
Collocate	**T-score**	**Collocate**	**T-score**
North (Korea)	16.138	weapons	6.921
Korean	13.827	North (Korea)	6.432
issue	12.812	power	5.816
problem	7.913	summit	5.790
program	7.333	security	5.735
Korea	6.830	plants	5.093
peacefully	6.231	Korea	4.713
resolve	6.060	Korean	4.560
weapons	5.736	safety	4.223
resolved	5.635	energy	3.965
test	5.280	issue	3.579
resolution	4.106	world	3.425
solution	3.989	terrorism	3.311
resolving	3.731	program	3.294
Pyongyang	3.724	Seoul	2.945
help	3.656	international	2.871
power	3.653	security	2.772
solve	3.144	development	2.749
give (up)	3.120	missiles	2.643
issues	3.094	plant	2.640

of the discursive level. In particular, there are no collocates that indicate a substantial model of extraordinary measures.

Be that as it may, there are still some traits that represent the two actors' policies on the DPRK's nuclear issue. First, according to the MI scores, Roh manifestly linked the nuclear issues to North Korea, even though both presidents put an emphasis on the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. T-scores show that

Lee also linked the nuclear issue with North Korea at a significant level. Second, it can be seen that the word ‘missiles’ is closely connected to ‘nuclear’. North Korea has always tested intercontinental ballistic missiles before or after each nuclear test in 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2016, for it wants their missiles to be armed with a variety of warheads, including a nuclear one (McGrath and Wertz 2015). The word ‘missiles’ was also seen in the tables, and it was sometimes shown as ‘rocket’.[43] In any case, it is clear that both presidents put ‘nuclear’ and ‘missiles’ together, and they recognised them as threats, which constitutes the ‘proliferation’ of nuclear weapons technology and therefore must be ‘dismantled’ or ‘given up’.

Third, many collocates of ‘nuclear’ in Lee’s speeches are related to nuclear power plants and nuclear safety, which are not directly pointing to the DPRK’s nuclear threat (e.g. ‘proliferation’, ‘terrorism’, ‘security’, ‘materials’, ‘accident’, ‘safety’ and so forth). As mentioned in Chapter 5, Lee’s security discourse on North Korea’s nuclear threat saw a sharp decrease in his latter days. What these two tables show is that with regard to the nuclear issues Lee changed his focus from North Korea to nuclear safety as South Korea held the second NSS in 2012. The NSS was initiated by former US President Obama’s Prague Speech, in which he expressed a grave concern about nuclear terrorism. Given that the main agenda of the NSS was focused on general nuclear safety, including improving the security of nuclear waste and the protection of radioactive sources, this world summit certainly did not have a direct link with the DPRK’s nuclear threat. Notwithstanding this trait, the NSS was a good opportunity for Seoul to deal with Pyongyang’s nuclear issue from a broader perspective since the DPRK had long been suspected of being involved in connection with nuclear proliferation activities (Cheon 2011). Lee himself also expressed his expectations that North Korea would feel pressure from the international community with the NSS as a momentum (Lee 2015). Apart from this, as ‘South Korea is a major world nuclear energy country’, and nuclear energy constitutes ‘about one-third of South Korea’s electricity’, the words ‘waste’, ‘plant(s)’ and ‘power’ are seen in both tables throughout the Roh and Lee’s periods (WNA 2016).

[43] The words ‘rocket’ and ‘missile’ were used interchangeably among the policymakers (NA 5/4/2009; NA 6/4/2009; NA 6/7/2006; NA 12/12/2012).

6.2 Security discourse and security reality: discursive chasms

6.2.1 The origin of discursive chasms

Before moving on to a further discussion about the fundamental grounds for South Korea's discursive pattern, it may be better to briefly recall some focal points of the comparative analysis of the two presidents' speech acts. With regard to similarities—discursive convergence—both administrations clearly articulated the North Korean nuclear threat. In other words, they considered the nuclear issue as an existential one that gave rise to a significant threat towards the ROK's national security and ultimately its survival itself. Although a detailed pattern of describing the threat over the course of each presidency was not the same, there is no doubt that both presidents tried to prioritise the nuclear issues.

Second, both actors failed to grasp the definition of *the other*, North Korea. Whilst the ROK's securitising actors knew that the DPRK's Kim regime was the source of the threat, they could not help but struggle with conceptualising the regime in Pyongyang. As was shown in the previous section, North Korea was a referent object, and at the same time it was the source of threat to the South. On top of that, paradoxically, it was essential for the South's actors to collaborate with the North in order to have them denuclearised. However, neither actor was able to come up with a way in which they could discursively pick out the 'evil and illegitimate' regime in Pyongyang, while being in cooperation with them. Nor could they construct cogent security discourses that could show how the ROK's collaboration with the DPRK would not consolidate Pyongyang's undemocratic and non-marketable regime.

Third, the collocations of the core terms have shown that both presidents had no options other than relying primarily on peaceful measures, meaning that they fell far short of creating unequivocal measures that could get rid of the North Korean actors' nuclear ambitions. Even when the ROK wanted to retaliate against the DPRK's attack by using force in 2010, they could not implement it because both Washington and Beijing did not want a military collision in the region. In sum, as stated, the ROK actors' goal to achieve denuclearisation on the Korean peninsula ran aground because of the *other's* (North Korea's) uncontrollable and unpredictable behaviour, the Northeast Asian international system (intensifying rivalry between the US and China), and the ROK's failure of representation of the



Figure 6.7 The boundaries of the ROK's securitisation

other, the DPRK. In fact, regardless of whether the measures were peaceful or not, the extraordinary measures that the ROK practised seemed intangible. Consequently, the actors' securitising efforts were not fully securitised, but at the same time it was clearly beyond the level of politicisation, thereby becoming institutionalised (Figure 6.7).

The traits of security discourses of Roh and Lee, however, are also different at certain points (discursive divergence). According to the tables based on the T-scores and MI scores, one of the most noticeable things is that Lee described North Korea in a much more negative way. Other than the words indicating mere facts of nuclear weapons and missiles, many of the collocates included in Lee's speeches relate to pessimism about the DPRK (e.g. 'perpetrated' and 'provocative'). The discursive differences between Roh and Lee were also added by the word '(UNSC) resolution' that was shown in Lee's speeches, in that this word gives us an impression that Lee was in favour of sanctions as a form of extraordinary measures. However, even in this case, Lee used the words '(UNSC) resolution' and 'sanctions' in a limited sense. Lee himself stressed that imposing sanctions could not be a goal in and of itself.

The second point is of course the active appearance of the North Korean nuclear discourse in Roh's speeches. Against all expectations, the DPRK's nuclear discourse did not assume a leading place among other discourses in Lee's speeches. Is this just because Lee equally allocated policy priorities throughout the policy sectors (e.g. economy, culture, social welfare, etc.) more than Roh did? Even if this is the case, at least one of the pertinent discourses on the DPRK's nuclear issue should have been included in the top-twenty key terms

(Table 6.1). Moreover, given the significance of the DPRK problem as security issues, it cannot be easily understandable. As was pointed out in Chapter 5, what this result demonstrates is that Lee's attempt to securitise the DPRK's nuclear threat in a complete manner ended in failure as Lee's relevant security discourse lapsed into silence.

Last but not least, Roh's securitisation against the US, particularly against the Bush administration, needs to be noted. This is an interesting point because Roh's double securitisation—against the US and the DPRK—could be interpreted as a result of surrounding circumstances at that particular moment. In other words, strictly speaking, the reason why Roh securitised against the US was not because they belonged to a 'progressive political group', but because, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the US was widely expected to launch military campaigns against North Korea. Perhaps Roh's 'liberal' perception brought about an amplification effect on his belief in the Bush administration's belligerence, but the point here is that this was a result of an intersubjective discourse practice between the ROK and US (i.e. between Roh's relatively more liberal inclination and Bush's relatively more hawkish perception).

The same pattern had already occurred in 1994 between South Korea and the US. The Kim Young-sam administration (1993–1997), which is well known for its conservatism, also securitised the Bill Clinton administration to not attack North Korea's nuclear facilities in 1994. Kim Young-sam said 'he feared such a strike would provoke a full-scale war' (Kim 2015d). Another important point here is that regardless of the position on the political spectrum, forestalling war and keeping an atmosphere for peaceful unification are sacrosanct duties that all heads of state in South Korea adhere to. Even though Roh's liberal characteristics pulled the trigger on his suspicion of the Bush administration's intention, as mentioned, it did not render him immune to another side of the ROK's fundamental referent object: maintaining the strong alliance with the US.

What these discursive convergences and divergences mean is that the actual difference between Roh and Lee does not rest on their perceptions of the DPRK's nuclear threat, referent objects, and following extraordinary measures. The speech acts practised by the two presidents were not that different in dealing with the DPRK's nuclear threat. From the perceptions of an existential threat to the referent objects to the ideas on extraordinary measures, both presidents saw

a similar pattern of speech acts in many ways. Rather, the initial expectations—Lee would be more active in practising the DPRK's nuclear discourse and Roh would be reluctant to articulate it—have proved wrong. In any case, both presidents must have gone through the limitedness of sanctions and dialogues that seriously delimited their options for extraordinary measures.

What, then, made the real divergence between the two? Why have the two presidents been recognised as starkly different actors? Getting a response to this question is not easy, for it belongs to an internal realm of security discourse, which official discourses may not straightforwardly reveal. The answer might rest on whether the ROK actors 'inwardly' accept the DPRK regime as legitimate. Stated differently, it rests upon whether the ROK 'fully accept the legitimacy of the Kim regime, or guarantee its domestic political stability' (Bluth 2011b: 1374). This is what discursive ambiguity is all about. The obscure definition of North Korea, in particular in relation to the future North Korea, and the temporary characterisation of inter-Korean relations (special relationship) have contributed to the ambiguity of the ROK's security discourses. If this cannot be fully and officially articulated, the discursive ambiguity would remain unless the DPRK regime voluntarily succumbs to the South.

More importantly, this is exactly where the discursive chasms into which South Korean actors fell begin. To reiterate, a discursive chasm in this study means a discursive structure that profoundly impedes the performance of actors' security discourse, and that distorts or paralyses discursive formation (here, securitisation process). Proceeding from what has been said above, the following sections investigate the elements that created the discursive chasms in detail according to the ST framework. Additional in-depth interviews will be used to look into the causes of the chasms that were not disclosed with ease by means of corpus-assisted DA.

6.2.2 Elusive threats: imminent or protracted?

As this study has already explored, Roh and Lee's speeches clearly showed that both presidents made it clear that the DPRK nuclear issue must be the top priority in terms of security policy. Policy reports and white papers published by the presidential office also demonstrated the urgency of finding a peaceful resolution to the issue. Given the results of the analysis, there is no doubt that the DPRK's

nuclear threat has always been recognised as an existential one that sparked the ROK's securitisation process. What is interesting is that the ROK's securitising moves against the nuclear activities have been repetitive while North Korea keeps developing its nuclear programmes and increasing the number of nuclear warheads and materials.

According to ST, the reason why actors launch a securitisation process is because they believe that existential threats are imminent enough to be deterred only by means of extraordinary measures which go beyond a normal boundary of politicisation (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). South Korea's securitising moves, however, have failed to prove that the North's nuclear threat is imminent. Had it really been imminent, the ROK-US Combined Forces should have eliminated the North Korean nuclear sites in the first place. If anything, it is North Korea's chemical and biological weapons, and its forward deployments of troops and multiple rocket launchers near the DMZ, which have long been the real imminent threats (Cha 2012: 226–227).[44] In that respect, particularly after the 1990s, the ROK's securitisation of the North's conventional weapons has been paid relatively less attention to compared to that concerning the nuclear issues.

Be that as it may, no actors in South Korea can condone the North's relevant nuclear activities that may well be turned into a material threat at some point in the future. North Korea has consistently stepped up its nuclear programmes, and they claimed that the fourth nuclear test in January 2016 was carried out as a form of a more powerful hydrogen bomb (Davenport 2016). Moreover, North Korea's nuclear weapons and capabilities could significantly damage the strategic stability of the Korean peninsula and surrounding regions, including Japan and Taiwan (Panda 2015). Given the magnitude of the nuclear issue, it is safe to say that the ROK's actors could not help but articulate the DPRK's nuclear activities. However, what needs to be taken into account here is not that it was inevitable for South Korean actors to securitise North Korea's nuclear weapons, but that their securitisation processes have failed to retain urgency in terms of bringing forth cogent extraordinary measures, thereby resulting in the chanting of 'No Nuclear North Korea' throughout the processes.

[44] It is believed that Pyongyang is able to indigenously produce biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, pest, and so on. Although North Korea joined the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in April 1997, it is suspected of maintaining such weapons programme. For the concept of biological warfare, see (Whitby 2002; Whitby et al. 2002).

That is, the ROK's securitising moves against the DPRK's nuclear threat have been conducted through 'ritualised incantation' (Oren and Solomon 2015: 313–336). After the DPRK's fourth nuclear test, Wit (2016) pointed out this situation by drawing an interesting analogy:

> I found last week's [6 January 2016] nuclear test and the events that followed depressingly familiar. They reminded me of Captain Renault's famous line from *Casablanca* just before he shuts down Rick's Café: "I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here!" The reactions to North Korea's 2006, 2009 and 2013 nuclear tests were the same—shock. Yet a decade has gone by and the North Korean nuclear threat has only grown.

When South Korea's actors speak about 'security' on North Korea's nuclear threat, it has become the norm rather than an imminent threat. In other words, the ROK's securitisation has fallen into institutionalisation. In the meantime, the DPRK has multiplied its nuclear capabilities, arming itself with uranium-based nuclear weapons and miniaturised nuclear warheads (Nikitin 2013). In sum, from a materialist perspective, the DPRK's nuclear threat, which originally was not that imminent when the ROK began to 'securitise' it in the early 1990s, has now indeed become a substantial/imminent one.

This paradoxical situation highlights a practical point that ST should consider. The crisis of securitisation comes not only from existential threats that are recalcitrant, but also from existential threats that cannot easily be split into imminent and non-imminent ones, just as the DPRK nuclear issue has shown. Most North Korea watchers have agreed that Pyongyang would not use its nuclear weapons unless foreign countries threaten the regime's very existence, since they are well aware that the current Kim regime is not expected to survive if a full-scale war occurs (Carpenter and Bandow 2004; Smith 2007; Bluth 2011a; Cha 2012). In other words, in normal circumstances, insofar as the ROK-US deterrence/alliance system, including the so-called 'extended deterrence' (or nuclear umbrella), is in a robust state, the DPRK's nuclear threats may not be imminent.[45] In addition, the role of Chinese leadership cannot be ignored (Swenson-Wright 2011: 21). Nonetheless, North Korea's 'all or nothing' mind-set and its belligerent attitude often force South Korean actors to worry that the North may use nuclear weapons, which results in securitising the North's threat.

[45] There is no doubt that the 'probability' of North Korea's provocation will be increasing as they miniaturise their nuclear warheads and develop nuclear capabilities such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In addition, 'retaining nuclear weapons' itself could give Pyongyang lots of strategic options.

Put differently, in theory, nuclear (or nuclear proliferation) issues should always be of great importance to actors, not only because of the terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons, but also because actors cannot be certain about the *other's* future intention. As Walton (Walton 2013: 209; emphasis in original) pointed out, 'there actually is a strong nuclear taboo which prevents leaders worldwide from "pushing the button". It is, however, all too plausible that we will instead see the breaking of the long nuclear truce'. In the case of South Korea, in particular, which is facing one of the most isolated and vituperative countries in the world, grasping the DPRK's intention is nearly impossible. In practice, however, one cannot easily imagine that a country, particularly a weaker state like North Korea, bent on developing nuclear programmes would have a real intention to attack a stronger party such as the US, despite its hyperbolic rhetoric, given that such actions will only bring forward its demise. Thus, North Korea's nuclear weapons can be seen as asymmetric strategies and for regime survival, even as they pose perceptions of grave threat for South Korea's actors and audiences.

This provides another talking point for ST, as the ROK's securitising moves constitute a case in which actors should securitise a specific threat without knowing how imminent the threat is. Moreover, the actors do not have much information about the degree of threat and the possibility of its realisation. Therefore, in a certain sense, the actors securitise a threat by their own beliefs (or cognitive structures). The reason why this needs to be considered is because such a securitising move could prevent a normal process (politicisation) from being carried out. In any case, the ROK's actors are overwhelmed by or preoccupied with the term 'the DPRK's nuclear weapons' when it comes to their security discourses. With the benefit of hindsight, the DPRK's nuclear threat does not necessarily have to be 'securitised', particularly given the result of a 20-year experience of 'failed' securitisation. The point here is not saying that the DPRK's nuclear issues need not have been securitised; rather, it is that the ROK's actors became stuck between the politicisation and securitisation that is inclined to institutionalisation. This point leads us to additional practical matters that cannot be explained by ST: how do actors securitise the *other's* threat when the *other* is an essential part of referent objects?

6.2.3 Elusive others: misrepresented referent objects

The problem of the ROK's referent objects has already been discussed in this study in Chapters 4 and 5. We have seen that both presidents struggled to establish a stable and consistent concept of referent object in terms of the relationship with the DPRK, and sometimes, the US. The above discussion should be highlighted because this issue is one of the major causes in regard to discursive chasms. In that regard, this section provides further evidences that expressly show the securitising actors' concerns over this issue.

The fundamental reason that held back the ROK actors' discourse on referent objects lies with a structural situation. It made the actors' discourses dysfunctional or unarticulated. That is, some referent objects, which must be inviolable under any circumstances just like other referent objects, did not represent the real world, and subsequently this imposed discursive limitations on the actors. However from far away they seem each other in terms of political ideology, and even though such an ideological gap could make some differences with regard to North Korea policy to some degree, neither of their discourses got through to the very point of declaring referent objects that had misrepresented the reality. The structural situation came out of at least two points: incompatibility with North Korea's Kim regime and a virtual impossibility of declaration of a 'nuclear-armed North Korea'.

Regarding incompatibility with North Korea, the cardinal principle of Roh and Lee's North Korea policy rested upon the premise that North Korea can be changed by abandoning nuclear weapons and opening its economic system. There were no differences between the two actors' discourses concerning this logic. The ROK government regarded this principle as an established discourse in dealing with the DPRK. This logic was also directly related to the ROK's referent objects: maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations towards peaceful unification under the flag of democracy and market economy. However, this logic lacks one point, which is so significant to the DPRK regime: what would happen if the DPRK regime disowned its current social and economic system? This shows exactly how disparate the referent objects between the two Koreas are. In other words, since Pyongyang regards their regime as a sacrosanct referent object, so long as Seoul does not show a clear path on which the Kim regime can

survive after its denuclearisation and social reform, the North cannot forsake its nuclear weapons, which are ‘the sword of State’.

The problem was that in no case could Roh and Lee proclaim the way for the Kim regime’s prosperity in official discourses, for the ROK’s Constitutional principle indicates that North Korea is not so much a state as an anti-government organisation, just as the North has not recognised the South as a fully legitimate state. This is why former Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan, who served under the Roh administration that actively carried out an engagement policy, pointed out that guaranteeing the DPRK’s security does not mean securing its social and economic system, as mentioned in Chapter 4. How can it be possible that a certain regime can be secured without a stable social and economic system that operates in the interest of the very regime? The same is true of Lee’s Grand Bargain initiative, in which he stressed that the DPRK regime would be secured.

Neither the conservative nor progressive governments have made it clear what the DPRK’s regime really means to South Korea. This is partly because there has been some strategic consideration. According to the Basic Agreement, a legal relation between the DPRK and the ROK is ‘special’.[46] The Basic Agreement is in line with neither international law nor domestic law, but rather is halfway between them. It is provisional and twofold (Lim 2008; Kim 2014a). No agreements between the two Koreas have articulated what exactly this ‘special’ means. Hence, this has created a discursive ambiguity for both parties. What then is the ‘special’ relations? What is really meant by ‘special’ was that one party does not acknowledge the other party as a state. Instead, the other party is not so much a state as a political entity. Should either party collapse, the party that is in a stable situation can then assert pre-emptive rights over the other.[47] Can this kind of underlying meaning be articulated as a form of official discourse? Had it been possible, the use of the term ‘special’ would not have been needed at all from the onset.

Therefore, the ROK’s referent objects would remain misleading, unless there is a regime change in North Korea. As was discussed earlier, even if the regime change of the DPRK occurred, there is no guarantee that the North would

[46] An agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea, called the Basic Agreement, signed on 13 December 1991, recognised the ‘special relationship’ between the two Koreas.
[47] Author’s interview with a high-ranking government official in charge of secret negotiations with the DPRK for over two decades (April 2014).

accept the ROK's way of referent objects. For the North Korean regime, even 'China was considered a dangerous enemy to the *Juche* ideology of self-reliance, forever tempting the isolated North Korean people with the fruits of reform and openness from over the border'. The cult of personality, that is, the cult of Kim, 'goes beyond mere ideology or politics' (Jang 2014: 260). The late Kim Jong-il stressed in his own article that '[economic] reform and openness are a straight path to national ruin. Nothing like reform and openness will be allowed. Never ever. *Gangseongdaeguk* (a strong and prosperous nation) should build on pursuing self-rehabilitation' (Hyun 2011: 288; translated by author).

It is interesting that many Pyongyang watchers in South Korea, regardless of whether they served for the Roh or the Lee administrations, particularly those who have actively engaged in making and carrying out the policies toward North Korea, saw very similar perceptions of Pyongyang and the structural constraints on South Korea. Both sides were well cognisant of the legal ground for unification that arises from the ROK Constitution, and they also acknowledged that articulating the ROK's own values—having a priority right over the DPRK in the event of a state of emergency—on a negotiation table is impracticable. Most of all, they all agreed that it would be extremely difficult to change the traits of the DPRK regime. Nonetheless, it was a 'willingness' to engage in dialogue with North Korea that was different. The following quotes show the similarities and differences between the two sides:

> We did not begin the SPT with the expectation that it would solve everything about the North Korean nuclear issue. However, should we not make the most out of the given situations? […] The SPT structure implies that the US and China acknowledge the special relations between the ROK and the DPRK. For example, Christopher R. Hill, former chief US negotiator with North Korea, asked me several times, 'what does North Korea mean to South Korea?' […] Although I did not publicly say that 'we have a special right over the North when they collapsed', there was a tacit consent among other concerned nations that the SPT can endorse a structure in which the South could assume a leading place over the North Korean issue. How can we demand such a right in the event of the North's collapse even without a framework like the SPT?
>
> (Interview: 3 July 2014)

The interviewee quoted above was one of the top officials in charge of the DPRK nuclear issues under the Roh administration. There are two important points that need to be highlighted: one is that even the actors belonging to the progressive realm implemented their policies with the possibility of North Korea's collapse in their minds. In that process, the SPT could be an important tool for Seoul to strengthen its position according to its own referent objects. The other

point is that they were also not certain about whether and when North Korea could change itself and renounce its nuclear weapons. The following quotes are from the actors who served in the inner circle of the Lee administration:

> Although we cannot make North Korea collapse, we should ask ourselves 'what should we do if North Korea collapses?' Of course, the only policy that we can use toward North Korea is 'attempting a gradual change of North Korea'. With regard to unification, we ought to give a consistent message to the North's elites that 'you will be safe even if you change yourselves', because otherwise, they will never accept our suggestion.
>
> (Interview: 12 June 2014)

> The SPT is nearly a dead fish. The US is not quite interested in the SPT, nor is South Korea. The SPT mechanism is not useful for the DPRK's denuclearisation. […] We know that North Korea is using salami tactics, brinkmanship and so on. […] It gives the North time to relax and enjoy the dealing. […] Behind the curtain they can develop nuclear weapons. The previous 10 to 15 years showed us that they did like that. We know that. Americans know that. We cannot do that [SPT] in the future.
>
> (Interview: 9 June 2014)

The above interviews strongly show the underlying thoughts of the Lee administration's securitising actors. First of all, it is needless to say that they also kept the possibility of North Korea's collapse in mind. Second, they abhorred having negotiations with the DPRK since they felt that the North had always deceived negotiating partners while developing its nuclear programme. Third, they do nonetheless know that the ROK has to keep an official discourse when it comes to North Korea policy: "We do not want to harm you. You would be secured even if you abandoned nuclear weapons and change the isolated society".

In sum, although it sounds pessimistic, the DPRK's uncontrollable traits proved that the referent objects practised by Roh and Lee, in relation to the link between denuclearisation and economic/social reform in North Korea, were misrepresented. Even though the DPRK's obsession with nuclear weapons was really due to its fear of the external threats posed by the US and South Korea, the systemic way in which they ran the regime sealed off every possibility that the ROK's referent objects could be compatible with it. However different Roh and Lee's discourses on the DPRK's nuclear threat seem to each other, the structural situation imposed the same level of constraints on the ROK actors' securitisation. The role of an individual agent in this situation has strictly been restricted. So have the actors' discourses.

Last but not least, an additional point needs to be taken into account: non-proliferation. This is much more related to the international system in terms of the discursive realm. It is well known that the NPT system has constituted the highest

order of nuclear discourse in the international community since 1970. In other words, by not acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear state, the NPT remains intact in Northeast Asia. If this were not the case, the denuclearisation of North Korea would be a much more difficult goal and the possibility of a nuclear domino effect would increase (Baker and Gale 2014). What is more, if North Korea secured a position of nuclear state, South Korea accordingly could not help accepting North Korea as a nuclear 'state', which may well represent quite the opposite of what the ROK's referent objects intended. What if an anti-government political entity, which must be united with the South under the ROK's referent objects, acquires a position of nuclear state from the international community?

> It is not that important whether North Korea renounces its nuclear weapons or not. North Korea has nuclear weapons already. Despite this, South Korea and the US does not accept North Korea as a nuclear state. Their policies began with a denial of the fact, because an official recognition of the North's nuclear weapons would be equivalent to an acknowledgement of a totally different international order in the Northeast Asian region.
>
> (Interview: 3 July 2014)

In short, 'nuclear North Korea' is a discourse that cannot be readily articulated. Had it been discursively accepted by South Korea and the US's securitising actors, the way of securitising against the DPRK's nuclear threat would have already changed. This clearly shows the role of discourse, in that discursive power controls the delineation of reality (e.g. the nuclear taboo), but at the same time, it also shows that a strongly established discourse can distort reality, thereby reinforcing already misrepresented referent objects.

6.2.4 Intangible extraordinary measures

Just as South Korea struggled to quadrate its discourse on referent objects with the security reality, the lack of ability creating extraordinary measures against the *other's* threat consistently inflicted a repetitive failure on the ROK's securitising moves. As aforementioned, the actors' speech acts about the denuclearisation of North Korea became a chant or an incantation at the level of deterrence, rather than securitisation that has a practical solution. In that sense, this is an issue of security discourse that cannot be realised.

This can be split into two parts: the self-securitising ability and the *other's* offset ability. The former is about an actor's ability to create extraordinary means. If an actor is strong enough to securitise the enemy's threat, the actor sometimes

does not even need to articulate the securitisation process. The US and Israeli governments' bombing of the *Al-Kibar* nuclear reactor in Syria in 2007, a country which is known for its nuclear collaboration with North Korea, could be a good example. Both governments 'remained conspicuously silent about this veritable act of war. There were no proclamations or statements, and officials ducked all questions about the incident. But the act spoke for itself' (Cha 2012: 241).

By contrast, however, the logic of deterrence on the Korean peninsula (see Chapter 4) prevented this kind of securitisation from occurring. This leads us to the latter point, the *other's* offset ability. As noted before, South Korea simply cannot consider a pre-emptive attack against North Korea unless it is under attack from the North, due to concerns about the dreadful results of war as well as its security discourse according to its constitution. No matter how threatening the DPRK's nuclear weapons are, the ROK's securitisation should therefore be a deterrence-based or discourse-based one: "You must abandon your nuclear programme, otherwise, frankly, we have no option but to keep securitising it by means of discourse and along with a deterrent strategy".[48]

It is worth noting that most South Korean securitising actors, regardless of their positions on the political spectrum, acknowledged the great importance and influence of the international system, while at the same time having concern for the role of individual actors. For many of them, in order for the ROK actors to strategically manoeuvre their own extraordinary measures against the DPRK's nuclear threat, the benign environment of the international system in Northeast Asia is vital. Put differently, there is a broad strategic consensus among the actors that South Korea's security discourse can rarely be realised without the consent of the great powers.

> [1] Countries that are not able to lead an international order cannot help but decide their policies based on the international system. That is, independent room for individuals and the state is not big. That said, for about 10 years after the end of the Cold War, the ROK could expand its room for manoeuvre, so the individual actors' tendencies and creativity became much more important.
>
> (Interview: 4 April 2014)

> [2] China's current status is so different from that of China 12 years ago. And the 'China factor' is so important to the ROK, which should bear unification in mind. Nothing could be done if

[48] Deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence system (THAAD) might be the archetype of deterrence-based measures from the ST perspective. THAAD, however, is not only limited to the realm of military deterrence, which cannot discourage the DPRK's nuclear ambitions, it is also limited because of its own deficiency and as its military effectiveness is undermined by the DPRK's added nuclear-capabilities (Griffiths 2016).

> China is unkind to us. […] I realised from my experiences that China is a country that cannot be trusted. I found that they have lots of diplomatic cards. […] This is why we need to enhance our presence based on the ROK, Japan and the US cooperation system.
>
> (Interview 9 June 2014)

> [3] South Korea cannot make North Korea change. We are only part of what the international community can do in order to make North Korea act in good faith. After all, China and the US are the keys to this issue. However, China can never discard North Korea regardless of whatever North Koreans do, as long as they are stuck in a situation in which the US-China rivalry continues. This is why I have a pessimistic view of the North Korean issues.
>
> (Interview: 12 June 2014)

> [4] I think that the ultimate change of North Korea will totally depend on China's change [giving up North Korea as its strategic asset]. When the timing of the change in China and the improved inter-Korean relations are right, we might be able to make an alternative [whereby the ROK can achieve its own referent objects].
>
> (Interview: 20 June 2014)

> [5] How could we change North Korea without even thinking of a possibility of structural change in the world? In other words, our policies ought to be predicated on the premise that the international environment surrounding North Korea will make them have no choice but to be changed. I believe that the structure will finally accelerate the North's change, and therefore, we should facilitate such a change in the North, although we are not a main character.
>
> (Interview: 3 July 2014)

The excerpts stated above are all from the transcripts of the interviews with the top securitising actors in South Korea. The interviewees became deeply involved with making and carrying out the ROK's policies toward North Korea. One of the interviewees [1] had worked throughout the Roh and Lee administrations. Two of the interviewees ([2] and [3]) worked for the Lee administration, and interviewees [4] and [5] belonged to the Roh administration.

It seems clear that there is a common thread across the interviewees: South Korea has been restricted by the international system. However, it does not mean that the individual actor's role is meaningless, for they can manoeuvre their own strategies within the context of the structure, as mentioned by interviewee [1]. Nevertheless, the actors' policies can be practically implemented only when allowed to do so by the structure. All of the interviewees agreed that their roles were gravely restricted by the structure. In particular, their statements show very well how the ROK securitising actors are feeling about China's rise and its growing influence on the Korean peninsula, not to mention the US, in terms of its policy on North Korea. This is noticeable in that all of them have had a lot of first-hand experiences in dealing with Pyongyang and countries involved in the North Korean nuclear issues.

Another point that merits discussion is that even though the actors on both sides (the Roh and Lee administrations) are cognisant of the structural limitations,

they still saw differences in terms of willingness to engage in dialogue with North Korea. For example, the actors from the Lee administration either placed much emphasis on the necessity of the strengthened relationship among South Korea, Japan and the US ([2]) or showed that they have very negative impressions of China and North Korea ([3]). On the contrary, the actors of the Roh administration showed their firm beliefs that although the international system delimits the ROK's decision, at the same time it also creates a situation that ushers in opening and reform of the social system in North Korea ([4] and [5]). They therefore insisted that improved inter-Korean relations can make South Korea get the upper hand when the DPRK reaches the threshold of a new era—e.g. an open society—caused by the international community's pressure.

Does this mean that the conservative actors of the Lee administration did not want to engage with North Korea? This is not right, at least in terms of official discourse. It is also worth noting that the actors in both administrations recognised their measures as an engagement policy toward North Korea. One of the top government officials, who was in charge of inter-Korean relations from the Roh Tae-woo administration (1988–1992) to the Lee Myung-bak administration, concluded as follows:

> Both progressive and conservative governments are well aware that North Korea was wrong. However, they are only able to work in the government when they are predicated on the belief that North Korea can be changed, aren't they? This is the essential point of the engagement policy, and it pursues the North's change by actively approaching them and providing them with economic incentives. Since the Roh Tae-woo administration every government's North Korea policy was based on one of engagement.
>
> (Interview: 4 April 2014)

Nonetheless, it should be noted that conservative actors seemed to have had a deep repugnance to implementing the engagement policy at heart. One of the influential securitising actors who was in Lee's inner circle said as follows:

> Engaging with North Korea is not easy. Basically it is contradicting against pursuing unification, which means getting over the North Korean system and absorption of North Korea into South Korean values and systems. Engaging with North Korea means that we have to reconcile with the North Korean government, […] by doing that we are strengthening the North Korean system and government. It's really a big dilemma.
>
> (Interview: 12 June 2014)

The point here is that even the conservative blocs, which have put less trust in North Korea, had no other options other than 'engaging' to denuclearise North Korea, at least from the perspective of official discourses. Regarding this, another

high-ranking government official who worked for the Lee administration voiced his thoughts on what South Korea lacks in its securitisation process:

> There is a common thread between the liberal and conservative blocs that both of them want to get North Korea denuclearised and to achieve peaceful unification based on liberal democracy. However, there has been no concept [as a form of extraordinary measures] that could be accepted by both sides. […] Even though North Korea keeps insisting their nuclear weapons are not a bargaining chip, and even though we know that the North is unlikely to receive our suggestions whatever they would be, what we have to do is to keep continuing our efforts to come up with an epoch-making measure. I think all of the South's administrations, including Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, were all the same in terms of making that kind of effort.
>
> (Interview: 9 July 2014)

What this quote shows is that South Korea has failed to articulate an epoch-making extraordinary measure that could change the *other* (North Korea) and the regional structure in Northeast Asia. However, put otherwise, it also means that the *other's* offset ability and the power of the international system placed limitations on South Korea in manoeuvring its measures.

To summarise, it seems clear that the structural factors—the DPRK factor and the international system factor—constitute an important part of the discursive chasms in the ROK's securitisation. The incompatibilities between the two Koreas and the irresistible logic of the international system have prevented the ROK's extraordinary measures to be implemented. Can North Korea denuclearise itself without change? As James Edward Hoare, former British chargé d'affaires and HM Consul-General in Pyongyang, pointed out in an interview with the author in May 2013, 'If Pyongyang continues to defend its right to hold nuclear weapons', which have been established as one of the DPRK's most important referent objects, no one can easily 'anticipate a particular way to break the impasse'.

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter has brought out two mythologies in the ROK's security discourse concerning the DPRK's nuclear issues. The first was a mythology of speech act pattern that was based on the ideological division. The notion that has been widely spread among audiences as well as political elites in South Korea—conservatives are more active in articulating the DPRK's nuclear issues—proved to be wrong. The result of analysing speech acts of the two presidents was actually the other way around. From ST's perspective, Roh, who is categorised

as progressive, was far closer to the role of a securitising actor than Lee. That is, North Korea's nuclear issue was more actively articulated and, therefore, more often described as an existential threat that requires urgent action during Roh's presidency.

The second mythology was the policy gap between the presidents, which has also been stereotyped by political ideologies. What this study uncovered was that regardless of those presidents' real emotions or intentions toward the Pyongyang's regime, at least in terms of the official security discourse on the DPRK's nuclear issues, the two sides' securitising moves were not disparate. If anything, they were strikingly similar. Both of them wanted Pyongyang to reach the threshold of change. Both of them had the same perceptions of existential threat and referent objects within the realm of official statements. What is more, both argued that their policies—extraordinary measures—toward North Korea were based upon engagement. The presidents' official speech acts and pertinent securitising actors' statements corroborated this.

The term 'discursive chasms' was used as a preliminary concept to explicate in what way the ROK securitising actors' speech acts became stuck at some point between politicisation and securitisation, which has led the actors' securitising moves to become institutionalised. The chasms consisted of three elusive discourses, each of which was related to the threats, the *other* (North Korea) and extraordinary measures. The elusive threat issue came from the traits of nuclear weapons, which evoke both imminent and not imminent threat perception. The elusive *others* issue was about the ROK's representation of the DPRK. The ROK has vacillated between the concepts of enemy and compatriot in regard to representing the DRPK regime. That is, Seoul failed to devise a way that the ROK-led unification could be possible in the event of Pyongyang getting security assurances. Seoul also failed to explain how Pyongyang could survive while opening up its tightly controlled society. Last but not least, the structural factors caused by the DPRK's offset ability and the international/regional system have made the ROK's extraordinary measures elusive.

Even so, this chapter has also suggested that there is a difference between the two political sides that may have produced a practical gap in terms of their perceptions of securitisation: willingness to engage in dialogue with North Korea. In other words, despite the similar perceptions of existential threats, referent

objects, and limitations on the ROK's extraordinary measures between the two administrations, they appear disparate in terms of beliefs in North Korea's change. What this study has showed about this is that beliefs in Pyongyang's willingness to change itself soon disappeared among the actors in the Lee administration, while the actors in the Roh administration still appeared to have staunch belief in the possibility that North Korea could be changed, albeit not easily.

The practical gap might have emanated from the ideological gap between conservativism and progressivism as aforementioned. The deep-seated anticommunism and anti-North Korea discourse in South Korea might have made conservatives reluctant to engage with Pyongyang in dealing with the nuclear issues, whereas progressives might have been less antagonistic to Pyongyang's regime. However, what is important here is that, as this chapter's analysis has demonstrated, such underlying ideological differences—the level of repugnance to the *other*—between the individual actors could not come to the surface in relation to the official security discourse whereby the actors could establish their policies as well as communicating with counterparts. In short, as an individual actor, neither Roh nor Lee could ultimately overcome the structural constraints.

Finding a fundamental reason 'why' they took different approaches to the perception of North Korea may be well beyond the aim of this research. Perhaps a more rigorous analysis of 'psychological environment', 'belief systems' or 'emotion' of each actor needs to be conducted in order to find a deep-rooted reason (Sprout and Sprout 1965; Larson 1994; Mercer 2010). Either way, this kind of research could substantiate real discrepancies among security discourses which DA, based on official discourses, cannot grasp. On the basis of this chapter and the previous chapters, it seems that we can now come to a conclusion to re-evaluate the hypotheses stated earlier in this thesis. The last chapter will also explore how adaptable the security studies based on discourse are to the ROK's security circumstances, thereby providing momentum for a wider analytical sphere of ST, as well as examining its theoretical adaptability and limitations.

7.
Conclusions

The concluding chapter consists of two parts. The first part summarises the main findings of this study along with an evaluation of the hypotheses. The second part, on the basis of the findings, considers ‘some viable directions in which future research might go from’ where this thesis leaves off (Dunleavy 2003: 207).

7.1 A summary of study

This thesis started with raising a question about the properness of the current security discourse that divided the ROK’s political blocs. Presidents Roh and Lee were chosen for the case study, as each actor has been characterised as an archetype of progressives and conservatives respectively. Roh was accused of remaining silent on the DPRK’s nuclear threat by conservatives. Progressives, by contrast, criticised Lee on the grounds that he only clung to the nuclear issue while exacerbating inter-Korean relations. The deterministic and dichotomous security discourse that was amplified as an intersubjective process amongst securitising actors has continued.

This research, however, did not seek an answer as to whether Roh or Lee’s way of describing DPRK’s nuclear threat was correct or not. Instead, the ambition of this study was to uncover misleading points in today’s discourse so that one may perceive the discourse in a critical manner. For instance, one can call the actors’ discourses into question as follows: to what extent do the current security discourses reflect the discursive reality? Is the dichotomous discourse that has divided conservatives and progressives right? Is today’s discourse not a specious argument that is based on biased perceptions? Have the securitising actors not been producing and reproducing the dominant discourse in order to take power and maintain their official authorities? In this light, this study aimed to show the reality of current discourse as it is, and this is why it raised the main research question as was shown in Chapter 1.

It has been over 20 years since the ROK began 'securitising' the DPRK's nuclear threat. At the time of writing, the ROK is still securitising the same threat, which is now much stronger than two decades ago. Pyongyang's nuclear threat seems to be expanding in an unrestricted manner, particularly after Kim Jong-un took power.[49] One could still ask this question: did the South Korean actors securitise the DPRK's nuclear threat in a real sense? If so, why have the actors had to securitise the nuclear issue for such a long time? Can they ever be free from the fetters of securitisation against the nuclear threat? As noted, ST's core argument lies in transforming normal politics into emergency politics (Newman 2010). For Seoul, Pyongyang's nuclear issue has always been exigent. The words 'nuclear weapon' are in themselves horrible. The image of 'a nuclear weapon in the DPRK's hands' is even more horrendous. It can be said that the ROK's securitising moves towards the DPRK's nuclear weapon were inevitable in this regard.

With the benefit of hindsight, however, and given the fact that the ROK is still securitising the same threat, which became much stronger, it is also true that the ROK's securitising moves turned into another type of normal politics (institutionalisation). In this process, the extraordinary measures taken by Roh and Lee were of little avail. In addition, it was more difficult for the ROK actors to accept the DPRK as a nuclear state. Even though they internally regarded the DPRK as a *de facto* nuclear state, as noted in the previous chapters, an official recognition of the fact could not be easily articulated. The ROK actors' extraordinary measures were also limited accordingly. In that sense, the distinction between politicisation and securitisation became more and more unclear in the ROK's security discourse and, therefore, as was shown in Figure 6.7, both Roh and Lee became stuck in the triangle of 'politicisation-securitisation-institutionalisation'. Hence, whether the securitising moves took place in general is not a focal point; what is more important is to know to what extent and how the securitising actors articulated the relevant discourses in a materially and discursively limited security environment.

[49] On 13 April 2012, Kim Jong-un revised the DPRK Constitution to refer to North Korea as a 'nuclear-armed nation'. In the following year, he adopted the 'Byungjin Policy', meaning a parallel development policy of economy and nuclear weapons, at a plenary session of the NKWP Central Committee.

Table 7.1 Sub-research questions and hypotheses

	Research questions	Hypotheses
A	A-1. To what extent and how were the DPRK nuclear-related issues described in each actor's speech act pattern? A-2. In what context and how were the core-terms 'nuclear' and 'North Korea' used in each actor's articulation of relevant discourses?	H.A-1. The progressive securitising actor will be less likely to articulate the DPRK nuclear issue. H.A-2. The conservative securitising actor will be more likely to articulate the DPRK nuclear issue.
B	B-1. What were the existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures for the discourses of each other? B-2. Did articulations of the threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures differ clearly between the actors?	H.B-1. If Presidents Roh and Lee's articulation of existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures are clearly different, there would be few impediments to forming the ROK's securitisation. H.B-2. If Presidents Roh and Lee's articulation of existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures are not clearly different, there would be some impediments to forming the ROK's securitisation.

7.1.1 Evaluation of hypotheses

In order to answer the main research questions, this thesis juxtaposed sub-research questions with hypotheses by dividing them into the speech acts pattern [A] and the characteristics of each securitising actor's securitising move [B] (Table 7.1). Since each hypothesis was designed to answer the sub-research questions, summarising the analysis results of the hypotheses would naturally lead to answering the questions. As discussed throughout the chapters dealing with the practical analyses, this study produced some distinctive results that contradict some of the hypotheses.

The research questions and hypotheses A were about the securitising actors' speech acts pattern. Within today's security discourse context, Roh was dubbed as an actor who was reluctant to securitise the DPRK's nuclear threat, whereas Lee was seen as an actor who seriously securitised the same threat. In this structure, Roh was expected to be subsumed under the category of (H.A-1), and Lee was under (H.A-2). Most debates about securitising the nuclear issues in the ROK have oriented around this structure. However, the analysis results based on corpus-assisted DA demonstrated that the aforementioned hypotheses A are incorrect. If anything, the subjects of the hypotheses H.A-1 and H.A-2 should be reversed as far as Roh and Lee's speech acts are concerned. Against all expectations, the level of securitisation (security as speech acts) was much

higher in Roh's case than that of Lee. What this means is that Roh, as the most important and influential securitising actor in the ROK during his presidency, actively articulated the DPRK's nuclear threat.

Interestingly, words related to the nuclear issue were prevalent in Roh's speeches (*n*-grams based keywords and extracted key terms). In fact, the DPRK's nuclear issue was almost always central to Roh's speech acts. More importantly, the term 'the DPRK's nuclear' was clearly articulated as an existential threat that required urgent action. In contrast, words based on the DPRK's nuclear issue were scarcely seen in Lee's speeches. The words related to the nuclear issue were detected only in the context of security speeches. The results were corroborated by analysis of documents. In particular, Lee's speech acts on the DPRK's nuclear issue rapidly decreased after the *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* incidents. After the two events, the focus of Lee's speech acts changed from the denuclearisation of the DPRK to receiving a formal apology from Pyongyang for the provocations. As was shown in Chapter 5, the SPT discourse, which had been a practical mechanism for the completion of denuclearisation, was pushed aside in this process.

Of course, to reiterate, articulation of threat itself does not guarantee the completion of the securitisation process. The securitising actors also need to articulate what the ROK's referent objects and extraordinary measures are in a meaningful way. The research questions and hypotheses B, about the characteristics of securitisation, were brought in with this context. With regard to this, firstly, as the analysis of the speech acts pattern showed, both Roh and Lee clearly and vocally expressed that the DPRK's nuclear issue should be regarded as an existential threat that must be dealt with in an immediate fashion. Hence, there was no significant difference between the two actors in terms of the articulation and security perception of the nuclear threat.

Secondly, what additional analysis demonstrated was that there were no significant differences between the two presidents in terms of articulating the ROK's referent objects. This is not to say that different levels of attention were paid to different kinds of referent objects (for instance, it can be said that Roh paid more attentions to maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations, while Lee was much more concerned with strengthening the ROK-US relations), but rather that both Roh and Lee could not discursively jettison any of the referent objects

and, subsequently, the way of articulation of the referent objects (North Korea as a compatriot and a negotiating partner that should be embraced in the process of peaceful unification; the US as a security pillar; and the unification that should be led by the ROK predicated on liberal democracy and a market economy) in their discourses recorded a very similar pattern.

Thirdly, the basic structure of the extraordinary measures between the two was strikingly similar. Both presidents adopted the same logic in dealing with the DPRK's nuclear issue. The logic pointed to the following standardised discursive structure: undertaking total denuclearisation → adopting reform and open-door policies → participating in the international community. The measures were reified as cardinal agreements of the SPT (the September 19 Joint Statement, February 13 and October 3 Agreements) during Roh's presidency, and they were named Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain Initiative during Lee's term. Although the Lee administration wanted to differentiate themselves from the Roh administration by paying more attention to receiving Pyongyang's definite decision on denuclearisation from the initial stage, in fact, as the Lee administration acknowledged later, the structure of its extraordinary measures was in line with the September 19 Joint Statement, in which the DPRK clearly said that they would abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes.[50]

More importantly, both presidents broke the ROK's Constitutional rule—South Korea is the sole legitimate political entity—as they offered North Korea 'security assurance'. This became clear when the September 19 Joint Statement was signed in 2005 and when the Grand Bargain Initiative was released in 2009. Even though both sides might argue that offering Pyongyang security assurance needs to be differentiated from enhancing its regime security, this did not give the audience any practical sense of distinction. Meanwhile, Pyongyang was not persuaded by these measures.

Last but not least, even though the two securitising actors' articulations were broadly similar, there were some differences. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 6, Roh tended to use the words related to the ameliorating events between the two Koreas, including GIC, whereas Lee put more stress on the

[50] Article 1 of the Joint Statement (19 September 2005) stipulated that 'The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards'.

deteriorating events, such as *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* incidents. Above all, further DA has shown that the securitising actors' willingness to engage with North Korea, which might have been caused by different senses of internal repugnance to Pyongyang's regime, was clearly different between the Roh and Lee administration's actors. Nonetheless, these differences were not influential enough to change each actor's official security discourse on the nuclear threat.

To sum up, it can be said that the analysis results give more credence to (H.B-2). Roh and Lee's securitising moves were built on similar articulations of the existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures. What is meant by similar articulation is that the actors did not use disparate languages. What factors, then, did make the ROK securitising actors' articulation ambiguous and overlap with each other? With regard to the factors, this research suggested that the concept of discursive chasms deterred the actors from articulating clarified threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures. The traits of the DPRK's nuclear threat (elusive threats), the ROK's ambiguous representations of the DPRK regime (elusive *others*), and the structural constraints caused by the US-DPRK and the US-China relations (intangible extraordinary measures) were among the most conspicuous elements that created the chasms. Both Roh and Lee were under the pressure of the chasms.

7.1.2 Theoretical and methodological points

In terms of the theoretical point of view, this thesis pointed out the unreality of realism (power politics) in the ROK's security discourse. First of all, realism confused DPRK's rationality with irrationality. For many conservatives, whose perceptions are based on realism, North Korea's obsession with nuclear weapons used to be seen as irrational. From this perspective, Pyongyang has always been described as unpredictable and belligerent. This is the very point where realists criticised the progressive governments for their proclivity to believe what the 'irrational' North Koreans say. At the same time, however, conservatives argued that North Korea would never renounce nuclear weapons. Given the realist concept of *self-help* as a guarantee of the state's survival, realists must have known that it would be unlikely for the DPRK to denuclearise on its own initiative. In that respect, the so-called IR realists of the ROK were suffering from self-deception.

Second, conservative actors confused realism with constructivism. For instance, the Bush and Lee administrations, which acknowledged that the DPRK regime would never be changed other than due to strong pressure (realist viewpoint), depended heavily on China's influence (constructivist viewpoint). Both strived to gain Beijing's permission to isolate Pyongyang, by persuading China that North Korea had become more of a liability to China. However, what realist insights tells us is that China will change its priorities by its capabilities, not by the persuasion of others (Waltz 2010; Mearsheimer 2014). In the same vein, Wit (2015) opined that realism needs to differentiate between 'pragmatic objectives and means to achieve them [Pyongyang's denuclearisation]' and 'magical thinking' that revolves around ideas of the DPRK's collapse or Korean reunification.

Liberalism and constructivism (as liberal-wing deviationism) are not beyond criticism. First and foremost, they showed a lack of driving force as an applicable theory. It goes without saying that every single effort to set up regional institutions initiated by the ROK presidents ended without result (e.g. 'New Asia Initiative' by Lee Myung-bak, 'Era of Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia' by Roh Moo-hyun and 'Northeast Asia Security Dialogue' by Kim Young-sam, etc.). Second, despite increasing efforts to approach the DPRK regime from various angles by means of a constructivist perspective, constructivist-based scholarship has yet to come up with a practical idea to be implemented in reality, and it is still stuck in the area of analysing identities. The biggest stumbling block to liberal-wing theories is that there seems to be no room for an application of these theories when states' indispensable interests collide. This has always been the grounds on which progressive governments have been criticised by conservatives.

It was against this background that ST was adopted as the main framework. Not only is ST relatively free from mainstream IR theories (but at the same time it took its place firmly in the realm of security studies) (Browning and McDonald 2013), but it is also closely relevant to a methodological dimension. Since ST argues that security is discursively constructed, it made it possible that discourse can be central to methods for security matters. Against this backdrop, DA, which is comprised of both quantitative and qualitative tools, was used in this research. The corpus-assisted DA proved that particular traits and repetitive patterns would be sticking out from loads of talks or languages produced by securitising actors

in a meaningful fashion. As qualitative tools, interviews and document analysis were used to corroborate the quantitative results. These methods also showed that the aim of analysing discourse is to map out a route that shows a way in which security discourse is constructed and changed. Given that discourse can be defined as 'socially constructed ways of knowing some aspects of reality' (Van Leeuwen 2009: 144), by investigating discourse one can observe not only the securitising actor's discursive traits but also the domestic and international circumstances that circumscribe the actor's world. By means of this method, albeit not perfectly, audiences are expected to understand the structure of the securitisation process better.

7.2 The limitations of Securitisation Theory

> My first priority is to keep the American people safe. Just like I'm sure Prime Minister David Cameron [would answer], if you ask him, "What is your first priority?", "It's keeping the United Kingdom safe". So security is always going to be a top-of-the-list item. […] But, how we address them is important. And recognising that security is not just a matter of military actions, but is a matter of the messages we send and the institutions that we build, and the diplomacy that we engage in, and the opportunities that we present the people.
>
> (Obama 2016: 23 April, London)

Security is 'a matter of the messages'. ST tried to show a way of sending security messages to an audience. A way of securitising security matters should be of great importance to all scholars studying security issues in this regard. Analysing the way of securitisation is not simply about what threats, referent objects and measures were articulated, but about critically examining contradictions and distorted points within and between security discourses. This is why this research analysed the ROK security discourse by means of the ST framework with DA applied to it.

However, this thesis also raised a question as to whether ST can explicate the cases in which securitising actors are surrounded by conflicting concepts of existential threats and referent objects. Given that 'the category of risk is a category of the understanding' (Campbell 1998: 2), it can be said that both Roh and Lee failed to offer the audience a clear category of an understanding of North Korea. Subsequently, the category of nuclear risk, referent objects and extraordinary measures could not be clearly expressed in their securitising moves, nor could their securitisation be sustained in a coherent manner.

The last section of this study places the aforementioned empirical findings within broader theoretical and policy implications, so that one can consider areas for future study. Three limits will show the practical issues that need to be taken into account concerning the application of security studies based on discourses to regional security studies: the limits of official discourses, successful securitisation, and a one-sided approach.

7.2.1 Official discourse

The ROK actors' security discourses on the nuclear threat posed by the DPRK lacked clarity and consistency in terms of showing practical differences between conservatives and progressives. Although they wanted to be discursively differentiated from each other (thereby making audiences anticipate different material consequences), what the results of this study presented were that there was no big divergence of security discourse between the two political blocs.

To recap, the first reason for this is that both administrations did not clearly and concretely articulate how the DPRK regime could be secured once it opens up its political and social system in the process of denuclearisation. Regarding this, the Lee administration gave no practical model to the audience how the provision of security assurance for Pyongyang and demanding openness can coexist. The second reason is that both administrations could not help upholding the ROK's own referent objects—open democracy and a market economy—that can never be compatible with those of the DPRK. In the case of the Roh administration, they did not cogently show the audience how ROK-led unification would be plausible when Pyongyang's hereditary system is secured by means of peace regime to the extent that conservatives are convinced.

In essence, although it is true that there are some differences between conservatives and progressives in terms of willingness to engage with Pyongyang, as long as both groups do not elucidate the future DPRK position in relation to inter-Korean relations, the fact that South Korea is in a discursive dilemma would remain. In this respect, it is interesting to hear the ROK securitising actors' ex post facto review of their security discourse:

> Politicians differentiate themselves [from the *other*] in an abstract way in order to seize power, and therefore it is not true that policies are differentiated in a practical manner.
>
> (Interview: 4 April 2014)

> We do not need to pay much attention to the cognitive gap [between the conservative and progressive governments]. Pyongyang will not give up its nuclear weapons one way or another. Neither the conservative nor progressive government has an alternative solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. In the end, what it all boils down to is local politics. It is all about justifying ourselves. Whose voice sounds more plausible? It is after all mere propaganda. The South Korean security discourse is therefore no more than local politics.
>
> (Interview: 8 July 2014)

The actors quoted above were all from the inner circle of the Roh and Lee administrations. They recognised two things. One is that there was no practical difference in security discourse between the two political blocs. The other is that it is assuming power within the context of local politics that was really important to the securitising actors. An incessant power struggle within and between securitising actors is therefore seen as an effort to assume an exceptional place to articulate their own perceptions.

The crux of the matter is that an underlying mechanism of securitising moves may not easily be denoted by an analysis based solely on speech acts (official discourse), since official discourses are almost always embroidering the reality as if a discursive chasm does not exist. In light of this, both Roh and Lee's articulations of the reality were inconsistent with real challenges. This means that although ST can show us how securitising actors' self-referential practices have been formed and structured by way of analysing their speech acts, it does not assure us of revealing fundamental reasons that caused the limit of official discourses.

Nevertheless, one should be reminded that even the official discourse has the power to shape social reality (Wodak and Meyer 2009). As was shown in the ROK's security discourse, even though the discourse was not able to dismantle the DPRK's nuclear threat, it is clear that it has shaped social reality into a place where seemingly disparate policies exist. It also enabled the ROK's actors to conduct endless securitising moves, which in turn made the public vacillate. At the same time, however, the actors failed to create a new reality while being bent on disguising their flawed security discourse. To borrow Herbert A. Simon's terminology, the ROK security discourses were tainted with 'bounded rationality', as they had only 'incomplete information about alternatives' (Simon 1972: 163). The limited information engendered distorted security discourse, and the discourse brought about confined social reality. Distorted security discourse can therefore be equated with distorted security reality.

7.2.2 Successful securitisation

Was either Roh or Lee's securitising move towards the nuclear threat of the DPRK successful? Given that Pyongyang has steadily enhanced its nuclear capability, Seoul's securitisation was not successful. However, if one lowers his/her expectations, it cannot be said that the securitisation of the ROK was totally unsuccessful, for the actors managed to keep prioritising the nuclear threat all the time. As a result, the audience has been well aware of the necessity of securitising the threat.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, for many years the role of the audience has been given attention by the so-called second generation of ST scholars. They have argued that the audience's role should be highlighted as a criterion for successful securitisation. They have put more weight on the perlocutionary acts whereby audiences are persuaded by a speaker. However, this thesis did not follow this point of view, since it would render the analytical process unnecessarily complicated. To reiterate, this is not to deny the importance of audience role; what it says is that the role of audience does still lack conceptual sophistication. To exemplify, one cannot easily understand how audiences are able to recognise the essence of threats, how they are able to acquire the correct information, to what extent they have a decision-making ability as a collective entity, what should be a criterion of classification between the audience and securitising actors, and so forth. This is why this research has analysed the securitisation process in terms of an illocutionary act. It helped us to focus on securitising actors' speech acts, so that one can maintain analytical and methodological clarity.

Be that as it may, it still seems worth trying to look into how the South Korean audience reacted to the actors' securitising moves. This will further allow us to ascertain why an analysis based on the actor-audience model can rarely be fruitful in terms of assessing successful securitisation. Figure 7.1 provides the South Korean audience's changing perceptions of the DPRK. The data used for this figure were collected from the 'Unification Attitude Survey' of the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University (IPUS) and the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), both of which are the most significant and representative institutions as far as unification and North Korea policies are concerned. The IPUS has annually conducted the survey since 2007, and the



Figure 7.1 South Korean perceptions of the DPRK

KINU did the same survey every other year until 2005.[51] The data were collected together and recreated as a form of an area chart in this figure.

What this figure demonstrates is clear. First, the audience's perception of the DPRK was fluctuating. It vacillated between the two perceptions that saw North Korea as a cooperative counterpart on the one hand and as a hostile one on the other. This reflects the very same ambivalent perceptions that the ROK securitising actors held toward the DPRK regime. Second, more importantly, the level of a vigilant/hostile perspective sharply decreased during Roh's presidency (2003–2007), and it rebounded after Lee took power in 2008. As this study has already discussed, Roh was persistent in adhering to a peaceful resolution in terms of inter-Korean relations, while Lee came into power claiming that Roh's North Korea policy was meek and inter-Korean relations should be based on conditional reciprocity. Roh's positive image of Pyongyang culminated in the 2007 inter-Korean summit, while Lee's negative image of North Korea reached a high point after the *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* incidents in 2010. What does this mean? Public opinion, in a general and collective manner, generally followed the securitising actors' perceptions and their policies. Of course, both the audience and actors' perceptions must have been influenced by the material incidents, including the inter-Korean summit and military collisions.

[51] The full data are available at: http://www.kinu.or.kr/www/jsp/prg/stats/PollList.jsp and http://tongil.snu.ac.kr/, both of which are written in Korean.

Table 7.2 Is public opinion well reflected?

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
well reflected (%)	18.3	23.4	22.2	28.0	30.4	23.8
poorly reflected (%)	81.3	76.6	77.8	72.0	69.4	76.2

What can be inferred from this? Firstly, as far as the ROK audience is concerned, creating a criterion for successful securitisation is not easy, for the audience have long been fluctuating in terms of perceptions of the DPRK (Swenson-Wright 2011: 20). Given that the audience itself was divided between conservativism and progressivism, they cannot reasonably be expected to provide actors with astute decision-making skills as to which type of North Korea policy would be better. Secondly, if a perlocutionary act was focused on, both Roh and Lee's securitisation might have been described as a successful one, since the audience generally followed the actors' perceptions (Roh and Lee were able to 'persuade' the audience for a certain period).

Thirdly, contrary to the second inference, even if the actor-audience model is accepted, Roh and Lee's securitisation cannot be dubbed as successful because their discourses were not able to gain public recognition (Table 7.2) (Park et al. 2012: 210). Throughout Roh and Lee's periods, a majority of the audience felt that they had not been seriously considered in the process of implementing North Korea policy. Put differently, they were relegated to the periphery of the securitisation process in a relative sense.

Can South Korea's securitisation against the nuclear threat ever be successful? Or is it already successful? What kind of securitising moves can ultimately be legitimised by the audience even when the move breaks the rules of the standard political system? These questions are seemingly insoluble, and it appears that ST and its second-generation scholars have not yet provided a competent answer to this problem.

7.2.3 A one-sided approach

Security studies needs to be based on the assumption that neither materiality nor discourse can claim a prerogative of an analytical position, for analysing contemporary security practice demands both. As aforementioned, although ST challenged the dualism of materiality and discourse by pursuing a performative

force of language, it has generally been criticised for its overreliance on language (Balzacq 2011; Aradau et al. 2015). The case of the ROK dealt with in this study also demonstrated the necessity of a more sophisticated theoretical framework that can elaborate both discursive and material traits. The ROK case proved that there are at least three major factors that need to be considered when it comes to applying ST. The factors were referred to as the causes for discursive chasms in this study: a discourse on threats that cannot simply be said to be either imminent or not imminent; a discourse on the *other* that cannot easily be represented; and a discourse on extraordinary measures that cannot easily be realised.

To recapitulate, the first factor is a discourse on the threat that is imminent but at the same time is not imminent. As noted in the previous chapter, it is contestable whether the North Korean nuclear threat was imminent or not. Needless to say, the degree of the threat has been rapidly growing as Pyongyang keeps developing nuclear capabilities. However, it can hardly be imagined that the North would use its nuclear weapons as long as it receives assurances from the world that its regime is secure. Pyongyang is well aware that it could not survive if it used nuclear weapons (Chang 2015). Put differently, 'no-first-use' discourse of nuclear weapons is still strong (Kim 2014b), which is called the nuclear taboo. In addition, from the US's perspective, the real imminent threat is not the North's nuclear weapons themselves. What matters to the US is the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear technology.[52]

This does not mean that the US is not seriously considering the DPRK's nuclear issue. What it means is that the US's perception of the nuclear threat cannot be as imminent as South Koreans believe, since the DPRK's nuclear threat sounds much more realistic and horrible for many South Koreans in both material and discursive terms. All of these have limited Seoul's scope of securitising move. The ROK has had no option but to securitise the nuclear issues. However, setting a standard of securitisation of the threat by means of extraordinary measures was not easy. The ROK's ability to come up with such measures was not only limited by the nuclear taboo (as a member state of the

[52] James L. Johns, former US National Security Advisor, clearly said 'the imminent threat is the proliferation of that kind of technology to other countries, potentially to terrorist organisations and non-state actors' (Presutti 2009).

NPT), but was also restricted by a situation in which actors vacillate between politicisation and securitisation.

The second factor is a discourse on the *other* that cannot easily be characterised. North Korea as a nuclear state appears to be a *fait accompli*. Most North Korea watchers agree that Pyongyang has at least 10 or up to 20 nuclear warheads as of 2016 (Klingner 2015; Niksch 2016). South Korean actors also acknowledge that North Korea is a *de facto* nuclear state. An inconvenient truth, however, is that under no circumstances could South Korea officially recognise North Korea as a nuclear state. The same goes for the US. This shows the power of discourse as well as its weakness. It enabled the NPT system—a concept that has defined the world—to be maintained in East Asia, but its performative power became weaker as the DPRK vehemently challenged the current discursive order.

Apart from this, incompatible ideologies between the two Koreas consistently prevented the ROK securitising actors from articulating relevant discourses. A real dilemma that weighed on the actors came out of the fact that the DPRK is an anti-government organisation. As noted, the main logic of Roh and Lee's speech acts on the denuclearisation of the DPRK was predicated upon the principle of Pyongyang's change (reform and openness). In other words, for the ROK actors, Pyongyang's denuclearisation should be preceded (or followed) by its willingness to change in character towards a democratic and market society. What is crucial, however, is that 'the nuclear programme is merely a symptom of a more fundamental problem' for the DPRK (Bluth 2011b: 1373; Lankov 2013). That is, North Korea became stuck in a situation in which it can never change to the extent that the Kim regime is deprived of its power. Since reform and openness are very likely to put the regime at risk, there was no room for them to accept the 'change' discourse. The Pyongyang regime, as a material and discursive bastion of the DPRK system, in and of itself is not compatible with the ROK. This made it extremely difficult for the ROK's actors to articulate their referent objects (i.e. in what way can we get North Korea denuclearised while not strengthening its regime?)

The third factor is a discourse on the extraordinary measures that cannot easily be realised owing to a limited securitising ability. This factor is perhaps the most significant one that shows the necessity of a combined perspective between materiality and discourse. The Northeast Asian regional system should be taken

into account. The regional powers constituting the system (or structure) around the peninsula are China and the US. The US has been the sole superpower of the world since the late 1980s. What about China? As Buzan and Wæver (2003: 35) put it, the single key ingredient of great powers is being 'observable in the foreign policy processes and discourses of other powers'. In this sense, China is absolutely a great power, if not a superpower. Therefore, it can be said that the structure surrounding the Korean peninsula needs to be interpreted as a quasi-international system that has virtually reflected the traits of the whole international system of the post-Cold War era, with China and the US as the central figures (the so-called *G2*). Although there is an argument that seeks to go beyond the US-Chinese competition narrative (Wickett et al. 2015), it is also true that this structure has made the ROK's security discourse restricted in terms of being materially practised beyond verbal articulation.

The two Koreas' geopolitical position between China and the US can be the archetype that simultaneously shows the power of materiality (geographical position) and discourse (a structure constituted by power politics; Hobbesian culture). As Scott A. Snyder (2015) aptly described, 'the defining characteristic of Korea's geography has been the curse of living in a bad neighbourhood where regional rivals have historically used the Korean peninsula as the stage for military conflict'. Regarding the discursive facet, Evans J. R. Revere, former US State Department's Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, introduced a dialogue that he had with a Chinese academic:

> He said, 'This situation that we have here describing China's posture towards North Korea is not really about Korea. It's not really about the Korean peninsula. It's about you [US] and us [China]. […] We understand that, we know that they [North Korea] are undermining our interests in certain ways. We know that they have nothing but contempt for us. However, in the grand scheme of things, this is about the rising contention between the US and China. And if you look at it in that way, we need North Korea'. […] I thought that was a fascinating answer. (FPA 2016)

What this excerpt suggests is clear. However much North Korea threatens South Korea, and however much the South securitises against the North, a fundamental key to the solution of the issue lies in Beijing and Washington (Glaser and Sun 2015; Niksch 2015). It is interesting to hear that Joseph S. Nye Jr., who is a leading exponent of 'soft power', concluded that the DPRK's nuclear issue could only be solved by 'hard power':

> If you think you can attract Kim Jung-un out of his nuclear programme, you're kidding yourself. The only solution there is the hard power that the Chinese possess, which is their provision of food and fuel to North Korea. They've been unwilling to use that because of a fear of collapse of North Korea and chaos on the borders more than the fear of the North's nuclear weapons, so one of the things you have to do with North Korea is to keep nudging and pushing the Chinese to use more of their hard power.
>
> (Nye 2013)

In a sense, this remark is a corollary of the security environment that has determined the Korean peninsula. Nye's answer suggests that the DPRK issue should be solved by a combination of materiality (hard power: economic leverage) and discourse (South Korea and the US's persuasion of China). Again, discourse and materiality are inseparable. The conjoined traits of the two facets can be seen everywhere in the ROK's securitisation processes.

7.3 Concluding remarks

This research examined the security discourses of the ROK between 2003 and 2013. It showed that ST's framework—existential threat, referent objects and extraordinary measures—were not strongly sophisticated enough to be applied to the ROK's security discourse. In the ROK's case, the concepts of existential threat and referent objects were ambiguous mainly because of Seoul's ambivalent perceptions of Pyongyang's position and, accordingly, the South Korean extraordinary measures became intangible, a situation which have been exacerbated by the power politics. ST was also not able to tell us whether we should put the position of the securitising moves of the ROK in politicisation or securitisation.

As noted before, Pyongyang's nuclear threat itself raised the level of Seoul's discourse to the securitising point, but at the same time Seoul's lack of capabilities materialising extraordinary measures held it back from maintaining the securitising level. In that respect, South Korea's security discourse is also distinguished from the concept of riskification, which 'is identified based on a re-theorisation of what distinguishes risks from threats' (Corry 2012: 235), as the nuclear threat posed by North Korea can never be regarded as something a second-order security. In essence, South Korea's security discourse on North Korea's nuclear threat cannot help being inclined to securitisation. At the same time, however, it has also been institutionalised securitisation, which subsequently blurred the boundaries between politicisation and securitisation.

Nonetheless, ST functioned as a suitable framework that laid the foundation for a more rigorous analysis of security discourses. Because of the framework, today's security discourse of the ROK could be challenged by the findings of this study. The framework also made it clear that the securitisation dilemma of the ROK cannot easily be solved. A principal focus of threats posed by North Korea might have been changed from a conventional to a nuclear-related one for the last couple of decades. However, the findings of this research demonstrate that even if the nuclear issue is resolved, insofar as the current form of North Korea exists, the fundamental logic of maintaining a securitisation phase in South Korea is unlikely to be changed.

This becomes clear when one thinks about the pre-nuclear threat period of inter-Korean relations. During the period of the Rhee Syngman, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan administrations, Pyongyang itself had to be seen as an existential threat, and thereby 'anticommunism' became a national mantra. Ever since the Soviet Union and China adopted a practical path instead of holding on to communism, and as North Korea isolated itself from the international community, the anticommunism discourse in South Korea abated accordingly but feelings of repugnance to the North's regime remain. This has contributed to dramatising the level of existential threat posed by North Korea's nuclear capability throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In other words, without solving the issue of elusive discourse in relation to North Korea, South Korean policymakers' security discourse could not break free of the threat-urgency modality that gives an impetus to securitising move. In addition, the discourse power of nuclear weapons—the absolute weapon—has also fortified the securitising move. To conclude, a combination of the two discourses—rogue/impossible state (here, North Korea) and absolute weapon—perpetuate the current structure of securitisation. Within this context, the division between conservativism and progressivism continues.

The securitising moves of the ROK wobbled. It suffered from triple distress: an abominable material power of nuclear weapons and the huge discursive impact of the weapons, the two Koreas' incompatibility, and the inescapable geopolitics indicating power politics. Stated reversely, only when one of the causes of the distress founders, then Seoul's securitising effort would be paid. Since this thesis is a single comparative case study of the Roh and Lee

administrations, perhaps it cannot provide generalised characteristics of the security discourses that can be applied to all of the ROK's administrations. If the speech acts' patterns are analysed in a more diachronic manner, or if the speech acts are dealt with in a more synchronic way, one might get a better understanding of how discourses relate to power and the system. However, one thing is for certain: without changing or transforming the current security discourse, the securitising actors as well as audiences may well be bogged down in the same reality. South Korean political leadership requires delicate handling of security discourse. As noted before, the role of South Korea's president is influential, at least in terms of forming domestic discourse. Nonetheless, however delicate it is, South Korea's security discourse is likely to be limited to the current level of securitisation in the short- to mid-term future, ceteris paribus.

The term discourse 'incorporates not just language but practice too' (Burr 2003: 63); one does not have to confine speech acts to talk or language. Discourse, therefore, needs to be seen as a part of social practice that is determined by or determines the international system (security reality). In this regard, this study took hold of the analyses that range from micro-linguistic traits (securitising actors' speech acts) to macro-structural elements (discourse as social practice and its position within the context of geopolitics). The ROK's securitisation and its security discourse should be understood in both contexts. Only then can one evaluate how credible the discourses are.

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